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Abstract
This doctoral thesis studies sovereign credit risk during periods of uncertainty about
the state of a government’s fiscal position. A new measure of fiscal uncertainty is in-
troduced, based on the disagreement in official forecasts of the public budget deficit,
and forecast revisions to approximate common uncertainty shocks. It is shown that
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, fiscal uncertainty increased substantially
in advanced economies. The effects of fiscal uncertainty are largely unknown, in par-
ticular in the context of sovereign credit risk. To estimate the response of sovereign
credit ratings to fiscal uncertainty, a new empirical framework is developed for the
analysis of rating determinants. Rating transition is modelled as the joint outcome of
two processes, which determine the frequency of rating changes, and their direction.
This thesis finds that fiscal uncertainty is perceived a credit risk by rating agencies
and increases the probability of a rating downgrade. Fiscal uncertainty also affects the
attention paid to sovereign ratings. An event study analysis shows that the attention
to rating announcements increases, the more noisy publicly available information about
fiscal outcomes is.
JEL Classification: C35, G14, G24, H68
Keywords: uncertainty, fiscal policy, sovereign credit ratings, event study, ordered out-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Until 2007, advanced economies enjoyed a period that came to be known as the ’Great
Moderation’. It was characterised by historically low levels of business cycle volatility
(Blanchard and Simon, 2001), independent central banks ensured that inflation re-
mained limited and output close to its potential level (Bernanke, 2012), while govern-
ments saw their responsibility mainly in supply-side policy measures, in the provision of
automatic stabilisers (Taylor, 2000) and in balancing public budgets (Woodford, 2001).
The global financial crisis was a turning point in many respects. The shock that em-
anated from the sub-prime loan market in the United States had repercussions around
the globe. As it came largely unexpected, it raised uncertainty levels immensely – un-
certainty about the stability of the financial system, uncertainty about consequences
for the real economy, and largely also uncertainty about government policy. To coun-
terbalance the abrupt dry-up of credit, fall in output and rise in unemployment, central
banks reverted to unconventional monetary policy measures such as sharp reductions
in policy rates, emergency provisions of liquidity and large-scale asset purchase pro-
grammes. Yet, as monetary policy became constrained by the effective lower bound on
interest rates, fiscal policy had to step in (Blanchard et al., 2010). For instance, the
President of the European Central Bank stressed on several occasions that ”monetary
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policy cannot be the only game in town” (Draghi, 2016). However, banking sector
bailouts and Keynesian instruments to stabilise output and labour markets weighed
heavily on public finances. Sovereign credit risk, which previously had been perceived
a problem solely of the developing world, rose substantially in the euro area to a point
that the future of the currency union would be questioned. Financial assistance was
provided to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain by the European Union and
the International Monetary Fund. To safeguard the European Monetary Union, the
European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism were es-
tablished in 2010 and 2012. Elevated debt and deficit positions reinforced calls for
fiscal consolidation also in other advanced economies, including the United States and
the United Kingdom (e.g. OECD, 2012). However, to implement consolidation mea-
sures the political climate proved not very conducive as partisan tensions worsened
and non-mainstream political movements gained support, which further contributed to
uncertainty.
Consequently, three themes that are central to this thesis – economic uncertainty,
the active role of fiscal policy, and sovereign credit risk – attracted the attention of
policy-makers, as well as the academic literature. Most work addresses these themes
separately. For example, a number of studies, some of which are reviewed in Bloom
(2014), tries to measure uncertainty about microeconomic and macroeconomic out-
comes and study its effect on the behaviour of economic agents. In the area of fiscal
policy, the effectiveness of fiscal measures during recessions (Canzoneri et al., 2016), at
the lower bound of interest rates (Correia et al., 2013) and when transmitted across
countries (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013), entered the limelight of the analysis.
Fairly independent of both these strands, an empirical literature started to focus on the
pricing of fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals into sovereign credit risk premia on
financial markets during sovereign debt crises (Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012), as banking
sector risk increases (Acharya et al., 2014), or under the expectation of bailouts (Beck
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et al., 2017). By contrast, this doctoral thesis is an attempt to provide a combined
account of uncertainty around the conduct of fiscal policy in advanced economies, and
the potential effects of fiscal uncertainty on sovereign credit risk.
Understanding the economic effects of uncertainty requires a coherent approxima-
tion. This holds for uncertainty about the macroeconomy, about economic policy and
about financial market outcomes. It holds importantly also for uncertainty about fiscal
outcomes. Chapter 2 is therefore concerned with a systematic way of measuring fiscal
uncertainty in advanced economies. From a theoretical perspective, fiscal uncertainty
arises from the fact that fiscal instruments follow stochastic processes (e.g. Sialm, 2006,
Born and Pfeifer, 2014, and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015), because agents are un-
aware of the costs of different policy options (Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2013), or because of
uncertain expectations about future fiscal consolidations (e.g. Davig et al., 2010, and
Bi et al., 2013). How to empirically capture fiscal uncertainty is far less clear. The
recent debate about economic implications of uncertainty brought about a range of
new measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. For instance, Jurado et al. (2015) exploit
the degree of predictability of macroeconomic series while Orlik and Veldkamp (2014)
provide a measure associated with the uncertainty about the forecasting model. On
one hand, these uncertainty proxies are more closely in line with the theoretical notion
of stochastic economic processes than measures based on observed volatility, which are
often employed to gauge uncertainty on financial markets, such as the volatility index
VIX. On the other hand, these indices are not directly observable and require data
about different forecasters’ probabilities or utilise complex modelling approaches. This
makes them difficult to apply in the context of fiscal policy. By contrast, a popular
measure of economic policy uncertainty by Baker et al. (2016) is directly observable
but often reflects news about policy rather than uncertainty about fiscal outcomes.
Chapter 2 discusses the shortcomings of existing economic uncertainty proxies for an
application to fiscal policy in more detail.
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The chapter proceeds with the construction of a new fiscal uncertainty index based
on the disagreement in official forecasts of the fiscal deficit and common uncertainty
shocks faced by forecasters. The index builds on the method Lahiri and Sheng (2010)
propose for the measurement of macroeconomic uncertainty. Important adjustments
are made to apply this index to fiscal data, forecasts of which are available only at a
low frequency from a small number of forecasters and with limited comparability across
countries. Given that fiscal forecasters are often overly optimistic about governments’
budgets, I clean fiscal forecast data from predictable biases. Another innovation pro-
posed in the chapter, that is applied to the Lahiri and Sheng (2010) approach for fiscal
variables, is the measurement of common uncertainty shocks using unexpected forecast
revisions. As discussed in Cimadomo (2016), the deficit is a key variable which is often
used to evaluate the sustainability of fiscal policy, given that, all else equal, an accu-
mulation of fiscal deficits over time increases the stock of sovereign debt. In addition,
forecasts of the deficit contain information about expected policy changes in the near
future as well as expectations about governments’ attempts to consolidate their bud-
gets. This links the empirical measure of fiscal uncertainty to the theoretical concept of
stochastic fiscal instruments and uncertainty about the public budget constraint. The
resulting index is straightforward to construct, observable in real time and available
for a set of 31 advanced economies. Its evolution over time confirms that the financial
crisis brought about a sizeable rise of fiscal uncertainty.
A second part of chapter 2 then links the new index of fiscal uncertainty to a num-
ber of potential determinants. The existing literature comes to the conclusion that
errors made by fiscal forecasters can be explained by the degree of fiscal policy dis-
cretion, and the extent to which the institutional framework constrains policy-makers
(e.g. Jonung and Larch, 2006, von Hagen, 2010, Pina and Venes, 2011, de Castro et al.,
2013). Yet fiscal forecast errors may also reflect unanticipated changes in the policy
environment and politically motivated biases (Artis and Marcellino, 2001 and Merola
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and Pe´rez, 2013). The new index provides a more direct measure of the degree of fiscal
uncertainty that prevails at the time a fiscal forecast is published. In chapter 2, I anal-
yse the extent to which it can be linked to underlying factors usually associated with
uncertainty about fiscal policy in the near term. This serves as a cross-check of how
accurately the index captures fiscal uncertainty. Linking the index to possible determi-
nants can also inform policy-makers about ways to potentially reduce fiscal uncertainty.
I find that fiscal uncertainty increases during downturns, as risks in the financial sector
heighten and before elections, i.e. at times when fiscal policy becomes less predictable.
Fiscal uncertainty remains subdued, however, when fiscal policy-makers face budgetary
constraints. This distinguishes the index from other measures of uncertainty, like finan-
cial market volatility or economic policy uncertainty, which appear to capture investor
sentiment or ambiguity about economic policy-making more than uncertainty about
fiscal outcomes. The near-term nature of the index also distinguishes it from notions
of longer-term uncertainty about the sustainability of public finances.
Chapter 3 turns to the implications of fiscal uncertainty. Given that the newly con-
structed index points to a sizeable increase during the financial crisis and its aftermath,
one could expect non-negligible effects on the economy and the behaviour of economic
agents. Bloom (2014) shows that economic uncertainty, generally defined, can have
negative effects on output growth, investment and hiring. This is because economic
agents delay economic decisions if they are uncertain about economic developments in
the near term. In the context of fiscal policy more specifically, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
et al. (2015) find that uncertainty reduces economic activity. This is attributed to an
endogenous increase in mark-ups. Julio and Yook (2012) and Julio and Yook (2016)
conclude that uncertainty during election years can negatively affect domestic as well
as foreign direct investment. Furthermore, fiscal uncertainty can compromise the effec-
tiveness of fiscal policy. For instance, uncertainty about the timing and composition
of a fiscal consolidation seems to determine whether such a consolidation is expansion-
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ary, or not (Bi et al., 2013), while noisy communication of fiscal policy blurs agents’
expectations and can reduce fiscal multipliers (Ricco et al., 2016). A reduction in real
activity and mitigated government effectiveness would need to be priced in by financial
market participants. Theoretical work by Sialm (2006) and Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013)
suggests that investors may require higher risk premia if tax policy becomes uncertain
or governments fail to provide a ‘put’ protection to the market. Taken together, adverse
macroeconomic effects, reduced effectiveness of fiscal policy and elevated risk premia on
financial markets imply that fiscal uncertainty may also translate into sovereign credit
risk.
The effect of fiscal uncertainty on market measures of government credit risk is an
area that has so far not received the attention it deserves. While uncertainty about debt
sustainability in euro area member states accompanied the substantial increase in bond
premia during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010 to 2012 and political divisions
in the United States regarding the government’s fiscal consolidation triggered the first-
ever sovereign rating downgrade in 2011 (Standard and Poor’s, 2011a), the empirical
evidence for a link between country-specific fiscal uncertainty and sovereign credit risk
is lacking. Chapter 3 tries to fill this gap. To do so, the chapter focuses on sovereign
credit ratings. Ratings summarise the expert opinion of rating agencies about the
capacity and willingness of governments to repay their debt. Rating scores are reported
along an ordinal scale and revised on a regular basis. They are available for all major
advanced economies and directly comparable across countries. This distinguishes them
from opinions expressed by other experts or market prices of credit risk, such as risk
premia on government bonds. Sovereign ratings appear to react to crises (Monfort and
Mulder, 2000), world stock market volatility (Hill et al., 2010) and consumer sentiment
(Schumacher, 2014). The direct effect of country-specific fiscal uncertainty, however,
has not been analysed. Chapter 3 shows that fiscal uncertainty is perceived a credit risk
by rating agencies. I find that the probability of a rating downgrade increases not only
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with a deterioration in the level of fiscal fundamentals but also due to second moment
effects, i.e. uncertainty about these fundamentals. Rating agencies are frequently
criticised for their failure to anticipate sovereign debt crises, and for reacting too late
and too excessively with downgrades during such crises (Ferri et al., 1999, Mora, 2006,
and Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016). Using a model-based sovereign credit
risk measure as an alternative to official credit ratings, Polito and Wickens (2014)
and Polito and Wickens (2015) find that sovereign ratings of the United States and
several European economies should have been downgraded much earlier during the
recent crisis. However, the reasons for these deviations of ratings from fundamentals
related to credit risk remain unclear. Chapter 3 comes to the conclusion that fiscal
uncertainty can explain some of this puzzle. As fiscal uncertainty increases at the
height of crises, considering it as an additional driver of credit risk can make ratings
appear to be pro-cyclical.
When estimating the effect of fiscal uncertainty, and other credit risk determinants,
on the probability that the sovereign rating changes in a given period of time, one
faces a number of challenges. Ratings of advanced economies hardly change over time,
which makes it difficult to pin down rating determinants. In addition, a large number
of countries receive ratings in investment grade categories. This only changed during
the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area when a number of countries saw their ratings
being reduced to below-investment grade status. From an empirical point of view this
means that some categories of the ordinal rating scale are rarely observed. Finally,
because the rating scale is not without boundary, standard estimation approaches can
yield misleading results. Chapter 3 shows that common approaches used by the em-
pirical literature on rating determinants, like Ordered Probit estimation (e.g. Afonso
et al., 2011, Hill et al., 2010), can yield biased estimates if the peculiar characteristics
of sovereign rating data are not taken into account. To address these challenges, the
chapter proposes a new empirical framework for the analysis of rating determinants. It
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builds on Harris and Zhao (2007) in modelling stability in ordered outcome estimations
with an unobserved process that reduces the probability of some outcomes. The frame-
work is adjusted to the context of sovereign rating migration where the outcome ‘no
change’ in a given period is much more often observed than rating downgrades or up-
grades. The new framework also accounts for the boundary of the rating scale, which
affects the likelihood of upgrades and downgrades of ratings at the top and bottom
end. Using this new framework allows me to evaluate the role of fiscal uncertainty in
determining rating changes, alongside fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals related
to sovereign credit risk. In addition, the new framework enables me to assess whether
rating agencies change their ratings more frequently during periods of elevated fiscal
uncertainty than suggested by movements in sovereign credit risk, for example to gain
attention.
Attention may be higher if fiscal uncertainty renders public information about fiscal
fundamentals noisy and thereby increases the reliance on economic experts, such as
credit rating agencies. Whether this is the case is the research question addressed in
Chapter 4. Indirect evidence suggests that sovereign ratings gain more attention during
crisis periods. Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) find that downgrades cause larger price
movements on sovereign bond markets compared to upgrades while exchange rates
respond more sharply to rating announcements when fiscal fundamentals are weak
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012). Hill and Faff (2010) show that stock market reactions
to sovereign rating announcements are more pronounced when global sentiment is high.
Focussing on the European government debt crisis, Afonso et al. (2012) come to the
conclusion that news about ratings of those countries that were most severely affected
by the crisis had the largest impact on markets for sovereign credit default swaps,
even in countries that were less affected. Yet the direct effect of country-specific fiscal
uncertainty on the attention to rating news has not been explored.
In line with the literature, I employ an event study approach to estimate the im-
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pact of announcements made by credit rating agencies. Price movements on financial
markets within a short window around the announcement are used as an indication
of the attention paid to news, such as rating changes. Estimating the effect of fiscal
uncertainty on short-term movements of financial market measures related to sovereign
credit risk on announcement days allows me to test the hypothesis that investors pay
more attention to ratings the noisier the public information about fiscal outcomes is. A
common challenge faced by event studies of the effect of rating news on market prices
is the fact that these news are often anticipated (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010) and
spill over across countries (Gande and Parsley, 2005, Bo¨ninghausen and Zabel, 2015).
This makes it difficult to pin down their direct response. To address this problem, the
methodological innovation proposed in Chapter 4 is the use of online search volume
data. It is shown that the number of search requests can identify more directly the
country-specific and rating agency-specific attention effect, compared to market price
data. It may also capture attention more timely and directly than prices if the efficient
market hypothesis fails to hold (Da et al., 2011), for instance as sovereign debt markets
deteriorate during crises.
This doctoral thesis therefore addresses three themes that gained importance since
the end of the Great Moderation in 2007: a) the coherent measurement of uncertainty
about fiscal outcomes, b) the effect of fiscal uncertainty on sovereign credit risk, and
c) the attention paid to sovereign ratings as a result of fiscal uncertainty. Chapter
5 concludes the thesis by bringing together individual findings. It discusses policy
implications, potential caveats and avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
The Rise of Fiscal Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
In response to the rising interest of academics and policy-makers alike in the role of
uncertainty after the Great Recession, a number of new proxies have been proposed
to measure uncertainty in the economy and on financial markets. Despite increas-
ing concerns about the conduct of fiscal policy and sovereign credit risk in advanced
economies, however, there is little consensus about how to measure more directly un-
certainty about future fiscal policy. This may partly be due to the lack of fiscal data
sources which can be used to gauge the uncertainty faced by economic agents. For
instance, the enormous number of financial instruments provides an opportunity to
construct proxies for uncertainty on financial markets, while various surveys exist that
inquire about professional forecasters’ subjective expectations of future GDP growth,
inflation and interest rates. By contrast, only a small number of forecasters assess fiscal
outcomes. For example, for 20 advanced economies the data provider Consensus Eco-
nomics gathers the opinions of different forecasters on GDP and consumer prices; yet
only for a subset of 11 countries, government budget balance projections are reported,
often for a much shorter time dimension. In addition, the conduct of fiscal policy de-
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pends on a range of different political stakeholders and complex institutional set-ups
that vary widely across countries, making it harder to approximate fiscal uncertainty
coherently. Given the less detailed news coverage of budgetary processes compared to
changes to economic policy, news-based indices like the Economic Policy Uncertainty
index by Baker et al. (2016) do not fully capture fiscal uncertainty either.
To fill this gap, I propose a new index based on uncertainty in forecasts of fiscal out-
comes, namely the fiscal deficit. Expectations about the future level of the fiscal deficit
incorporate considerations of different spending and revenue options as well as the like-
lihood of their implementation. These expectations therefore distill the complexities
of fiscal policy in a meaningful way. Fiscal deficit data is also more widely available
and better comparable across countries compared to other fiscal measures such as debt,
spending or revenue figures. Building on the approach developed by Lahiri and Sheng
(2010) for the measurement of macroeconomic uncertainty, I employ the disagreement
in and revisions to current-year and year-ahead fiscal forecasts published by the OECD,
IMF and European Commission. Disagreement across forecasters is used to measure
idiosyncratic uncertainty about fiscal policy while revisions to the average (consensus)
forecast serve as a proxy for common uncertainty shocks faced by forecasters. The
resulting index measures uncertainty in near-term projections of future fiscal outcomes
more directly than the Baker et al. (2016) EPU, or macroeconomic uncertainty indices
(Orlik and Veldkamp, 2014, Jurado et al., 2015). The index is comparable across a
set of advanced economies and computationally less demanding than proxies of fiscal
policy volatility (e.g. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015). The fiscal uncertainty index
covers the global financial and European sovereign debt crisis and captures uncertainty
in real time. This gives it an advantage over ex post available forecast errors, or forecast
error-based uncertainty proxies (e.g. Rossi and Sekhposyan, 2015). Its evolution over
time suggests that fiscal uncertainty rose to striking levels during the financial crisis of
2008, after a decade in which fiscal policy had been relatively predictable. In the after-
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math of the crisis, average fiscal uncertainty abated but the cross-sectional dispersion
of the index measure remained high for a longer period.
The second part of the chapter proceeds with an analysis of possible drivers of fiscal
uncertainty. Understanding the determinants of fiscal uncertainty can inform policy-
makers about potential means to reduce this uncertainty given its negative effects on
economic outcomes and sovereign credit risk – such as those explored in the following
chapter. A better knowledge of the factors linked to the uncertainty faced by fiscal
forecasters may also provide new insights for theoretical work on fiscal uncertainty.
The public finance literature often models uncertainty about fiscal policy as un-
certainty about discretionary spending or revenue decisions. A commonly adopted
approach is to let fiscal instruments follow stochastic processes, in simple models of
economic growth (e.g. Dotsey, 1990), or a New Keynesian context (e.g. Sialm, 2006,
Davig and Leeper, 2011, Born and Pfeifer, 2014, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015). In
Pa´stor and Veronesi (2013), political uncertainty arises from the fact that agents do not
know the costs attached to various policy options. This literature strand has in com-
mon an emphasis on fiscal uncertainty as the uncertainty about short-run discretionary
fiscal policy. A second strand in the literature emphasises the role of uncertainty about
fiscal policy in the longer run, which may arise out of concerns about the sustainability
of public finances. Davig et al. (2010) analyse the effects of uncertainty about future
adjustments of fiscal policy to accommodate unfunded liabilities under rational expec-
tations when permanent debt rollover is not feasible and government revenue is limited.
Uncertainty about future fiscal policy may also arise when fiscal consolidations become
necessary as fiscal positions turn unsustainable (Bi et al., 2013). Given that fiscal un-
certainty in this thesis is measured using uncertainty in forecasts of the current-year
and year-ahead fiscal deficit, the focus lies on short-run rather than long-run fiscal
uncertainty. However, uncertainty about fiscal policy discretion in the short-run and
uncertainty about future fiscal adjustments to address debt sustainability concerns are
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closely intertwined. Fiscal policy measures in the short run may help stabilise the econ-
omy in response to exogenous shocks but increase uncertainty about future financing
needs (Croce et al., 2012). Vice versa, if fiscal policy has already reached its limits
in terms of sustainability, this constrains the scope for discretionary policy and may
thereby alleviate uncertainty.
To shed light on the potential drivers of fiscal uncertainty, I regress the fiscal un-
certainty index on a number of variables potentially related to uncertainty about fiscal
policy in the near term as well as factors that tend to constrain fiscal policy. I find
evidence for a strong link between elections and fiscal uncertainty and show that eco-
nomic and financial crises are also associated with elevated levels of fiscal uncertainty.
By contrast, (near-term) fiscal uncertainty is reduced, the more constrained fiscal policy
is. This appears to be the case if fiscal fundamentals are severely deteriorated, leaving
little room for additional fiscal manoeuvre. In other words: if uncertainty about the
long-term sustainability of public finances is high. Likewise, if a country participates
in an Economic Adjustment Programme, under which fiscal policy is monitored closely
by international institutions, the uncertainty in fiscal forecasts is relatively low.
This chapter links to a literature on errors made in fiscal projections.1 Fiscal forecast
errors are attributed to economic downturns (Strauch et al., 2004; Jonung and Larch,
2006) and when fiscal rules become binding (von Hagen and Wolff, 2006). Institutions
like the IMF, OECD or European Commission seem to be able to reduce forecast
errors (Artis and Marcellino, 2001) but cannot eliminate them fully (Merola and Pe´rez,
2013). Strict fiscal rules and contract-based fiscal governance, on the other hand, lead
to smaller fiscal forecast errors (von Hagen, 2010, Pina and Venes, 2011, de Castro et al.,
2013). Because fiscal forecast errors are often predictable, they may not always capture
uncertainty about future fiscal policies. I deviate from the literature on forecast errors
by testing more directly whether economic and political economy factors can explain
1Cimadomo (2016) surveys this literature in more detail.
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fiscal policy uncertainty.
By looking at uncertainty about fiscal outcomes more directly, I also link to a lit-
erature on the reaction of fiscal policy to the business cycle and on the volatility of
discretionary policy. The key question this literature addresses is whether fiscal policy
is pro-cyclical, counter-cyclical or does not react to the cycle at all.2 Results are mixed
but overall suggest that fiscal policy has become more counter-cyclical in advanced
economies (Gal´ı and Perotti, 2003), in particular if looked at from a real-time perspec-
tive (Cimadomo, 2012, Bernoth et al., 2008). Apart from its reaction to the business
cycle, this literature confirms that political economy factors affect fiscal policy discre-
tion, such as the dispersion of political power (Lane, 2003), the political orientation
of a government (Sørensen et al., 2001), or the election cycle (Hallerberg and Strauch,
2002). Henisz (2004) and Agnello and Sousa (2014) show that political institutions,
such as checks and balances and the level of democracy, can explain differences in the
volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. In addition, an economic environment with low
inflation, low levels of the fiscal deficit and high GDP per capita is found to reduce fiscal
volatility (Agnello and Sousa, 2013), while lower foreign foreign reserve holdings seem
to be associated with higher fiscal policy volatility (Zhou, 2009). I find that the factors
that tend to increase fiscal policy discretion are also related to fiscal uncertainty. Un-
expected volatility of discretionary fiscal policy itself is sometimes interpreted as fiscal
uncertainty, e.g. by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), but, similar to forecast errors,
may not fully reflect uncertainty in agents’ expectations. The fiscal policy uncertainty
index based on forecast disagreement and revisions proposed in this chapter can fill this
gap. I further add to the literature by taking into account factors that became relevant
during the Great Recession, namely fiscal-financial sector linkages.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews different measures of economic
and policy uncertainty. It continues with the construction of an index of fiscal uncer-
2Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) provide a detailed survey of papers estimating fiscal reaction
functions.
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tainty. Potential sources of fiscal uncertainty are analysed in section 2.3. Section 2.4
concludes this chapter.
2.2 Measuring fiscal uncertainty
2.2.1 Existing measures of fiscal uncertainty
A classification of existing measures of uncertainty can be made according to their field
of application.3 Uncertainty on financial markets is often approximated by volatility
indices, like the Chicago Board Options Exchange index of options-implied volatility
VIX. In the context of sovereign credit risk, Beber et al. (2009), Gerlach et al. (2010) and
De Santis (2014) find that the VIX can explain much of the common component in euro
area sovereign yield spreads, and Remolona et al. (2008) show the same for euro area
sovereign CDS spreads. The VIX index has been considered a determinant of sovereign
credit ratings by Haque et al. (1996) and Hill et al. (2010) who find that it is a significant
driver of Standard & Poor’s ratings. To measure uncertainty about the future path of
macroeconomic variables, like GDP growth and inflation, macroeconomic uncertainty
indices have been developed by Lahiri and Sheng (2010), Orlik and Veldkamp (2014),
Jurado et al. (2015), and Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) amongst others. A third field of
application is policy-making. For instance, uncertainty about future economic policies
is reflected in an Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index by Baker et al. (2016). The
fiscal volatility measure derived for the United States by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.
(2015) tries to approximate unexpected innovations to the volatility of fiscal policy.
A second classification can be made according to the methodology of measurement.
Table 2.1 provides an overview. While volatility measures, such as the VIX, are easily
available, it remains unclear, to what extent market volatility does indeed reflect uncer-
tainty and not simply mere sentiment or risk aversion (see discussion in Jurado et al.,
3This classification follows Marakova (2014).
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Table 2.1: Measures of fiscal policy uncertainty and macroeconomic uncertainty
Type of measure Areas of appli-
cation
Examples
News-based indices economic pol-
icy, finance,
consumption
forecasting
newspaper-based (Economic Policy Uncertainty by Baker
et al., 2016); Lumsdaine, 2010; Beetsma et al., 2013),
Google search intensity (Vosen and Schmidt, 2011;
Carrie`re-Swallow and Labbe´, 2013), social media (Der-
giades et al., 2014)
Variance of fiscal
shocks
fiscal policy Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), Agnello and Sousa
(2014), Fata´s and Mihov (2003)
Volatility measures finance, macroe-
conomics, fiscal
policy
CBOE VIX, regional stock market volatility measures,
macroeconomic volatility indices (Huizinga, 1993; Aizen-
man and Marion, 1999; Baum et al., 2006; Baum and
Wan, 2010; Bali et al., 2014; Segal et al., 2015), fiscal
volatility (Henisz, 2004)
Forecast errors macroeconomics Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015), Jurado et al. (2015), Orlik
and Veldkamp (2014)
Forecast dispersion macroeconomics Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Bomberger (1996), Bali
et al. (2015), Giordani and So¨derlind (2003), Boero et al.
(2008), Siklos (2013), Lahiri and Sheng (2010)
2015). In particular since 2016, financial market volatility has been subdued despite
elevated levels of uncertainty.
Likewise, news-based indices like the EPU may not necessarily capture uncertainty
about current and future paths of fundamental variables but predominantly attention
by the media. In the context of news as an uncertainty measure, the so-called ‘narrative
approach’ of Romer and Romer (1989) needs to be mentioned. It is a qualitative method
to identify policy shocks and has been used to approximate unexpected innovations to
government spending (e.g. Romer et al., 2010, Favero and Giavazzi, 2007, Ramey,
2011). Brutti and Saure´ (2015) adopt it to identify news about Greek sovereign risk.
It is, however, not directly related to the theoretical concept of uncertainty either.
Furthermore, if the interest lies in determinants and effects of fiscal uncertainty,
an uncertainty index measure would ideally be observable in real time. This does not
apply to measures based on ex post forecast errors. To ensure comparabiltiy across
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a range of countries, another constraint is set by the data that is available: given
that fiscal variables are only observed at low (quarterly or semi-annual) frequency, a
method for extracting an uncertainty measure is needed that can be applied to relatively
short time series (T ≈ 30). This does not hold for relatively complex, model-based
analyses of expected forecast errors, like those proposed by Jurado et al. (2015) and
Orlik and Veldkamp (2014). Measures of the variance of fiscal shocks come with a
similar disadvantage. While being more strongly related to genuine uncertainty and
grounded in theory, fiscal shocks derived from fiscal reaction functions (Taylor, 2000)
are available only at low, at best semi-annual frequency which makes respective variance
estimates, like in Fata´s and Mihov (2003) and Agnello and Sousa (2014), or stochastic
volatility estimates as in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), unsuitable for the present
analysis.
Instead, I follow a strand in the literature on forecast-based uncertainty measures
that interprets disagreement among forecasters as uncertainty. Disagreement is observ-
able in real time and can be directly inferred from published forecasts, hence demands
on data availability are small. Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) find a strong positive
correlation between the dispersion of point forecasts (of GDP and inflation) and the
diffuseness of corresponding probability distributions. This is important if only point
forecasts are reported. Dispersion in point forecasts is found to understate uncertainty
however. This is explained by risk aversion among forecasters, which prevents them
from deviating from the consensus. Bomberger (1996) compares disagreement in point
(US inflation) forecasts to a standard conditional variance measure. He finds a sig-
nificant relationship between both measures. His work initiated a debate on whether
forecaster disagreement truly captures uncertainty (Rich and Butler, 1998, Bomberger,
1999, see also Marakova, 2014). Disagreement may reflect a mere difference in opinion
and not uncertainty (Diether et al., 2002). Forecasters may provide biased answers
because they may want to stand out (Laster et al., 1999). Some may provide erroneous
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answers because they conduct a less thorough analysis than others. Or there may be
spurious determinacy if, due to a lack of available information, all forecasters rely on
the same information set and provide the same forecast. Bali et al. (2015) clean their
dispersion measure from biases – or more generally, predictable components. However,
Clements (2008) finds only moderate correlation between forecast dispersion (in GDP
growth forecasts) and individual forecast uncertainty as measured by individual fore-
cast variances. Consequently, Giordani and So¨derlind (2003) combine a disagreement
measure with individual forecasters’ variances. Their approach relies on reported indi-
vidual variances (density forecasts), which are only available for fiscal data of a small
number of advanced economies. Similarly, Boero et al. (2008) decompose their uncer-
tainty measure – the aggregate density across forecasters – into an average of individual
variances and the disagreement in point forecasts. This shows that disagreement alone
cannot replace a direct measure of uncertainty but can be thought of as a component of
such a measure. Finally, Lahiri and Sheng (2010) derive the theoretical ‘missing link’
between forecaster disagreement and uncertainty from a Bayesian learning model. In
their model, each forecaster obtains a public and a private signal about the future state
of an economic variable. Using Bayes’ rule, both sources of information are combined.
It is shown that individual forecast uncertainty is a function of the variance of the pub-
lic signal and the variance of the private signal. The authors then link this theoretical
result to an empirical model in which aggregate uncertainty is the sum of the variance of
aggregate shocks, accumulated over the forecast horizon, and forecaster disagreement.
I use the Lahiri and Sheng (2010) framework because it can yield an uncertainty index
that is available in real time, meets the constraints set by cross-country fiscal data
and addresses the weaknesses of previous disagreement-based uncertainty measures by
linking the uncertainty measure to a theoretical forecasting model. To my knowledge,
I am the first to use this approach to construct an index of fiscal uncertainty. The
closest analysis is Ricco et al. (2016) which focuses on the disagreement in deficit fore-
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casts for the United States to approximate ambiguity in policy communication. In my
empirical analyses, results obtained from using this new fiscal uncertainty index will be
contrasted with results obtained from using as an alternative the EPU by Baker et al.
(2016), realised government bond yield volatility as well as fiscal forecast errors.
2.2.2 Forecasting model
Applied to the context of uncertainty about the current and future path of the fiscal
deficit, the theoretical forecasting model developed by Lahiri and Sheng (2010), and
refined in Ozturk and Sheng (2018), can be summarised as follows. Let xct be the
realisation of a fiscal variable, say the deficit/GDP ratio, in country c and year t.
Forecaster i, which may be the IMF, OECD, or European Commission, provides a
prediction of xct, h periods ahead. I denote this forecast Ficth. The individual forecast
error made by forecaster i is then
eicth = xct − Ficth. (2.1)
The weighted average of individual forecast errors is called the consensus forecast error:
ecth =
N∑
i=1
wictheicth. (2.2)
It is assumed to be independent over forecasting horizons h. The w’s denote the weights
of individual forecast errors in the consensus forecast error. They may vary for each
forecaster i, over time t, countries c or forecast horizon h (for simplicity I will consider
equal weights across forecasters in the empirical application).
The individual forecast error can then be decomposed as follows:
eicth = βichecth + icth + φich. (2.3)
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The first component is common across all forecasters and approximated by the consen-
sus forecast error ecth. In the context of fiscal forecasting it can be interpreted as an
error in the data provided by governments to forecasting institutions. Common errors
may result from future policy changes or the misreporting of data. βich measures the
exposure of forecaster i to this common error, i.e. the extent to which forecasters rely
on the data they are provided with by fiscal authorities, which may vary across fore-
casters i, countries c and the forecast horizon h. The second component icth captures
idiosyncratic forecast errors that result from mistakes each forecaster makes in her own
expert analysis. icth is assumed to be orthogonal to ecth and to have a mean of zero.
The final component φich is an additional time-invariant bias forecaster i adds to the
forecast every period. The reason for constant biases may be of political nature or
caused by other non-economic factors. Since φich is a predictable component of the
forecast error, I ignore it for the rest of this section by setting φich = 0 but get back to
it in section 2.2.3.
Taking equations (2.2) and (2.3) together and setting φich = 0, the restriction
N∑
i=1
wicthβich = 1 is imposed. The variance of individual forecast errors V ar(eicth) is then
interpreted as a measure of individual uncertainty faced by forecaster i in her forecast
h periods ahead of x to be realised at time t in country c. It can be decomposed as
follows:
V ar(eicth) = β
2
ichV ar(ecth) + V ar(icth). (2.4)
The covariance term between ecth and icth drops out because of the former being the
aggregation of the latter, as defined in equations (2.2) and (2.3). Individual uncertainty
is therefore a function of a common uncertainty shock (V ar(ecth)) and idiosyncratic
uncertainty (V ar(icth)).
The problem with equation (2.4) is that individual uncertainty cannot be observed
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without knowledge of βich and estimates of icth. However, Ozturk and Sheng (2018)
show that an aggregation of individual uncertainty measures over the sample of fore-
casters can be written as:
ucth ≡
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(eicth) = ccth + dcth (2.5)
where wicth again denote aggregation weights. The aggregation yields a measure of the
aggregate level of forecast uncertainty that prevails in the economy, or, in other words,
the overall uncertainty faced by the average forecaster. Henceforth, ucth will be referred
to as overall theoretical (as opposed to empirical) uncertainty measure. ccth ≡ V ar(ecth)
is the common uncertainty shock a representative forecaster faces. The aggregation,
details of which are provided in Appendix A1, lets individual βich’s drop out. It also
enables me to write the idiosyncratic uncertainty component as disagreement across
forecasters dcth, where disagreement is defined as the expected weighted sum of squared
individual forecasts (or forecast errors) relative to the consensus forecast (error):
dcth ≡ E[
N∑
i=1
wicth(Ficth − Fcth)2]. (2.6)
2.2.3 An empirical uncertainty measure
Equation (2.5) makes clear that measures that directly associate disagreement with
uncertainty may underestimate overall uncertainty by ignoring the aggregate shock
component. The wedge between uncertainty and disagreement depends on two charac-
teristics of aggregate shocks. First, ccth will be small if the forecast horizon h is small
as it captures common shocks that occur between the time the forecast of x is made
and the realisation of x at time t. Second, the difference between uncertainty and dis-
agreement will be small if aggregate shocks have a low variability, i.e. during relatively
stable periods. Since the focus in this study lies on the recent global financial and
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European sovereign debt crisis, i.e. periods of substantial volatility, the assumption of
stable shocks will be violated and a measure of overall uncertainty will need to take it
into account. I therefore construct the empirical measure as follows.
Forecast disagreement estimates The first step consists of obtaining estimates of
forecast disagreement dcth, i.e. the variance of point forecasts for a given horizon h,
realisation time t and country c. Remember that equation (2.3) contains the term φic
which can be interpreted as time-invariant forecast bias: forecasters may consistently
underestimate the fiscal deficit. In fact, there exists evidence that IMF forecasts of
GDP growth and inflation are biased (Dreher et al., 2008). Artis and Marcellino (2001)
found similar evidence for IMF and OECD forecasts of the fiscal deficit, at least for
some countries. Biases may stem from over-optimism or pessimism or differences in
forecasting technologies. I assume φic to be known to the public and to be constant over
time. To clean forecasts from time-invariant biases, I estimate the following equation
separately for each forecaster i and forecast horizon h allowing for biases to differ across
countries c:
eicth = φ¯ih + φich + (βichecth + icth) (2.7)
where eicth = xct − Ficth is the (ex post observable) forecast error. It is regressed
on the constant term φ¯ih capturing the average bias in forecaster i’s deficit forecast
and the country-fixed effect φich representing the additional country-specific bias. In
other words, φich in equation (2.3) is decomposed into an average forecaster-specific
bias and a forecaster- and country-specific bias. (βichecth + icth) is the combined
residual. Forecasts cleaned from time-invariant, country-specific biases are obtained
by subtracting bias estimates from observed point forecasts Fˆicth = Ficth − ˆ¯φih − φˆich,
where hatted variables represent estimated parameters. I use the observed variance of
cleaned forecasts Fˆicth as a proxy for disagreement
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dˆcth =
N∑
i=1
wicth(Fˆicth − Fˆcth)2 (2.8)
giving each of the three forecasting institutions equal weight in the consensus forecast
Fˆcth =
N∑
i=1
wicthFˆicth and in the observed forecast variance, i.e. wicth = wjcth =
1
3 for all
c, t and h.
Estimates of the variance of aggregate shocks In order to arrive at the aggregate
uncertainty index, the second step consists of obtaining a real-time estimate of ccth, the
variance of the aggregate shock. A number of adjustments to existing work is needed to
obtain an estimate that meets the limitations set by cross-country data on forecasts of
the fiscal deficit. Lahiri and Sheng (2010) use as a proxy conditional variance estimates
from an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model for average forecast errors.
However, given that the present sample contains on average only around 24 forecast
observations per country, and at most 30, I refrain from such a time series estimation.
Instead, I build on Barron et al. (1998) who approximate the time-varying variance of
a forecast time series with squared average forecast errors (xct − Fcth)2. Given that
forecast errors are only observable after the realisation of the forecast variable xct,
I work with forecast revisions. The consensus forecast of the fiscal deficit of year t
made h + 1 periods ahead is calculated as Fcth+1 =
N∑
i=1
wicth+1Ficth+1 as before. I call
the revision published in period h Fcth. Errors made in h + 1-period ahead consensus
forecasts, ecth+1 = xct−Fcth+1, will be larger than errors in revisions, ecth = xct−Fcth.
This is because more information will have become available between h+ 1 and h. ecth
will, however, still be different from zero as time h has to pass until xct is realised at t.
I write errors inferred from revisions in consensus forecasts as:
Fcth − Fcth+1 = (xct − ecth)− (xct − ecth+1) = ecth+1 − ecth (2.9)
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Forecast revisions may be predictable if forecaster- and country-specific forecast biases
are present. I therefore use the bias-cleaned forecasts to compute the measure of the
variance of aggregate shocks that were introduced above, i.e. Fˆicth and Fˆicth+1. Forecast
revisions may also be predictable by projections of other macroeconomic series pub-
lished one period before. In order for the estimate of the variance of aggregate shocks
to meet the assumption of independence over time, I strip revisions of the consensus
forecast of predictable components. To do so, I follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013) in regressing revisions to fiscal deficit figures on the average revision made one
forecasting period before as well as previous projections of the fiscal deficit/GDP ra-
tio, debt/GDP, real GDP growth, unemployment, inflation and the current account
balance:
(Fˆcth − Fˆcth+1) = δch(Fˆcth+1 − Fˆcth+2) +Xcth+1′Γch + (fcth − fcth+1) (2.10)
where (Fˆcth − Fˆcth+1) is the revision in the consensus forecast, i.e. the average of
bias-cleaned individual forecasts, h periods ahead of the realisation at t relative to the
consensus forecast published h + 1 periods ahead. (Fˆcth+1 − Fˆcth+2) is the revision
undertaken h+ 1 periods ahead relative to forecasts from h+ 2 periods ahead. Matrix
Xcth+1 contains fiscal and macroeconomic data as of forecast horizon h + 1. δch and
Γch are parameters to be estimated.
4 The estimate of the residual (fˆcth − fˆcth+1)
is orthogonal to fiscal and macroeconomic information ahead of the publication of
forecasts. It therefore yields an estimate of unexpected innovations to the consensus
4Estimates of coefficients δch and Γch are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix for revisions of
current-year and one-year-ahead consensus forecasts of the fiscal deficit. Results are obtained using
data introduced in section 2.2.4 and show that revisions from one period to the next can partly be
explained by their lags and previous forecasts of fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. In particular
year-ahead forecasts are adjusted sluggishly to new information as earlier revisions can explain current
revisions at statistically significant levels; the same does not hold for forecasts of current-year values.
In addition, the size of the deficit contains some explanatory power, and so does the current account
balance as well as previously forecast GDP growth rates (for nowcast revisions only).
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forecast.
Under the assumption that common shocks, that occurred between initial forecasts
and revisions, are a good indicator for common uncertainty shocks that currently pre-
vail, I use the following expression to approximate the variance of aggregate shocks,
ccth:
cˆcth = [s1(fˆcth+1 − fˆcth+2) + s2(fˆcth − fˆcth+1)]2 (2.11)
(fˆcth+1 − fˆcth+2) and (fˆcth − fˆcth+1) are the revisions at forecast horizons h+ 1 and h,
respectively, cleaned from information that is available before revisions are made public.
s1 and s2 are smoothing parameters as a raw revision measure might be overestimating
the common shock variance by abstracting from inertia. To give more weight to current
values compared to past values, I set them to s1 =
1
3 and s2 =
2
3 . The empirical proxy
or the variance of aggregate shocks is therefore a weighted average of squared revisions.
Aggregate fiscal uncertainty index The empirical version of the fiscal uncertainty
measure across forecasters is then constructed as the simple sum of the proxies for the
variance of aggregate shocks and the disagreement measure:
uˆcth = cˆcth + dˆcth (2.12)
To obtain an index of fiscal uncertainty that is comparable to alternative uncertainty
indices, I normalise the empirical uncertainty measures across the entire sample to
adopt a mean of zero and a variance of one:
Ucth =
(uˆcth − 1C 1T
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
uˆcth)√
( 1C
1
T
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(uˆcth − 1C 1T
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
uˆcth)2
. (2.13)
One unit of the index value is therefore equal to the sample standard deviation of the
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uncertainty measure. I obtain two versions of the uncertainty index for current-year and
year-ahead forecasts, denoted Uct0 and Uct1, respectively. I also calculate normalised
indices for the sub-components of the uncertainty measure separately, replacing uˆcth in
equation (2.13) with cˆcth and dˆcth, and using capital letters to label the corresponding
common shock index versions Cct0 and Cct1, and disagreement index versions Dct0 and
Dct1.
2.2.4 Official fiscal deficit projections
For the construction of the fiscal uncertainty index, I employ staff projections by the
IMF, OECD and European Commission (EC) of the general government deficit, i.e. net
borrowing, as a percentage of GDP. The fiscal deficit relative to GDP is a key policy
variable that is used to evaluate the stance of fiscal policy across countries and targeted
by governments. It also plays an important role in the fiscal surveillance framework of
the European Union. A deviation of the fiscal deficit above 3 percent triggers corrective
actions under the so-called Excessive Deficit Procedure.
The fiscal deficit can be derived from the government budget constraint (Cimadomo,
2016):
Bt = Bt−1 + iBt−1 − St (2.14)
where Bt is the level of public debt and i is the nominal interest rate on bonds issued
by the government. St is the government primary balance that is the amount by
which government revenue exceeds primary expenditure, i.e. expenditure less interest
payments. Dividing (2.14) by nominal GDP (lower case letters) and defining the growth
rate of nominal GDP as g = GDPt−GDPt−1GDPt−1 yields the dynamic equation of public debt:
∆bt =
i− g
1 + g
bt−1 − st ≡ ht. (2.15)
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The change in the debt/GDP ratio, or government budget balance, is the fiscal deficit as
a share of GDP ht. Equation (2.15) implies that the deficit increases as the growth rate
of GDP decreases, as the interest rate on outstanding government debt increases, and
as the primary balance decreases. The fiscal deficit is therefore considered an important
indicator of the sustainability of public finances. It captures interest payments as well as
cyclical and automatic components of fiscal policy and thereby differs from estimates of
the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB). The latter indicator is often used as a
measure of discretionary spending (Gal´ı and Perotti, 2003, Cimadomo, 2016). However,
forecast data of the CAPB is only available for a small sample of countries. It is also
less comparable across countries and forecasters given that its measurement depends on
the definition of cyclical and non-cyclical spending components as well as estimates of
the output gap. Likewise, alternative fiscal indicators such as government consumption,
spending, revenue and debt/GDP are often not uniquely measured as forecasters employ
different methodologies and definitions to compute them. This makes them less readily
comparable across countries and time. The fiscal uncertainty index is therefore based
on forecasts of the fiscal deficit relative to GDP, published for the current year and the
year ahead. This renders the index a measure of uncertainty about the overall stance
of fiscal policy in the near term, rather than a measure of uncertainty related to the
long-term sustainability of public finances or uncertainty about particular spending,
revenue or interest payment components.
The IMF, OECD and EC report point forecasts for advanced economies for the cur-
rent year and one year ahead at a semi-annual frequency in their publications World
Economic Outlook, Economic Outlook and European Economic Forecast. My sample
covers 31 OECD countries over the period 1999 to 2014.5 These forecasts are highly
correlated with each other (Table 2.2, top panel). OECD and EC projections display
5Forecasts by the European Commission are not available for Australia, Canada, Iceland, Israel,
South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, see Table 2.2. Fiscal uncertainty indices for these countries are
based on forecasts published by the IMF and OECD only.
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the highest correlation coefficients while IMF projections appear to deviate more. Nev-
ertheless, the standard deviation across all three forecasters is 0.508 for current-year
projections and 0.596 for one year-ahead vintages, which is statistically significant at
the 0.1 percent level in both cases.
Using fiscal forecasts by the IMF, OECD and European Commission instead of
forecasts by individual governments or national, non-governmental research institutes
ensures that definitions and methodologies applied across countries are sufficiently co-
herent.
I find evidence for a significant underestimation of fiscal deficits. Forecast errors are
defined as in equation (2.1), i.e. a positive value indicates that actual deficits lie above
projections. This implies that forecasters have been too optimistic on average. In fact,
Table 2.2 shows that current-year deficit projections significantly deviate from final
reported values (2015 spring publications). The IMF forecast error of 0.23 percentage
points is lower than OECD and EC errors, and somewhat lower than what Artis and
Marcellino (2001) report for an earlier sample that is restricted to G7 countries. The
EC forecast error of 0.35 percentage points corresponds to the error de Castro et al.
(2013) estimate for their European sample up to the crisis of 2009.
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Table 2.2: Forecast correlation and errors
OECD IMF EC
h=0 h=1 h=0 h=1 h=0 h=1
Forecast correlation
OECD 1.000 1.000
IMF 0.961 0.958 1.000 1.000
EC 0.983 0.979 0.954 0.959 1.000 1.000
Forecast errors
Mean 0.37*** 0.67*** 0.23** 0.59*** 0.35*** 0.57***
Standard deviation 2.03 2.93 2.13 2.90 2.00 2.85
Noise/signal ratio 55.0% 90.5% 60.6% 92.2% 53.6% 85.5%
Australia -0.45** 0.19 0.12 0.83**
Austria 0.34* 0.38 0.48** 0.73 0.39* 0.54
Belgium 0.40** 0.54* 0.26* 0.35 0.30* 0.30
Canada 0.06 0.34 0.04 0.64**
Czechia -1.08*** -1.22*** -0.50 -1.38*** -0.93*** -1.04**
Denmark -0.36 -0.41 -0.58* -0.42 -0.25 -0.33
Estonia -1.06*** -1.16* -0.86** -0.76 -0.64** -0.98*
Finland -0.35* -0.13 -0.40* -0.12 -0.11 0.01
France -0.10 0.39 -0.05 0.49** -0.12 0.25
Germany -0.33** -0.42 -0.49** -0.47 -0.30** -0.35
Greece 3.75*** 4.57*** 3.20*** 3.85*** 3.31*** 4.16***
Hungary 0.90* 0.92** 1.53 -0.82** 1.10* 0.56
Iceland 1.00 1.46* 0.93 1.19
Ireland 0.84 2.25* 0.97 1.70 0.65 1.87*
Israel -0.48* 0.08 0.69** 1.30***
Italy 0.14 0.42 0.15 0.48 0.23 0.47*
Japan -0.52** -0.45 -0.63*** 0.12 -0.53* -0.37
Korea 0.75* 1.22** -0.74 -0.54
Luxembourg -1.52*** -1.72*** -2.14*** -2.18*** -1.59*** -1.92***
Netherlands -0.12 0.21 -0.11 0.14 -0.12 0.14
New Zealand -1.01*** -1.10** -0.63*** -0.45
Norway 0.27 -0.27 -0.19 -0.84
Poland 0.87 0.85 -0.01 0.08 0.76 0.59
Portugal 1.27*** 1.98*** 1.10*** 1.77*** 1.22*** 1.83***
Slovakia 0.19 0.24 0.40 0.56 -0.20 0.12
Slovenia 1.79* 3.30 0.56 2.26** 0.89 1.20
Spain 0.73** 1.54** 0.62** 1.22 0.64 1.19
Sweden 0.33 0.45 0.03 0.26 0.36 0.49
Switzerland -0.24 -0.54** -0.89*** -0.93***
United Kingdom -0.20 0.24 0.15 0.63 -0.02 0.41
United States 1.11*** 1.72*** 0.35 1.70*** 1.09*** 1.52***
Observations 882 882 858 800 667 623
Countries 31 31 31 31 23 23
Notes: Projections of the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP. Errors relative to actual values as
reported in 2015 spring publications. h=0 : nowcast, h=1 : one year-ahead forecast. Significance level
of t-test given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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One year-ahead forecast errors with values between 0.57 and 0.67 percentage points
are almost twice as large as nowcast errors. Similar to de Castro et al. (2013), I
find that forecast biases, i.e. mean forecast errors, significantly vary across countries.
While deficits of Czechia, Estonia, Luxembourg and New Zealand exhibit a negative
bias, i.e. have on average been overestimated, the deficits of the countries hit most
by the European sovereign debt crisis, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, as well as
the deficit of the United States have on average been underestimated. The presence
of time-invariant and therefore predictable as well as statistically significant average
and country-specific forecast biases (φ¯i and φci in equation (2.7)) supports the adopted
approach of bias cleaning.
The noise-to-signal ratio reported in the second panel of Table 2.2 is defined as the
standard deviation of forecast errors divided by the standard deviation of forecasts. It
implies that the relative dispersion of forecast errors compared to the dispersion of fore-
casts is non-negligible. Ratios above 50 percent for current-year forecasts and around
90 percent for one year-ahead forecasts are higher than those reported by de Castro
et al. (2013) for the European Union. They show that final revisions made to forecasts
are of substantial size, relative to initial point forecasts.
Table 2.3: Decomposition of forecast errors and forecaster disagreement
Average forecast error Forecast standard deviation
h=0 h=1 h=0 h=1
Overall forecast 0.16 0.47 0.47 0.55
due to fiscal deficit forecasta 0.21 0.50 0.45 0.54
due to GDP forecastb -0.05 0.00 0.25 0.27
Notes: Based on IMF and OECD projections of the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP. Average
forecast errors and the standard deviation of forecasts across forecasters. h=0 : nowcast, h=1 : one year-
ahead forecast. (a) Hypothetical forecast errors and the standard deviation of forecasts are calculated
using forecasts of the fiscal deficit and realisations of GDP. (b) Vice versa, forecasts of GDP and
realisations of the fiscal deficit are used.
Finally, I decompose average forecast errors into errors made in estimates of the
deficit and errors made in estimates of nominal GDP. To do so, I construct hypothetical
deficit/GDP forecast errors, holding either the error in deficit forecasts at zero by using
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final revisions, or, vice versa the error in GDP forecasts (Table 2.3, panel on the left).
Overall, I confirm the finding for EC forecasts by de Castro et al. (2013) for OECD and
IMF forecasts: nominal GDP forecast errors contribute only a small fraction to overall
deficit/GDP forecast errors, while deficit forecast errors explain most of the imprecision.
If deficit figures had been fully known ex ante, the average error in deficit/GDP one
year-ahead forecasts due to imprecise GDP estimates would have been close to zero.
This compares to the actual average error of 0.47. Nowcast errors would have been
small and somewhat negative (-0.05 relative to the actual average error of 0.16), i.e.
deficits would have been over-predicted (indicated by the negative sign). By contrast,
had overall year-ahead forecast errors been caused solely by deficit errors, they would
have been 6.6 percent larger (0.5 relative to 0.47). Nowcast errors would have been
29.6 percent larger in nowcasts (0.21 relative to 0.16).
A similar exercise is conducted for the standard deviation of forecasts across the IMF
and OECD, i.e. the forecasters for which the larger overlap of data is available (Table
2.3, panel on the right). Similar to forecast errors, disagreement about the fiscal deficit
can explain most of the disagreement about fiscal deficit/GDP ratios. Had forecast-
ers got their deficit projections right, the disagreement due to GDP estimates would
have been 0.25 and 0.27 standard deviations, for nowcasts and year-ahead forecasts
respectively, compared to observed standard deviations of 0.47 and 0.55, respectively.
I conclude from the descriptive analysis that the variation in forecast data is suffi-
ciently large in order to construct an index of fiscal uncertainty based both on average
revisions in forecasts as well as the disagreement across OECD, IMF and EC forecasts.
Such an index captures uncertainty about the future path of the fiscal deficit to the
largest extent, and uncertainty about nominal GDP only to a small extent.
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2.2.5 Index characteristics
Decomposition Table 2.4 shows that the current-year measure of fiscal uncertainty
uˆct0, i.e. the measure based on deficit nowcasts, has a substantially larger variance
than the one year-ahead version uˆct1, which is the measure based on year-ahead deficit
forecasts. The disagreement component dˆcth contributes nearly one quarter to the
overall variance of the measure. The contribution of the aggregate shock component
cˆcth is larger, in particular for the year-ahead measure as less information is known at the
time forecasts are published, which increases the variance of aggregate shocks. This
confirms that disagreement alone is not sufficient to capture the overall uncertainty
faced by forecasters. Accounting for aggregate uncertainty, which originates in the
information provided by governments to forecasting institutions, is important.
Table 2.4: Decomposition of the fiscal uncertainty measure
uˆct0 uˆct1
Mean Variance Contri-
bution
Mean Variance Contri-
bution
Uncertainty uˆcth 1.54 41.01 100.0% 1.45 11.41 100.0%
Disagreement dˆcth 0.59 9.49 23.1% 0.61 2.58 22.6%
Aggregate shock cˆcth 0.95 15.17 37.0% 0.83 6.27 54.9%
Covariance 8.17 19.9% 1.28 11.2%
Variation across time and countries An overview over the evolution of the fiscal
uncertainty index, i.e. the normalised uncertainty measure, and its sub-components
is shown in Figure 2.1. Solid blue lines depict the cross-country median of the index
versions for current-year and year-ahead forecasts. Dashed lines mark the interquartile
range, illustrating the cross-country dispersion in fiscal uncertainty at each point in
time. The effect of the financial crisis of 2008/09 on uncertainty about the fiscal deficit
is striking. The degree of uncertainty in forecasts published in spring 2009 supersedes
all other episodes of fiscal uncertainty during the 14-year sample period, including
small increases during the early and mid-2000s. Figure 2.1 also suggests that most
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of the uncertainty in 2009 originated in innovations to fiscal policy during that time
rather than disagreement across forecasters: the disagreement component exhibits a
substantially smaller increase that year compared to the overall index and common
shock sub-index (see solid line in Figures 2.1e and 2.1f relative to Figures 2.1a to 2.1d).
In fact, the contribution of the disagreement component to the overall index, plotted
by the grey lines in Figures 2.1e and 2.1f, appears to vary quite substantially over time
but drops to nearly zero in 2009. The grey lines in Figures 2.1c and 2.1d show, as a
mirror image, the contribution of the common shock component to the overall index.
After its major contribution to the rise in overall uncertainty during the financial crisis,
the importance of common shocks abated and idiosyncratic uncertainty, reflected in the
disagreement component of the fiscal uncertainty index, rose.
Before the crisis of 2008/09, fiscal uncertainty did not vary much across countries.
Even as fiscal uncertainty surged in 2009, it did so in most countries to a similar extent.
This is shown by the relatively narrow interquartile range during that period in Figure
2.1 (dotted lines). In fact, Pesaran (2015) tests of weak cross-sectional dependence
suggest that the fiscal uncertainty index is substantially correlated across countries
(Table A2 in the Appendix). By contrast, after the crisis, heterogeneity in uncer-
tainty across countries increases, in particular idiosyncratic uncertainty as measured
by forecast disagreement (while the property of cross-sectional dependence remains
statistically significant for all index versions after 2009).
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Figure 2.1: Time variation in fiscal uncertainty
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Figures A1 to A4 in the Appendix plot the fiscal uncertainty index and its com-
ponents separately for each country of the sample. The cross-country heterogeneity is
large. This is also summarised in Table 2.5, which gives an overview of country-specific
characteristics of fiscal uncertainty. With index versions being normalised across the
whole sample, a positive country-specific mean suggests that uncertainty has been
above the sample average. This applies to the countries hit most by the financial crisis
including Greece, Iceland and Ireland, but also Korea. It also applies to Norway, a
country that ran substantial surpluses during the mid-2000s, when oil prices were high
and volatile, which presumably made fiscal forecasting more difficult. In general, high
disagreement contributes to high overall uncertainty. Exceptions include (year-ahead)
uncertainty in Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which is predominantly driven
by aggregate uncertainty shocks. Forecaster disagreement has been relatively low in
these countries. Likewise, for a majority of the sample, uncertainty about current-year
deficits feeds through to uncertainty about the deficit one year ahead. An exception
is Poland, for which I measure relatively low levels of current-year uncertainty but
substantial levels of year-ahead uncertainty.
Comparison to existing uncertainty measures To assess how my fiscal uncer-
tainty index may add to existing measures of economic and fiscal policy uncertainty,
I compare it to a set of conventional indices. The first is the ex post observable fore-
cast error in projections of the fiscal deficit/GDP, averaged across the OECD, IMF
and EC. The second measure is the Economic Policy Uncertainty index (EPU). It is
based on uncertainty-related terms in newspaper articles and was proposed by Baker
et al. (2016). It has recently become popular and is now available for 14 countries.6
Third, as a measure of uncertainty about sovereign credit risk as perceived by financial
6I use the EPU versions for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union version for
remaining EU members. The data has been obtained from www.policyuncertainty.com.
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Table 2.5: Variation in fiscal uncertainty across countries
Years Uct0 Dct0 Uct1 Dct1
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Australia 13.5 -0.04 0.25 0.00 0.24 -0.05 0.59 -0.02 0.47
Austria 13.5 -0.20 0.08 -0.17 0.03 -0.28 0.32 -0.29 0.11
Belgium 13.5 -0.19 0.14 -0.19 0.01 -0.27 0.42 -0.29 0.12
Canada 13.5 -0.15 0.15 -0.14 0.11 -0.22 0.48 -0.21 0.27
Czechia 8 -0.12 0.23 -0.15 0.06 -0.18 0.39 -0.27 0.11
Denmark 13.5 -0.15 0.16 -0.13 0.08 -0.14 0.44 -0.12 0.37
Estonia 2 -0.20 0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.39 0.05 -0.30 0.10
Finland 13.5 -0.11 0.25 -0.16 0.05 -0.09 0.70 -0.27 0.12
France 13.5 -0.19 0.11 -0.18 0.03 -0.27 0.36 -0.31 0.09
Germany 13.5 -0.15 0.18 -0.18 0.03 -0.21 0.74 -0.32 0.07
Greece 13.5 0.27 1.31 0.57 2.41 0.07 0.85 0.24 1.06
Hungary 8 0.07 0.58 -0.07 0.19 -0.28 0.12 -0.13 0.24
Iceland 13.5 0.48 1.15 0.26 0.55 0.15 0.55 0.26 0.88
Ireland 13.5 1.03 4.57 0.78 4.58 0.28 1.92 -0.09 0.47
Israel 2 -0.13 0.06 -0.08 0.11 -0.38 0.03 -0.32 0.05
Italy 13.5 -0.20 0.06 -0.17 0.03 -0.30 0.18 -0.29 0.09
Japan 13.5 0.00 0.36 0.09 0.31 -0.01 0.70 0.09 0.40
Korea 10.5 0.31 0.47 0.60 0.84 0.61 0.98 1.10 1.42
Luxembourg 11.5 -0.14 0.14 -0.12 0.08 -0.08 0.45 -0.01 0.42
Netherlands 13.5 -0.13 0.26 -0.17 0.04 -0.07 1.13 -0.24 0.31
New Zealand 11.5 0.02 0.29 0.06 0.39 -0.01 0.48 0.03 0.75
Norway 13.5 0.40 0.79 0.27 0.44 1.67 2.13 2.29 3.03
Poland 3 -0.17 0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.98 3.32 1.41 4.34
Portugal 13.5 -0.15 0.10 -0.13 0.14 -0.15 0.33 -0.19 0.28
Slovakia 10.5 -0.10 0.26 -0.06 0.43 -0.21 0.49 -0.17 0.35
Slovenia 2 0.03 0.23 0.19 0.44 0.11 0.57 0.32 0.72
Spain 13.5 -0.03 0.50 -0.15 0.12 0.05 1.15 -0.13 0.52
Sweden 13.5 -0.14 0.17 -0.14 0.08 -0.20 0.52 -0.27 0.09
Switzerland 7 -0.18 0.11 -0.15 0.05 -0.24 0.24 -0.16 0.27
United Kingdom 13.5 -0.01 0.58 -0.11 0.15 0.05 1.61 -0.24 0.29
United States 13.5 -0.04 0.38 -0.02 0.29 0.01 0.88 0.05 0.85
Total 346 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
markets, I use the realised volatility of 10-year government bond yields. I calculate it
using the standard deviation of monthly yield observations from the OECD every half
year. As a proxy for global uncertainty, I employ the VIX options-implied volatility
index published by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. I normalise all measures to
take a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.7
Figure 2.2 illustrates the time variation of different uncertainty indices, averaged
across countries. All measures agree that the period between 2003 and the global
7Formula (2.13) is applied to all measures.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison to other uncertainty measures
Table 2.6: Correlation matrix for uncertainty measures
Uc,t+k,h=1 Dc,t=k,h=1 Uc,t+k,h=0
k -2 -1 0 1 2 0 0
Forecast error 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.35 0.43 0.16 0.06
EPU 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.02
Bond yield vol 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.20
VIX 0.14 0.10 0.32 0.44 0.13 0.18 0.09
Deficit/GDP 0.29 0.38 0.38 0.06 -0.05 0.21 0.25
Notes: k is the number of semi-annual periods ahead.
financial crisis has been a period of subdued uncertainty. The financial crisis of 2008/09
leads to a surge in all indices, yet at different points in time. Financial market volatility,
as measured by the VIX, peaked at the height of the financial crisis in 2008, while fiscal
uncertainty (year-ahead version) reached its highest level in 2009 when it became clear
that the crisis will have real effects on governments’ budgets. This is confirmed in
Table 2.6. It summarises the correlation between conventional measures of uncertainty
and different lags of the fiscal uncertainty index. The correlation between the VIX and
fiscal uncertainty is largest for one half-year forward lag of my index. The same holds
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for government bond yield volatility, which suggests that bond yields reflect global
uncertainty more than country-specific uncertainty about fiscal outcomes, although
the former may be a good predictor of the latter. By contrast, the co-movement
between fiscal uncertainty and the EPU is small. The EPU peaked at the height of
the European sovereign debt crisis in 2012, when fiscal uncertainty returned to its
mean in most countries (Figure 2.2). Overall, the fiscal uncertainty index leads the
EPU by at least one year (Table 2.6). Interestingly, average uncertainty about the
year-ahead fiscal deficit increases only in 2009, when a large increase in current-year
deficits materialises. This suggests that high deficit levels were not anticipated by
forecasting institutions. Hence, realised forecast errors can be a very misleading proxy
for uncertainty experienced in real time. While the variation across countries is large,
patterns in the evolution of the new fiscal uncertainty index in comparison to other
measures of uncertainty are confirmed for a number of countries in Figure A5 in the
Appendix.
2.3 The determinants of fiscal uncertainty
The aim of this section is to analyse in more detail potential factors associated with
fiscal uncertainty. Both from a policy perspective as well as to inform theoretical work
on fiscal uncertainty, understanding the drivers of this uncertainty is important.
2.3.1 Related literature and hypotheses
The surge in fiscal uncertainty during the Great Recession suggests that uncertainty
about future fiscal policy correlates with the business cycle. A reason may be that
announced discretionary fiscal policy not only tends to be counter-cyclical in advanced
economies, as suggested by Bernoth et al. (2008) and Cimadomo (2012). Announced
policy may also be more volatile during downturns, leading to heightened uncertainty.
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I therefore assess the relationship between the fiscal uncertainty index and measures of
the business cycle. Another cause for the extreme rise in fiscal uncertainty after 2008
may have been the substantial deterioration of the international banking system during
the financial crisis, in response to which governments provided substantial support to
ailing banks. Panageas (2010) shows theoretically that such transfers alter optimal
taxation policy. A negative feedback loop between risks in the banking sector and
sovereign risk was initiated. This has been studied extensively by Corsetti et al. (2013),
Philippon and Schnabl (2013), Acharya and Rajan (2013) and Acharya et al. (2014).
To test the hypothesis that such a feedback loop contributed to uncertainty about
fiscal policy, I consider a measure of banking sector risk as a potential uncertainty
determinant.
On the other hand, a number of fiscal and macroeconomic factors may reduce fiscal
uncertainty. If governments aim at stabilising their debt levels in the long run, net
spending is expected to decline, or the primary balance to increase, as debt levels
rise (Bohn, 1998). This is also illustrated by the dynamic equation of public debt
(equation 2.15): higher levels of debt may limit the scope for fiscal policy and therefore
be negatively related to fiscal uncertainty. Vice versa, concerns about the sustainability
of fiscal policy and a lack of clarity about fiscal consolidation could lead to the opposite
outcome, as argued in Bi et al. (2013) and Croce et al. (2012). However, I would expect
debt sustainability concerns to be reflected in longer-term measures of uncertainty
rather than the index constructed above, which focuses on uncertainty about fiscal
policy in the short run. Equation (2.15) also implies that low GDP growth or higher
interest rates paid on government debt may counteract the objective of stabilising
the real stock of debt and constrain fiscal policy in the near term, which may reduce
fiscal uncertainty. Likewise, fiscal uncertainty may increase with higher inflation, which
helps stabilise the stock of nominal debt held in domestic currency, and thereby provide
room for unanticipated fiscal policy measures. In the analysis, I include a number of
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fiscal and macroeconomic variables to test whether fiscal uncertainty is correlated with
them. If the debt stabilisation motive would indeed lead governments to reduce fiscal
uncertainty in the short term, I would expect the level of debt and government bond
yields to be negatively correlated with uncertainty, while growth and inflation should
be associated with an increase.
According to the political business (or budget) cycle literature (Nordhaus, 1975),
fiscal policy discretion increases during periods when elections take place. This may
be because politicians have incentives to buy votes by lowering taxes or increasing
spending. The credibility of such measures may make fiscal policy more uncertain
prior to elections. In addition, elections may lead to uncertainty about the future
composition of government and thereby increase the uncertainty about fiscal policy.
While the degree of economic development in advanced economies, the quality of their
institutions, stable electoral rules and fiscal policy constraints should limit the degree
of fiscal uncertainty in these countries (Persson, 2002), the post-crisis change in the
political climate may be able to explain some of the rise of fiscal uncertainty.8
On the contrary, strict fiscal rules and contract-based fiscal governance have been
found to reduce fiscal forecast errors (von Hagen, 2010, Pina and Venes, 2011, de Cas-
tro et al., 2013), unless governments misreport more frequently as fiscal rules become
binding (von Hagen and Wolff, 2006). Henisz (2004) and Agnello and Sousa (2014),
for instance, show that political institutions, such as checks and balances and the level
of democracy, can explain differences in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. In
fact, most advanced economies have implemented fiscal rules over the course of the
last decade. In the European Union, the Stability and Growth Pact set the limit on
8See Klomp and De Haan (2013) and Dubois (2016) for a survey of the political economy literature
on the conditions under which political budget cycles can arise. Sørensen et al. (2001), Hallerberg and
Strauch (2002) and Bernoth et al. (2008) find that elections increase fiscal policy discretion. This may
explain why errors in fiscal forecasts are larger prior to elections (de Castro et al., 2013, Pina and
Venes, 2011). Bru¨ck and Stephan (2006) argue that governments cheat in their fiscal forecasts when
elections are coming up. Dreher et al. (2008) show that a political alignment with the US can explain
IMF forecast errors before elections. This evidence implies that an upcoming election may also increase
fiscal uncertainty.
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the fiscal deficit at 3 percent of GDP, above which an Excessive Deficit Procedure is
triggered. Countries with a debt/GDP ratio above 60 percent are required to bring
debt levels down in the medium term, which is meant to enforce debt stabilisation. A
reduction in the scope for fiscal policy imposed by fiscal rules is therefore expected to
lower fiscal uncertainty. Over the course of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area,
a number of peripheral countries entered into an Economic Adjustment Programme.
Such a programme further tightens the constraints placed on fiscal policy and is en-
forced by the IMF and European institutions. As part of the programme, countries
pre-commit to fiscal targets over a longer time horizon. In what follows, I test whether
fiscal rules and the participation in an Economic Adjustment Programme can be linked
to differences in fiscal uncertainty across countries and time.
2.3.2 Empirical strategy
My empirical analysis of potential determinants of fiscal uncertainty builds on the
Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) test of forecast rationality:
eicth = αich + [F
d
icth]
′β + victh (2.16)
A forecast F , for instance of the fiscal deficit d of country c, to be realised at time t,
made h periods ahead, is considered rational if its forecast error e is pure noise, i.e. is
unbiased and uncorrelated with the forecast. For the constant term this would imply
αich = 0, and for the coefficient for the level of the forecast β = 0. Analyses of forecast
errors made by official forecasters show that this is very often not the case (von Hagen,
2010, Pina and Venes, 2011, de Castro et al., 2013). In fact, by including other fiscal
and macroeconomic variables and political economy factors to the regression equation,
forecast error analyses show that errors are predictable along a number of dimensions
(see previous section).
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Given the interest on fiscal uncertainty determinants, I instead regress the new
uncertainty measure on the squared average forecast of the fiscal deficit at forecast
horizon h, F dcth
2
, other forecasts FMcth and potential fiscal uncertainty determinants Cct
and Pct+h:
Ucth = [F
d
cth
2
]′β1 + FMcth
′
β2 + Cct
′β3 + Pct+h′β4 + vcth (2.17)
Given that my measure of uncertainty is observable at the time the forecast is published,
and average uncertainty about fiscal forecasts is defined as the aggregate variance of
forecast errors ucth ≡
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(eicth) (equation (2.5) above), equation (2.17) can be
interpreted as a real-time equivalent to a Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) test of forecast
rationality, applied to the variance of forecast errors. F dcth
2
in this equation is the
squared forecast of the fiscal deficit. If forecast errors are indeed linked to the level of
the deficit, then fiscal uncertainty should increase in the squared deficit figure, not the
level. Furthermore, the fiscal index uncertainty index constructed above has not been
scaled relative to the level of the deficit.9 One could divide Ucth by F
d
cth
2
to obtain
unbiased estimates of parameters βj 6=1. Controlling for it on the right-hand side of the
equation is the alternative.
In line with the literature on forecast errors, I augment the regression model with
three additional regressor sets. Matrix FMcth contains h-period ahead consensus pro-
jections of other fiscal and macroeconomic variables. In particular, I account for the
business cycle, the level of debt/GDP, the government bond yield as well as inflation.
Matrix Cct collects as measures of financial sector risk the CDS spread of domestic
banks, and stock market volatility. Political economy variables, including an election
indicator, and fiscal rule proxies enter matrix Pct+h.
The error term vcth is assumed to consist of a country-fixed effect uch and an id-
9This is because of data properties, such as the fact that for a number of data points the fiscal
deficit is exactly zero.
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iosyncratic error εcth. Country-fixed effects capture persistent differences in fiscal un-
certainty across countries, potentially as a result of different institutional frameworks.
Idiosyncratic errors reflect the index component that cannot be attributed to uncer-
tainty about future fiscal policies as approximated by economic or political economy
factors. These errors may instead be interpreted as the uncertainty that arises from
technical mistakes made by forecasters, or pure differences in opinion. Given that fiscal
uncertainty is highly dependent across countries (see tests for cross-sectional depen-
dence in Table A2 in the Appendix), I further allow for a common error component ft
to affect country-specific uncertainty with factor loadings γch:
vcth = uch + γ
′
chfth + εcth (2.18)
Cross-sectional dependence of fiscal uncertainty may be caused by fiscal policy spillovers
across countries. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008) account for spillovers explicitly using
a spatial lag specification. Applied to fiscal uncertainty, factor fth is approximated
with equally weighted fiscal uncertainty indices of all other countries in the sample. In
addition, I estimate equation (2.17) using the Common Correlated Effects estimator
(CCE, Pesaran, 2006).10 This approach accounts for the common error component by
including cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable as well as other variables
potentially responsible for co-movement in the set of regressors. Alongside averages of
the dependent variable, I include averages of the squared forecast of the fiscal deficit and
of real GDP growth. In addition, a dummy variable for the first half of 2009 is added
given that the financial crisis itself constituted a large common shock. Depending
on the specification, I also include averages of other regressors to reduce the cross-
sectional dependence of the error term and potential biases in model parameters. The
CCE approach allows for a high flexibility about the sources of common shocks but
remains ignorant about potential channels through which shocks spill over, compared
10The Stata routine xtdcce2 provided by Ditzen (2016) implements the CCE estimator.
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to a spatial lag specification. As for some countries the T dimension lies below 10, I
apply the recursive mean adjustment method to correct for small sample time series
biases (see Ditzen, 2016).
2.3.3 Data
Semi-annual data on macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals for 31 advanced economies
over the period 1999 to 2014 are taken from the OECD and IMF projections published
in the Economic Outlook and World Economic Outlook. Table 2.7 reports summary
statistics and the number N of country-semi-annual observations for which data is
available. I employ fiscal forecasts of the fiscal deficit/GDP (general government net
borrowing as a percentage of GDP, OECD and IMF average), and debt/GDP (general
government gross financial liabilities as a percentage of GDP, OECD). To account for
the business cycle, I use annual real GDP growth (IMF), the output gap calculated
as the share of cyclical real GDP over an HP-filtered real GDP series (OECD), or,
alternatively, the unemployment rate (OECD). One-year ahead forecasts are used when
the year-ahead uncertainty measure Uct1 is employed as the dependent variable; current-
year projections of fiscal and macroeconomic measures serve as regressors of current-
year deficit uncertainty Uct0. In addition, I use the 10-year government bond yield
(annual change every half-year, OECD), and the annual change in the consumer price
index (OECD) as measures of interest rates on government debt and inflation.
To test whether banking sector risk contributes to fiscal uncertainty, I employ data
on banking sector CDS spreads. I use the half-year difference of the logged average of 5-
year US-Dollar CDS prices for bonds issued by major banks per country (Bloomberg).11
11The following banks are included: AU: National Australia Bank, Westpac, Australia and New
Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank; AT: Hypo Group Alpe Adria, Erste Group; BE: Dexia,
KBC; CA: Royal Bank of Canada; FR: BNP Paribas, Cre´dit Agricole, Natixis, Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale;
DE: Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Landesbank Baden-Wu¨rttemberg; EL: National Bank, Alpha; IS:
Landsbanki I´slandi, Glitnir, Kaupthing; IE: Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Banks; IT: Unicredit, Intesa
Sanpaolo, Mediobanka; JP: Nomura, Mizuho, Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui; KR: Hana, Kookmin
Bank, Shinhan, Woori; NL: ABN Amro, ING, Rabobank, Fortis; NZ: Australia and New Zealand
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Table 2.7: Determinants of fiscal uncertainty – descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Max
Deficit/GDP (nowcast), % 693 1.70 4.72 -20.2 27.4
Deficit/GDP (forecast), % 693 1.52 4.31 -19.2 15.5
Debt/GDP (nowcast), % 693 68.5 38.3 3.5 228.4
Debt/GDP (forecast), % 693 69.5 39.5 1.5 233.1
Real GDP growth (nowcast), % 693 1.57 2.41 -10.6 8.8
Real GDP growth (forecast), % 693 2.22 1.42 -4.0 7.5
Output gap (nowcast), % 652 -0.30 4.99 -19.0 31.8
Output gap (forecast), % 652 -0.33 5.24 -18.3 33.5
Unemployment rate (nowcast), % 693 7.21 3.71 1.3 27.8
Unemployment rate (forecast), % 693 7.30 3.79 1.8 28.4
10-year bond yield, % pa 684 4.42 2.10 0.6 25.1
Inflation (nowcast), % 693 2.07 2.46 -10.0 16.1
Inflation (forecast), % 693 1.95 2.03 -4.8 15.2
Bank CDS spread, log of % 410 4.35 1.41 1.8 8.0
Stock market volatility, index 693 0.05 1.18 -0.5 23.3
Election, dummy 693 0.14 0.35 0 1
Snap election, dummy 693 0.04 0.19 0 1
Fixed election regime, dummy 693 0.26 0.44 0 1
Expenditure rule, dummy 672 0.39 0.49 0 1
Revenue rule, dummy 672 0.14 0.34 0 1
Balanced budget rule, dummy 672 0.89 0.31 0 1
Debt rule, dummy 672 0.79 0.41 0 1
Ecoonomic Adjustment Programme, dummy 693 0.03 0.18 0 1
Table 2.7 shows that the bank CDS data are available only for a sub-sample of N =
410 country-semi-annual observations. In addition, I control for realised volatility on
domestic stock markets using the bi-annual standard deviation of monthly index values
of each country’s main stock price index (OECD).
In line with the literature on political budget cycles, I collect data on national elec-
tions at which voters decide over the composition of the central government. These are
taken from various country-specific sources. For countries with parliamentary systems,
I use the date of elections for the main legislative assembly, usually the lower house of
parliament. For presidential systems, the date of the first round of presidential elections
is chosen. I define a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an election is scheduled
Banking Group; NO: DnB NOR; PT: Caixa Geral de De´positos, Banco Comercial Portugueˆs, Banco
Esp´ırito Santo; ES: Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, La Caixa, Bankia; SE: SEB,
Swedbank, Nordea, Handelsbanken; CH: UBS, Cre´dit Suisse; UK: Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, Royal Bank
of Scotland; US: Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo.
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for the current year, or alternatively, the following year. On average, elections take
place every four years (once in around 7 half-annual periods, see Table 2.7). Elections
may be called as a result of uncertainty about fiscal policy and therefore be endogenous.
I follow Julio and Yook (2012) and allow for different election effects for those countries
that follow a fixed election cycle, as classified in their study, using a dummy indicator.
In around a quarter of the countries, that are part of the sample, this is the case. In
addition, I control for whether an election has been called as a snap election, i.e. earlier
than the usual election cycle suggests.
To approximate the prevailing fiscal framework, I make use of fiscal rule indicators,
which are provided by the IMF. They indicate whether a country has implemented
expenditure rules, revenue rules, budget balance rules, or debt rules. Given that time-
invariant country-specific effects are picked up by fixed effects uch, IMF indicators
account for the effect an implementation of fiscal rules has on fiscal uncertainty, i.e.
the time variation in fiscal rule indicators is exploited. Mean values for these dummy
indicators in Table 2.7 show that expenditure and revenue rules are less common while
balanced budget and debt rules are in place for the majority of semi-annual country
observations (a mean of the dummy variable greater than 0.5). Finally, I define a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the period during which a country is part
of a European Economic Adjustment Programme.12
2.3.4 Results
Baseline results Results from a baseline specification are reported in Table 2.8, with
year-ahead fiscal uncertainty as the dependent variable (Uct1) and fiscal fundamentals
as well as a business cycle measures as regressors. I find that fiscal uncertainty is higher,
the larger the squared value of the fiscal deficit. This confirms that forecast errors are
not rational and indicates that year-ahead deficits become harder to predict, the more
12Greece: from 2010-1, Portugal: 2011-1 to 2014-1, Ireland: 2011-1 to 2013-2, Spain: 2012-2 to
2013-2.
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they are different from zero. The squared forecast term is kept as a control in all sub-
sequent specifications to control for the proportionality of the fiscal uncertainty index
relative to the level of the forecast deficit. The business cycle has a negative effect on
fiscal uncertainty. Results suggests that when economic downturns are anticipated, the
reaction of fiscal policy becomes less certain. However, the statistical significance varies
across different business cycle approximations. An increase in expected unemployment
increases fiscal uncertainty as uncertainty about a policy response rises. More fre-
quently changing measures of the state of the macroeconomy, like projected real GDP
growth (column IV) and the year-ahead output gap (column V), have a negative effect
but are not found to be significant uncertainty determinants. It may be because both
measures are more volatile and movements of GDP over the cycle are not necessarily
associated with large unanticipated fiscal policy responses, unlike less frequent swings
in unemployment.
Furthermore, the coefficient for the debt/GDP ratio is negative and statistically
significant throughout. While this may contradict common perceptions of fiscal uncer-
tainty as a concept that applies to long-term concerns about fiscal policy sustainability,
I interpret the finding as support for the hypothesis that debt stabilisation may de-
crease the degree of fiscal uncertainty. High levels of debt seem to constrain fiscal
policy, which, in turn, renders it more predictable. Similarly, the long-term interest
rate has a negative effect on fiscal uncertainty. I also interpret this as an outcome
of constraints to fiscal policy, which are set by borrowing conditions. These findings
are consistent with uncertainty about fiscal policy in the short term, which is reflected
in the fiscal uncertainty index. As government bond yields may themselves be driven
by fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals, I will report subsequent results based on
a specification that excludes yields. Findings about the effect of fiscal and macroeco-
nomic fundamentals are robust to including inflation expectations, a variable that is
itself not statistically significant.
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Columns I, II and III of Table 2.8 compare different estimation approaches to ac-
count for cross-sectional dependence. Relative to a standard Fixed Effects regression
that does not explicitly take common shocks to fiscal uncertainty into account (column
I), a spatial lag approach controls for cross-sectional dependence by adding the average
level of the dependent variable in all other countries as an explanatory variable to the
specification. Column II shows that this leads to a twofold increase in the goodness-of-
fit. The explanatory power of the regression model is enhanced because other countries’
fiscal uncertainty (spatial lag term) appears to play an important part in explaining a
given country’s fiscal uncertainty. This is in line with findings on fiscal policy spillovers
in Giuliodori and Beetsma (2008). On average, a one-standard deviation increase in
foreign countries’ fiscal uncertainty indices increases uncertainty about the domestic
fiscal deficit by more than 0.8 standard deviations. However, the spatial lag approach
does not fully account for fiscal uncertainty spillovers: a Pesaran (2015) test for weak
cross-sectional dependence cannot reject the hypothesis that residuals are only weakly
dependent (reported at the bottom of Table 2.8). By contrast, the CCEP approach of
adding cross-sectional averages of fiscal uncertainty as well as of the deficit, growth and
a crisis dummy variable eliminates cross-sectional dependencies in the error structure
(column III, bottom). More flexibly accounting for international spillovers also raises
the goodness-of-fit considerably, as illustrated by an R-squared above 0.8.
Results for financial sector risk Table 2.9 shows that risks in a country’s banking
sector increase fiscal uncertainty, albeit only with a lag. Contemporaneous effects are
not statistically significant. Up to four lags of financial sector variables are added to the
specification as fiscal effects of banking sector risk may become effective only gradually.
In fact, 1 percent increase in banking sector CDS spreads leads to a more than 0.1
standard deviation increase in fiscal uncertainty half a year later (first lag). The effect
increases over time as bank bailouts may be provided and consequences for the public
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Table 2.8: Baseline results for fiscal uncertainty determinants
I II III IV V VI VII
FE Spatial
FE
CCEP CCEP CCEP CCEP CCEP
Deficit squared 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Debt/GDP -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Unemployment 0.083*** 0.031* 0.017* 0.018 0.017
[0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
GDP growth -0.011
[0.02]
Output gap -0.000
[0.00]
Bond yield -0.024*
[0.01]
Spatial lag 0.828***
[0.05]
Inflation 0.010
[0.01]
Observations 693 693 693 693 652 680 693
Countries 31 31 31 31 31 30 31
R-squared 0.255 0.471 0.882 0.881 0.884 0.854 0.882
p-value CD
statistic
0.000 0.006 0.560 0.794 0.220 0.191 0.656
Notes: Dependent variable: Uct1. Common Correlated Effects estimates: cross-sectional averages of
fiscal policy uncertainty, deficit/GDP and GDP growth included as well as the crisis dummy. Standard
errors in brackets, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Specification VII also
controls for the current account balance which is not statistically significant.
purse materialise. Accounting for up to four semi-annual lags (column II) shows that
fiscal uncertainty effects are largest 1.5 years (3 semi-annual lags) after the increase in
banking sector risk. This result also holds when stock market volatility is controlled
for (column IV). The fact that financial sector measures, similar to long-term interest
rates, are somewhat correlated with macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes explains why
debt/GDP and unemployment are less statistically significant in these specifications.
Political economy determinants Table 2.10 reports a series of results for politi-
cal economy factors that may be related to fiscal uncertainty. In general, upcoming
elections render forecasts of the fiscal deficit uncertain (columns I to IV). This is in
line with findings in the literature on forecast errors and political budget cycles (e.g.
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Table 2.9: Financial sector determinants of fiscal uncertainty
I II III IV
Deficit/GDP squared 0.008*** 0.006*** -0.002* 0.006**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Debt/GDP -0.008** -0.005 0.001 -0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Unemployment 0.038 0.003 -0.007 0.007
[0.03] [0.03] [0.02] [0.04]
Bank CDS spread -0.005 -0.007 -0.070
[0.14] [0.16] [0.27]
Lag 1 0.128 0.340** 0.150
[0.14] [0.17] [0.28]
Lag 2 0.515*** 0.386** 0.125
[0.14] [0.17] [0.31]
Lag 3 0.998*** 0.637**
[0.17] [0.31]
Lag 4 0.073 0.136
[0.17] [0.33]
Stock volatility -0.040 0.372
[0.04] [0.50]
Lag 1 0.056 2.031***
[0.06] [0.48]
Lag 2 0.011 -0.759
[0.04] [0.50]
Lag 3 0.031 -0.420
[0.03] [0.46]
Lag 4 0.042* -0.010
[0.02] [0.45]
Observations 353 316 541 316
Countries 20 19 31 19
R squared 0.602 0.632 0.946 0.783
p-value CD statistic 0.038 0.398 0.517 0.874
Notes: Dependent variable: Uct1. Common Correlated Effects estimates, cross-sectional averages of
fiscal policy uncertainty, deficit/GDP and GDP growth included as well as the crisis dummy. Standard
errors in brackets, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sørensen et al., 2001, Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002, de Castro et al., 2013). On aver-
age, if an election is scheduled for the upcoming year, the uncertainty about that year’s
fiscal deficit increases by 0.06 standard deviations (column I). This result is robust to
controlling for snap elections, which are often not anticipated during the year prior
to the election and should not affect fiscal uncertainty (column II). The statistically
not significant coefficient for the snap election dummy suggests further that calling
unanticipated elections is unlikely to be a reaction to heightened uncertainty, address-
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ing potential endogeneity concerns. In addition, an interaction between the election
dummy and an indicator for the fixed election regime in column III is statistically sig-
nificant and larger than the average effect reported in column I. For countries, where
elections follow a set schedule, official forecasters face substantial uncertainty about fis-
cal forecasts during the year before the election. To explore the channel through which
elections affect fiscal uncertainty in more detail, I interact the election dummy with the
level of the fiscal deficit in column IV. If increases in the deficit ahead of an election
were anticipated, as suggested by the political budget cycle literature, one would expect
that such an increase raises uncertainty. The empirical evidence points in the opposite
direction. Fiscal uncertainty about future deficits is higher during the year preceding
an election, the lower the level of the projected fiscal deficit. This may be because
fiscal authorities deliberately report lower deficit projections to offical forecasters prior
to elections, supporting the argument made in Bru¨ck and Stephan (2006).
Fiscal space is constrained if a country’s fiscal policy is subject to an Economic
Adjustment Programme. Consequently, fiscal uncertainty is reduced considerably when
fiscal policy is scrutinised by the IMF and institutions of the European Union as part
of such a programme. On average, participating in a programme is associated with a
reduction in fiscal uncertainty of more than 0.2 standard deviations (column V of Table
2.10). As a note of caution it should be mentioned that this result does not necessarily
imply causality as countries with higher initial levels of fiscal uncertainty may have
been more likely to enter a programme. Yet within those countries, the programme
period is marked by substantially lower levels of fiscal uncertainty. Unlike the literature
on forecast errors and determinants of fiscal policy discretion, I do not find statistically
significant effects of fiscal rules on fiscal uncertainty (column VI). This may have to do
with the fact that there is not sufficient time variation in the adoption of fiscal rules
across advanced economies, especially in the European Union, or because rules have
been adopted largely simultaneously.
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Table 2.10: Political economy determinants of fiscal uncertainty
I II III IV V VI
Deficit/GDP squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Debt/GDP -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Unemployment 0.017* 0.017* 0.016 0.017* 0.024** 0.025**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Election 0.061* 0.085** -0.015 0.116***
[0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Snap election -0.088
[0.07]
Election * Fixed 0.321***
[0.08]
Election * Deficit/DGP -0.046***
[0.01]
Programme -0.263*
[0.14]
Expenditure rule -0.046
[0.07]
Revenue rule -0.009
[0.15]
Balanced budget rule -0.095
[0.35]
Debt rule 0.016
[0.38]
Observations 693 693 693 693 693 672
Countries 31 31 31 31 31 30
R squared 0.883 0.883 0.886 0.889 0.883 0.861
p-value CD statistic 0.542 0.587 0.587 0.246 0.253 0.954
Notes: Dependent variable: Uct1. Common Correlated Effects estimates, cross-sectional averages of
fiscal policy uncertainty, deficit/GDP and GDP growth included as well as the crisis dummy. Standard
errors in brackets, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Fiscal uncertainty index versions Results presented so far have given insights
about potential drivers of uncertainty about the fiscal deficit of the upcoming year.
The composite index of fiscal uncertainty has been used, based on forecast revisions
to approximate common uncertainty shocks and forecast disagreement. Table A3 in
the Appendix presents results from other index versions. It shows that results for the
deficit/GDP, banking sector and political economy determinants apply also to forecast
disagreement alone (Dct1, columns I, II, III). Unlike for the full index version, debt/GDP
and unemployment are not statistically significant. This confirms descriptive findings
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of section 2.2.5: forecast revisions capture predominantly business cycle-related com-
mon forecast uncertainty while forecast disagreement is a good proxy for sources of
idiosyncratic fiscal uncertainty. Somewhat weaker results are obtained for the current-
year version of the fiscal uncertainty index, Uct0 (columns IV, V, VI). While results for
fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals as well as for banking sector CDS spreads are
similar, the election dummy is not found statistically significant. This can be explained
by the fact that, as elections take place, their fiscal effects for the ongoing year are
better known than effects of elections in the following year. Similarly, the nowcast
disagreement component Dct0 appears to mainly reflect the type of uncertainty that
stems from fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals (columns VII, VIII, IX).
Determinants of alternative uncertainty measures Table A4 in the Appendix
shows that other measures of fiscal uncertainty, or policy uncertainty, show somewhat
different responses to the uncertainty determinants considered here. In particular, I
compare results to those obtained using as the dependent variable the Baker et al.
(2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty index, realised government bond yield volatility
and forecast errors. Differences relative to the fiscal uncertainty index proposed in this
chapter suggest that these measures may either reflect other types of uncertainty, or
do not capture uncertainty at all.
Turning to more detailed results, I find that the EPU is not significantly corre-
lated with my financial sector risk proxy and the election dummy (columns II, III).
In addition, debt/GDP is found to have a positive effect on EPU at statistically sig-
nificant levels, contrary to the debt stabilisation hypothesis and findings for my fiscal
uncertainty index. The business cycle, as approximated by unemployment, appears
to have the opposite effect: high unemployment is associated with lower uncertainty
about economic policy. This appears implausible and suggests that the EPU at best
reflects other types of uncertainty.
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Findings for government bond yield volatility are more similar to results for fiscal
uncertainty (columns IV, V, VI). Squared deficit/GDP and unemployment have a sig-
nificantly positive effect on bond yield volatility while debt/GDP has a negative effect.
An increase in banking sector CDS spreads affects sovereign bond yield volatility with
a one-year lag, which is comparable to findings for forecast uncertainty (column V).
Only election effects are found to be insignificant (column VI).
I also obtain mixed findings for ex post observable forecast errors. For a comparison
with the forecast uncertainty index, I regress the absolute value of one year-ahead and
current-year forecast errors of the fiscal deficit on uncertainty determinants (columns
VIII to XII). This is to account for the fact that errors may be large in a positive or
negative direction but reflect uncertainty in both instances. Overall, debt/GDP has a
negative effect on forecast errors, while the effect of unemployment is positive, in line
with findings for the index. Absolute forecast errors, however, appear to be larger,
the closer the deficit/GDP is to zero (as indicated by the negative coefficient on the
squared deficit term). While banking sector risk is positively correlated with absolute
year-ahead forecast errors, the effect of elections is negative, contrary to findings for
the fiscal uncertainty index.
I conclude that the widely used EPU index captures other aspects of policy uncer-
tainty compared to the fiscal uncertainty index proposed in this chapter. More closely
related to my index is a government bond yield volatility measure. This may be the
case because bond yield spreads react to uncertainty about sovereign credit risk and
future discretionary policy, i.e. uncertainty reflected in my forecast-based index. Ex
post forecast errors, however, appear to be driven by somewhat different factors and
may not always reflect uncertainty about the forecast variable.
63
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a measure of fiscal uncertainty based on the disagreement be-
tween official forecasts of the fiscal deficit and a common uncertainty shock faced by
forecasters. The resulting index captures uncertainty about fiscal policy in one year-
ahead forecasts and nowcasts as faced by the OECD, IMF and European Commission
forecasting departments. It is comparable across a set of 31 advanced economies and
reflects uncertainty about the path of fiscal policy in real time. This index there-
fore provides an insightful complement to existing measures of uncertainty about the
macroeconomy, like those proposed by Jurado et al. (2015) and Rossi and Sekhposyan
(2015), uncertainty on financial markets, such as the VIX, and uncertainty about eco-
nomic policy, e.g. the EPU by Baker et al. (2016). The index is shown to provide a
direct proxy of uncertainty about fiscal outcomes in the near term.
A regression analysis finds that both fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals as well
as non-fundamental variables, like financial sector risk and political economy factors, are
correlated with uncertainty about the fiscal deficit. However, fiscal uncertainty appears
to decrease as the debt stabilisation motive imposes constraints on fiscal policy, or
externally enforced adjustment programmes limited fiscal policy during the euro area
crisis. I also find that the index is more closely related to those drivers than more
indirect proxies, such as forecast errors or the volatility on markets for sovereign debt.
The evolution of the index over time suggests that fiscal uncertainty increased to
unprecedented levels in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. This raises the
question of potential effects on economic outcomes, which the following two chapters
address.
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Chapter 3
Sovereign Credit Ratings under
Fiscal Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
The recent global financial and European government debt crisis was characterised
by a substantial deterioration of public finances. In many advanced economies, the
fiscal deficit relative to GDP saw double-digit percentage increases, which had not
been experienced in decades. In Greece and Ireland, this increase was among the
most pronounced as both countries tipped into a severe sovereign debt crisis after
the global financial turmoil of 2008. Figure 3.1 shows that official forecasts of the
government budget deficit published by the IMF (blue line) and the OECD (red line)
rose to levels just below 10 percent of GDP for Greece and substantially above 10
percent for Ireland. Concerns about sovereign debt heightened not only because fiscal
deficits rose in absolute terms. Equally salient was the fact that uncertainty about
the fiscal position surged significantly, as indicated by the newly constructed fiscal
uncertainty index (dotted and dashed lines) in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Official fiscal forecasts, uncertainty and sovereign rating migration
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In Greece, the rise in fiscal uncertainty at the end of 2009 was aggravated by reve-
lations made by the newly elected Papandreou government about the misreporting of
past deficit figures. In Ireland, uncertainty about banks’ balance sheets spilled over to
the public sector when bank rescues were undertaken by the government in 2010.
Investors in sovereign debt can rely on a number of experts to provide them with
information about future fiscal positions, including independent national auditing units,
central banks, investment banks and fund managers. In this thesis, I focus on credit
rating agencies, which have been subject to much debate during the recent global
financial and European government debt crisis. Their sovereign debt credit ratings
are an expert opinion on the credit risk of a government. Ratings are available for
all major advanced economies. Unlike opinions provided by other experts, ratings are
revised on a regular basis and are directly comparable across countries. Figure 3.1
shows that credit rating agencies adjust their sovereign ratings when projections about
the fiscal deficit change substantially (arrows indicate changes to rating categories,
plus/minus signs illustrate changes in the rating Watch status). By raising the stock
of public sector debt, an increase in the deficit may weaken the future ability of the
government to service its debt. The deficit-to-GDP ratio is therefore considered one
important sovereign credit risk factor by credit rating agencies, alongside the stock of
sovereign debt and the expected state of the macroeconomy. However, rating agencies
have frequently been criticised for their failure to anticipate crises and for reacting too
late and too excessively with downgrades during crises, compared to what movements
in fundamentals, such as the deficit, would imply (e.g. Ferri et al., 1999, Mora, 2006,
Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016). Polito and Wickens (2014) and Polito and
Wickens (2015) show that a model-based measure of sovereign credit risk, that is purely
based on fundamentals, would have issued a credit warning much before credit rating
agencies changed their official ratings for the United States and euro area countries.
D’Agostino and Lennkh (2016) decompose sovereign credit ratings into an objective,
67
fundamentals-based component, using the methodology of Moody’s, and a subjective
component that enters ratings as a form of expert opinion. They find that for crisis-hit
euro area countries, the subjective component appears to be too optimistic before the
crisis, but too pessimistic during and after. Figure 3.1 also seems to suggest that the
frequency of rating announcements increases when there is higher fiscal uncertainty
(the dotted line is the fiscal uncertainty index based on year-ahead forecasts, the dash-
dotted line is the index version based on current-year forecasts). In this chapter, I
analyse to what extent fiscal uncertainty can explain the pro-cyclicality of sovereign
ratings during crises.
In particular, I test two hypotheses about the effect of fiscal uncertainty on sovereign
credit ratings. A first hypothesis is concerned with the effect of fiscal uncertainty on
sovereign credit risk. Following surges in fiscal uncertainty in advanced economies dur-
ing the recent crisis, a new literature emerged that analyses the effects of uncertainty
about fiscal policy. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015) find that fiscal policy uncertainty
reduces economic activity. Political uncertainty during election years often negatively
affects domestic and foreign direct investment (Julio and Yook, 2012, Julio and Yook,
2016) while uncertainty about fiscal consolidation measures seems to determine whether
these measures are expansionary, or not (Croce et al., 2012, Bi et al., 2013). Likewise,
noisy communication of fiscal policy blurs agents’ expectations and reduces fiscal mul-
tipliers (Ricco et al., 2016). An accurate assessment of sovereign credit risk should
take these adverse effects of fiscal uncertainty on country fundamentals and risk pre-
mia premia into account. However, the link between fiscal uncertainty and sovereign
credit risk has not been given much attention. Sovereign ratings have been shown to
react to crises (Monfort and Mulder, 2000, Ga¨rtner et al., 2011), world stock market
volatility (Hill et al., 2010) and consumer sentiment (Schumacher, 2014). Yet the di-
rect effect of country-specific fiscal uncertainty has not been analysed in detail. This
chapter tries to fill this gap. Using the slowly-moving index developed in chapter 2.2
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allows me to identify the effect of fiscal uncertainty, once it has been realised, on de-
cisions taken by credit rating agencies across countries and over time, independent of
potential feedback effects rating announcements may arguably have on the degree of
uncertainty. I find that for a sample of advanced economies and the three main credit
rating agencies Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, fiscal uncertainty increases the
probability of a rating downgrade. A pro-cyclical movement of credit ratings during
crises may therefore be justified if it reflects adverse effects of uncertainty on sovereign
credit risk.
The second hypothesis is concerned with changes in the behaviour of credit rating
agencies that cannot be explained by accurate reflections of sovereign credit risk alone.
Fiscal uncertainty creates an information asymmetry between financial market partic-
ipants and rating agencies as credit risk experts. It is argued that this asymmetry
may sometimes be exploited by rating agencies, for instance if they were to seek public
attention to increase their publicity. Publicity may be gained by announcing a rating
change that cannot be entirely justified by movements in sovereign credit risk. I find
that sovereign ratings are changed more frequently during periods of fiscal uncertainty
than suggested by fundamentals related to sovereign credit risk. This holds indepen-
dently of the effect fiscal uncertainty has on such movements of sovereign credit risk.
I conclude that rating pro-cyclicality may therefore not be fully explained by the fun-
damental effect of fiscal uncertainty on sovereign credit risk. Rating agency behaviour
not only appears to be driven by the incentive to provide an accurate risk assessment
but other incentives related to publicity also play a role.
A number of characteristics in data on advanced economies’ sovereign ratings make
the estimation of rating determinants difficult. Given that advanced economies gener-
ally enjoy investment-grade ratings, not all rating categories along the ordinal rating
scale are observed. In addition, sovereign ratings are very stable over time. Rating sta-
bility can result from three sources. First, credit ratings are measures of relative credit
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risk. Sovereign ratings change only if the relative movement in sovereign credit risk
exceeds certain thresholds defined by rating agencies. Second, ratings at the upper end
of the rating scale are by construction changed less frequently than below-investment
grade ratings, i.e. as a technical feature of the rating process some rating categories
are more stable. Finally, ratings are assigned using categories along a bounded or-
dinal scale. A rating at the top end of the rating scale cannot be improved further.
Similarly, a rating at the bottom end of the scale cannot be reduced. This renders
ratings at the boundary of the rating scale more stable, relative to all other rating cat-
egories. This chapter proposes a new empirical framework for the analysis of sovereign
rating determinants that accounts for these features. The new framework includes a
regression model which consists of two processes. A credit risk process determines the
direction of rating changes and depends on the movement in fiscal and macroeconomic
fundamentals related to sovereign credit risk. Technical factors of a stability process,
like the rating level, determine the probability of whether a rating change is allowed
to occur in a given period. Both processes are estimated jointly using a new ordered
outcome estimator that builds on Ordered Probit and the Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit
estimator by Harris and Zhao (2007). The estimator also accounts for the boundary of
the rating scale by imposing a probability of zero on one of the rating change outcomes
for boundary observations. This chapter therefore also adds to an empirical strand of
literature that aims to assess the determinants of sovereign ratings assessed by credit
rating agencies (Cantor and Packer, 1996, Afonso et al., 2011, Hill et al., 2010). Monte
Carlo simulations show that standard estimation techniques generate biased estimates
if rating stability is not taken into account. In addition, the new empirical strategy
proposed in this chapter is better able to predict rating changes compared to an esti-
mation of a simple model of rating changes by Ordered Probit that has previously been
employed in the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides the theo-
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retical background and derives the two empirical hypotheses related to fiscal uncertainty
as a credit risk, and rating attention. Section 3.3 develops the empirical framework and
provides results from a Monte Carlo experiment. Empirical findings for the effect of
fiscal uncertainty on sovereign rating transition are presented in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Theory and hypotheses
3.2.1 Hypothesis of fiscal uncertainty as a credit risk
When credit rating agencies assign sovereign ratings, they evaluate the capacity and
willingness of a sovereign entity to meet its financial obligations at the time of the
rating announcement and in the future, fully and on time (FitchRatings, 2010; see
also Standard and Poor’s, 2011b, Moody’s, 2013, IMF, 2010). This definition encom-
passes various types of sovereign default such as the repudiation of debt, restructuring
and renegotiations – events more likely in the context of sovereign issuers than ac-
tual defaults (Duffie and Singleton, 2003, pp. 147). Rating agencies claim to take
a wide range of quantitative and qualitative information into account to determine
the sovereign rating (e.g. FitchRatings, 2010, Standard and Poor’s, 2011b, Moody’s,
2013). This includes measures of macroeconomic performance, the soundness of public
finances, external financial strength, the stability of the financial sector and contingent
liabilities as well as the strength of political and economic institutions. Transparency
about rating determinants has improved in recent years, partly as a result of financial
regulation (e.g. European Union, 2013). Moody’s (2013), for instance, now claims that
its sovereign rating levels are predictable with a three-notch accuracy. That the degree
of fiscal uncertainty guides rating agencies’ decisions often becomes clear more indi-
rectly than through stated descriptions of their methodology, for instance in the form
of statements justifying particular rating actions (e.g. Standard and Poor’s, 2011a).
71
According to theory, rating agencies care about their reputation in the long run. To
earn reputation, they have to provide an accurate assessment of sovereign credit risk
based on movements in underlying fundamentals (cf. Mariano, 2012, Bar-Isaac and
Shapiro, 2013, and others).
Following the seminal paper by Cantor and Packer (1996), empirical studies have
tried to relate sovereign credit ratings to economic variables. Table 3.1 provides an
overview. Most studies show that a relatively parsimonious set of macroeconomic and
fiscal fundamentals associated with sovereign credit risk can explain a significant part
of the variation in sovereign ratings across countries and time.
In particular during crises, sovereign ratings appear to deviate from these funda-
mentals. For the Asian crisis of the 1990s, Ferri et al. (1999) and Eliasson (2002) find
that ratings significantly moved away from what movements in fundamentals would
have implied. A model-based indicator of sovereign credit risk proposed by Polito and
Wickens (2014) and Polito and Wickens (2015) reacted much earlier than official ratings
to deteriorations in governments fiscal positions in the aftermath of the recent financial
crisis. Sovereign ratings seem to react to crises (Monfort and Mulder, 2000), as well as
world stock market volatility (Hill et al., 2010) and consumer sentiment (Schumacher,
2014), rather than to anticipate these crises. It is argued that this made rating changes
pro-cyclical leading to self-fulfilling deteriorations, which could have aggravated pres-
sure on sovereign borrowers.1
However, ratings may appear pro-cyclical if fiscal uncertainty, which often increases
during crises, is considered a risk determinant to which agencies react. Given that
uncertainty about fiscal policy has itself been found to have adverse effects on growth
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015, Croce et al., 2012), consumption, investment (Jo-
hannsen, 2014) and risk premia on financial markets (Sialm, 2006, Pa´stor and Veronesi,
2013), an accurate assessment of sovereign credit risk should also take fiscal uncertainty
1Mora (2006), by contrast, finds that during the Asian crisis ratings were stickily reacting to news
rather than being pro-cyclical.
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as a credit risk factor into account. In what follows, I refer to this as the credit risk
hypothesis: as fiscal uncertainty increases, the probability of a rating downgrade is
expected to increase.
Given that fiscal uncertainty does not directly enter the reported objective rating
component that is based on the level of fundamentals associated with sovereign credit
risk, rating agencies likely consider it in a subjective part of their risk assessment.
D’Agostino and Lennkh (2016) decompose Moody’s ratings into an objective and a
subjective component and find that the latter increased substantially during the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis. The increase in fiscal uncertainty may explain this finding.
Similarly, fiscal uncertainty is likely captured by the arbitrary non-fundamental that
Ga¨rtner et al. (2011) show drives ratings of those euro area countries that were most
severely hit by the crisis. De Vries and de Haan (2016) find that after the crisis in
the euro area, rating agencies have become more cautious and changed ratings less
frequently than movements in bond yield spreads would have suggested. This may
have been due to persistent levels of fiscal uncertainty. Policies that promote fiscal
transparency have been shown to have a positive effect on sovereign ratings by Arbatli
and Escolano (2015). This indirectly implies that, as fiscal outcomes become more
uncertain, rating agencies react with downgrades.
Another channel through which fiscal uncertainty may affect sovereign credit risk,
and which may hence be considered by credit rating agencies who aim for an accurate
assessment of this risk in the long run, is the following: Bonfiglioli and Gancia (2015)
show that economic uncertainty can be conducive to structural reforms, which in turn
would support sovereign creditworthiness. Likewise, uncertainty about fiscal funda-
mentals may be the result of budgetary reforms, which are beneficial in the long run.
In both cases, rating agencies might reward governments with higher fiscal uncertainty
and the downgrade probability falls.
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Table 3.1: Previous findings on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings
Reference Sample Main determinants
Linear regression model of rating levels
Cantor and Packer
(1996)
S&P, Moody’s, 49 countries (ad-
vanced and developing), 1995
GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation,
fiscal deficit, external debt, development
indicator, default history
Ferri et al. (1999) Moody’s, 17 countries (advanced
and developing), 1989-1998
GDP growth, fiscal deficit, current
account balance, development indica-
tor, external debt, current account and
short-term debt relative to foreign re-
serves
Monfort and Mulder
(2000)
S&P, Moody’s, 20 emerging mar-
kets, 1994-1999
GDP growth, inflation, fiscal deficit,
debt over exports, rescheduling history,
terms of trade, export growth, invest-
ment
Borio and Packer
(2004)
S&P, 52 countries (advanced and
developing), 1996-2003
GDP per capita, inflation, GDP growth,
corruption indicator, political risk in-
dicator, default history, ”original sin”
measure (foreign currency debt), GDP,
currency mismatch
Butler and Fauver
(2006)
Institutional Investor, 86 countries
(advanced and developing), 2004
GDP per capita, inflation, foreign debt,
development indicator, legal and politi-
cal environment indicators
Non-linear regression model of rating levels
Hu et al. (2002) S&P, 62 countries (advanced and
developing), 1981-1998
debt, reserves, inflation, default history
Block and Vaaler
(2004)
S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, IBCA, DCR,
Thompson, 19 developing coun-
tries, 1987-1998
inflation, fiscal deficit, external balance,
external debt, default history, election
year indicator
Mora (2006) S&P, Moody’s, 105 countries (ad-
vanced and developing), 1989-2001
GDP per capita, GDP growth, fiscal
deficit, current account balance, exter-
nal debt, default history, sovereign bond
yield spread
Mellios and Paget-
Blanc (2006)
S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, 86 countries
(advanced and developing), 2003
GDP per capita, government revenue,
real exchange rate, inflation, default his-
tory, corruption indicator, political risk
indicator
Depken et al. (2006) S&P, 57 countries (advanced and
developing), 1995-2003
GDP per capita, inflation, fiscal deficit,
external balance, default history, trade
openness indicator, corruption indicator
Afonso et al. (2011) S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, 130 countries
(advanced and developing), 1970-
2005
GDP per capita, GDP growth, unem-
ployment, inflaiton, debt, fiscal deficit,
government effectiveness indicator, ex-
ternal debt, current account balance, ex-
ternal debt, default history
Regression model of rating changes
Hill et al. (2010) S&P, Moody’s, Fitch, 129 countries
(advanced and developing), 1990-
2006
GDP per capita, GDP growth, external
debt, international risk premium
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3.2.2 Asymmetric information and attention hypothesis
Investors, for instance in government debt, base their investment decision on publicly
available information about fundamental factors related to the credit risk of the in-
vestment. The role for rating agencies arises from the fact that public information
may be noisy. Theories of rating agency behaviour hypothesise that rating agencies
receive a private signal about the true state of fundamentals, for instance as a result
of their expert analysis (Mariano, 2012, Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2013, Manso, 2013).
They can decide to make the signal public in the form of a credit rating. The infor-
mation made available by rating agencies is taken into account by investors and the
general public if it adds value to publicly available information. If ratings provide ad-
ditional information to market participants, then, on sufficiently efficient markets as
described by Fama (1970), rating announcements will have a measurable impact on
financial indicators shortly after being made public. Theoretical contributions suggest
that, while rating agencies may be concerned about their reputation in the long run,
they may nevertheless have incentives to deviate from fundamentals in the short run.
Mariano (2012) shows theoretically that agencies may want to conform with market
expectations if the private signal they receive is itself noisy, for instance because the
agency is not capable of making a good assessment of credit risk. Such a ”low-skilled”
agency loses reputation from publishing potentially wrong private information. It may
therefore decide to contradict its signal and conform with public information to make
short-term reputational gains. In a different scenario by Manso (2013), credit ratings
have an impact on the survival of the debtor while agencies’ pay-offs depend on this
survival. Agencies may then also want to publish a softer assessment of credit risk
than suggested by the private signal they receive about fundamentals. In a model
by Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013), producing assessments of credit risk becomes more
costly during economic upturns as wages for rating analysts increase. Agencies then
compromise on rating quality and publish ratings that deviate from fundamentals.
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By the same token, agencies may trade off long-term reputational concerns for the
short-term publicity of sovereign rating changes, for instance to draw the attention of
customers in other business areas, like the corporate rating sector (Attention Hypoth-
esis). In the following section, a model is presented that introduces publicity pay-offs
to a simple theory of rating agency behaviour. It is shown that publicity can provide
a short-term benefit that is traded off against long-run reputational concerns. It can
provide rating agencies with the incentive to change sovereign ratings more often than
justified by movements in underlying fundamentals. In particular, the model shows
that the probability of changing ratings more frequently than justified is greater than
zero if reputational and publicity concerns enter the agency’s utility function with equal
weight. The model is related to a theory by Laster et al. (1999) in which macroeco-
nomic forecasters gain from publicity and therefore have an incentive to deviate from
consensus forecasts.
Model
Set-up Let there be two players, the Credit Rating Agency A and the Public P .2
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, Nature determines the dynamics of
sovereign credit risk x ∈ {0, 1}. Sovereign credit risk changes, x = 1, with probability
pix ∈ [0, 1], or not, x = 0, with probability (1 − pix). In the second stage, the Agency
observes x and can decide to adjust its sovereign credit rating R accordingly. In par-
ticular, it can choose the probability of a change in the rating R = 1 conditional on
x = 1, pi1 = Prob{R = 1|x = 1} ∈ [0, 1]. The Agency may also decide to contradict
Nature by reporting a rating change even though x does not change. Let us denote the
probability of contradicting Nature pi0 = Prob{R = 1|x = 0} ∈ [0, 1]. The Public has
an interest in the dynamics of sovereign credit risk, for instance to adjust its sovereign
debt portfolio. It therefore seeks information about the true value of x. The Public can
2I am grateful to Xueheng Li for his help with this section.
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Figure 3.2: Rating game and pay-offs
decide to pay attention to the rating change a ∈ {0, 1}, where a = 1 denotes paying
attention while a = 0 means the Public ignores whether a rating change occurs. The
Agency and the Public make decisions simultaneously.
Pay-offs and fiscal uncertainty The set-up and pay-offs are summarised in
Figure 3.2. The Public earns b > 0 if x = 1 as a result of portfolio readjustments,
and 0 otherwise. If the Public believes the Agency instead of basing decisions on x, it
receives a pay-off of zero if no rating change is issued although fundamentals change
({R = 0|x = 1}), or if ratings change even though fundamentals do not ({R = 1|x =
0}). The Public gains a pay-off h if R = 0 correctly indicates x = 0.
The Agency has two objectives. First, it receives a reputational benefit r in the long
run if its rating action corresponds to the true value of x, i.e. r > 0 for {R = 1|x = 1}
and {R = 0|x = 0}. r could also be interpreted as a benefit that indirectly translates
into monetary gains in the corporate sector. Second, the Agency gains a publicity
pay-off p > 0 every time the Public pays attention to its rating change.
If there was complete information, both the Agency and the Public would observe
x. Information is available to the Public without cost and it’s pay-off from observing
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{R = 0|x = 0} is h = 0. The Public neither gains nor loses from paying attention to
rating changes and could therefore ignore them, i.e. a∗ = 0. Its pay-off is either b or
0 for sure. Given a∗ = 0, the Agency always provides information that is in line with
true movements in sovereign credit risk. It earns r.
Under asymmetric information, the information set for the Agency remains un-
changed. However, the Public can no longer observe the true value of x in the short
run when it is relevant for investment decisions. It only holds the ex ante belief pix.
Only in the long run, x will be observed by both players and reputation r be realised.
h now becomes greater than 0. The intuition behind this is that uncertainty generates
a cost of information acquisition. Having normalised losses to zero, h becomes the
Public’s gain from knowing for sure that portfolio readjustments are not necessary.
Equilibrium under asymmetric information The Agency will always report
truthfully if fundamentals change x = 1 given that the Public observes its rating change
a∗ = 1, i.e. pi∗1 = 1. a∗ = 1 is the Public’s best response to pi∗1 = 1 and pi∗0 if rating
changes contain more information than the Public’s prior belief over the probability of
x = 1, pix. In fact, the Public will know for sure that x = 0 if it observes R = 0. So
as long as pi∗0 < 1 and the Public values knowing x = 0, i.e. h > 0, it will be better off
paying attention to the rating change. Unless the Agency always reports R = 1 given
x = 0, a rating change conveys some information to the Public. The Public’s trade-off
boils down to not gaining any knowledge and gaining at least certainty over x = 0
through the (second-best) action a∗ = 1. Finally, given a∗ = 1, the Agency adjusts its
response to x = 0 by maximising its expected pay-off. Mixing between reporting x = 0
truthfully and untruthfully issuing a rating change R = 1 is only then the best response,
if publicity and reputational pay-offs are exactly equal, i.e. p = r. The Agency has an
incentive to report rating changes more often than justified by movements in credit risk
if it gains exactly as much in the form of short-run publicity than it gains reputation in
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the long run. If long-run reputational pay-offs are higher than publicity gains, it would
not pay off to mislead the public. Vice versa, if publicity matters more, the Agency
would have an incentive to set pi∗0 = 1 which would make the rating change not credible.
Let us define the Public’s belief that x = 1 if R = 1 is issued µ = Prob{x = 1|R =
1}. The following formal proposition then summarises the argument made:
Proposition: Under asymmetric information there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(pi∗0, pi∗1, a∗, µ) such that the Agency changes the rating with non-zero probability despite
there being no change in fundamentals 0 < pi∗0 < 1, the Agency always changes the
rating if fundamentals change pi∗1 = 1, the Public always observes the rating a∗ = 1 and
the Public believes x = 1|R = 1 with probability µ = pixpix+(1−pix)pi∗0 .
A formal derivation is provided in Technical Appendix A2.
This simple model of rating agency behaviour is too abstract to test empirically,
and pay-offs are not observed in practice to enable a direct test. The model can nev-
ertheless provide the motivation for the Attention Hypothesis of this chapter. Fiscal
uncertainty can generate an asymmetry between the information set of rating agen-
cies and the information held by financial market participants. Rating agencies may
exploit this information asymmetry by changing ratings more frequently than justified
by underlying fundamentals, if they care about their reputation as well as about their
publicity. Differences across rating agencies in the effect of fiscal uncertainty on the
frequency of rating changes may therefore reflect differences in reputational concerns.
In practice, it seems reasonable to assume that the degree of information asymme-
try will be proportional to the degree of uncertainty about the future state of fiscal
fundamentals.3
3Chapter 4 picks up this argument and tests to what extent attention to rating announcements can
be linked to fiscal uncertainty.
79
3.3 Empirical strategy
3.3.1 Sovereign rating data
The dataset covers the long-term debt credit rating of 31 OECD countries over the
period 1999 to 2014 provided by the three major credit rating agencies, Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. Rating agencies report the results of their
assessment of credit risk by assigning a rating from an ordered 21 to 24-notch scale.
Notches are sub-categories of a scale with 9 or 10 letter categories AAA, AA, A, BBB,
BB, B, CCC, CC, C, Default (labelled Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, C, D by
Moody’s). In addition, credit rating agencies sometimes set a country under ‘Watch’
or change the ‘Outlook’ without changing the actual rating. This means that credit
risk is scrutinised more carefully and serves as a warning. If certain conditions during
the ‘Watch’ period are not met, such as a credible return to sustainable fiscal policy,
rating agencies downgrade the rating. Table 3.2 shows the number of end-of-quarter
observations per rating category.
Three main characteristics strike the eye. First, in contrast, for example, to data
on corporate ratings, the sample can only be of moderate size given the cross-country
dimension. As a result, the number of observations in speculative, bottom categories
is zero or very small as sovereign default is a relatively rare event. It may be argued
that excluding non-OECD countries from the analysis may exacerbate econometric
challenges as this reduces the variation in credit ratings. Given that rating agency
analysts make use of different methodologies and factors when assessing developed
countries’ credit risk, compared to that of developing countries, a pooled analysis may
be problematic as well. As the interest in this chapter lies in recent developments in
advanced economies, a focus on OECD countries is justified. Furthermore, data on
macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals related to credit risk are more readily available
for advanced economies. Data at higher frequency (quarterly or semi-annual instead of
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Table 3.2: Observed sovereign rating changes
Total Fitch S&P Moody’s
AAA/Aaa (highest quality) 2492 44.6% 826 43.1% 822 42.1% 844 49.1%
AA+/Aa1 (very high) 501 9.0% 158 8.2% 247 12.6% 96 5.6%
AA/Aa2 (very high) 479 8.6% 205 10.7% 128 6.6% 146 8.5%
AA-/Aa3 (very high) 271 4.8% 99 5.2% 107 5.5% 65 3.8%
A+/A1 (high) 385 6.9% 109 5.7% 103 5.3% 173 10.1%
A/A2 (high) 429 7.7% 127 6.6% 154 7.9% 148 8.6%
A-/A3 (high) 363 6.5% 132 6.9% 176 9.0% 55 3.2%
BBB+/Baa1 (good) 268 4.8% 138 7.2% 78 4.0% 52 3.0%
BBB/Baa2 (good) 97 1.7% 40 2.1% 31 1.6% 26 1.5%
BBB-/Baa3 (good) 114 2.0% 20 1.0% 53 2.7% 41 2.4%
BB+/Ba1 (speculative) 110 2.0% 48 2.5% 17 0.9% 45 2.6%
BB/Ba2 (speculative) 24 0.4% 0 0.0% 21 1.1% 3 0.2%
BB-/Ba3 (speculative) 10 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 9 0.5%
B+/B1 (highly speculative) 2 0.0% 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.1%
B/B2 (highly speculative) 5 0.1% 3 0.2% 2 0.1% 0 0.0%
B-/B3 (highly speculative) 13 0.2% 6 0.3% 7 0.4% 0 0.0%
CCC+/Caa1 (substantial risk) 3 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
CCC/Caa2 (substantial risk) 8 0.1% 5 0.3% 3 0.2% 0 0.0%
CCC-/Caa3 (substantial risk) 3 0.1% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.2%
CC/Ca/C (very high risk) 4 0.1% 0 0.0% 2 0.1% 2 0.1%
DDD/SD/C to D (Default) 8 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 7 0.4%
Total 5,589 100.0% 1,917 100.0% 1,953 100.0% 1,719 100.0%
negative Watch 38 0.7% 11 0.6% 16 0.8% 11 0.6%
downgrades 144 2.6% 45 2.3% 58 3.0% 41 2.4%
no change 5,310 95.0% 1,824 95.1% 1,848 94.6% 1,638 95.3%
upgrades 135 2.4% 48 2.5% 47 2.4% 40 2.3%
positive Watch 17 0.3% 6 0.3% 1 0.1% 10 0.6%
Source: Bloomberg financial database, 31 OECD countries, 1999-2014, end-of-quarter observa-
tions.
annual) allows more directly for an analysis of the effect of relatively frequent events
on sovereign ratings. For instance, the index of fiscal uncertainty constructed in the
previous chapter only covers the sample of OECD countries.
Second, almost half of the observations are found in the top category AAA (or
Aaa). Compared to corporates, this can be explained by the fact that it is much easier
for governments to fund themselves, through taxation or reducing the stock of nominal
debt through inflation. Therefore, sovereign credit risk is comparatively low.
Third, Table 3.2 (bottom) shows that sovereign ratings of advanced economies are
particularly stable. Overall, only 5 percent of Fitch, S&P and Moody’s sovereign
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ratings are changed every quarter, whereby one-notch as well as multiple-notch down-
grades are classified here as a quarterly downgrade (likewise for upgrades). Between
2.4 and 3 percent are rating downgrades, between 2.3 and 2.5 percent are upgrades.
Four countries in my sample (Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland) do not
experience any rating change by either of the three agencies over the entire sample pe-
riod. Several others, including France, the UK and the US, have been downgraded only
once or twice very recently following the financial crisis. Stability of sovereign ratings
from the perspective of quarterly changes partly results from the fact that credit rating
agencies usually revise their ratings only once a year. This approach changed during
the European government debt crisis when sovereign ratings of most affected countries,
i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, were adjusted several times per year,
or even per quarter. Table 3.2 shows that the Watch or Outlook status was changed
with an even lower frequency. In particular, ratings at the upper end of the rating scale
are very stable. Transition matrices show that upgrades and downgrades happen more
often for lower than higher rating categories (Tables A5, A6, and A7 in the Appendix).
AAA (Aaa) ratings exhibit the highest persistence.
A theoretical argument for why agencies have rating stability in their objective
function, alongside accuracy, is provided by Cantor and Mann (2003) and Cantor and
Mann (2006): stability, in particular at the upper end of the rating scale, is demanded
by investors who incur costs if rating changes trigger portfolio rearrangements. This
is because of the sovereign rating ceiling characteristic according to which ratings of
companies based in a certain country usually receive a rating below that of a country’s
government. Corporate credit risk is subject to fiscal and economic policies as well
as the probability of bailouts by the government and therefore partly a function of
sovereign credit risk. Gaillard (2011) attributes the higher frequency of rating changes
in speculative-grade categories relative to investment grade ratings to the sensitivity
of high credit-risk countries to the business cycle (p. 133). Rating agencies achieve
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stability by adopting a so-called ‘through-the-cycle’ approach as opposed to point-in-
time evaluations. This means that agencies focus on longer-term outlooks and claim
to look at deeper structural developments as part of their expert analysis rather than
short-term cyclical movements of sovereign credit risk. Further contributing to stability
and a means to implement the through-the-cycle approach is the fact that ratings are
relative rather than absolute or cardinal measures (e.g. FitchRatings, 2010, Standard
and Poor’s, 2011b, Moody’s, 2013). If a global shock hits all countries to the same
extent, this should not translate into a change of ratings holding all else equal. The
relative nature of ratings deliberately prevents en masse changes. It does not necessarily
imply that the distribution of ratings across sovereign issuers remains fixed at all times
but in the long run distributions should converge. As a consequence, this definition of
credit ratings also impedes direct translations into default probabilities.
3.3.2 A regression model with two processes
In order to test the two hypotheses about the effect of fiscal uncertainty on the way
sovereign ratings are determined by rating agencies, I propose a regression model
that consists of two latent processes which jointly determine the probability of rat-
ing changes. This approach allows me to separately estimate the determinants of the
frequency of rating changes and the determinants of their direction.
Stage 1: credit risk process When assessing whether to adjust a country’s credit
rating, credit rating agencies are assumed to face a trade-off between two objectives:
rating accuracy and stability. Accuracy is achieved through the identification of a set
of economic rating determinants and their weight in contributing to sovereign credit
risk. Movements in sovereign credit risk determine the direction of rating changes, i.e.
upgrades and downgrades. The movement in country c’s credit risk from period t − 1
to t is modelled as a latent process of the form:
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∆R∗ct = β0 + (∆Xct −∆Xct)′β2 + β3(∆Uct −∆U ct) + εct (3.1)
where R∗ct is the latent state of credit risk and the difference operator ∆ denotes the
movement in credit risk from one period to the next. Xct contains the deficit/GDP ratio,
government debt/GDP ratio, real GDP (logs), and the unemployment rate as controls
for fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals, which also enter in differences relative to
the preceding period. Adding changes in fiscal uncertainty Uct as a regressor to the
credit risk equation allows me to test whether credit rating agencies take it into account
as a separate determinant, alongside fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals (Credit
Risk Hypothesis). Coefficients βj reflect the weights assigned by the rating agency in
its assessment of sovereign credit risk to macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals and
fiscal uncertainty, respectively. εct is the error term reflecting other unobserved factors
that are subjectively taken into account by the agency.
Note that I subtract cross-country averages (∆Xct,∆U ct) from the determinants of
the credit risk process (3.1). This accounts for the fact that credit ratings are relative
rather than absolute measures of credit risk. Cross-country averages can be thought of
as a common factor, like global business cycle effects (cf. discussion in Chapter 2 on
cross-sectional dependence in the linear regression context). Working with movements
in fundamentals cleaned from global business cycles brings the regression model closer
into line with approaches by credit rating agencies that look ‘through the cycle’. It can
be thought of as one of the sources of rating stability.
Stage 2: stability process Rating stability may also result from a purely technical
decision whether to change a rating in a certain period or not. A second process is
therefore allowed to determine whether country c’s credit rating can be changed at all in
period t independent of fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. I assume independence
between both objectives. The decision about rating stability is modelled as a latent
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process s∗ct. It remains unobserved to the public and, thus, the empirical investigator.
What enters the observed rating change is a binary outcome. If s∗ct > 0, a rating change
is possible, henceforth marked as sct = 1. Vice versa, s
∗
ct ≤ 0 results in sct = 0 and c’s
rating remains unchanged in t. s∗ct depends on the following determinants:
s∗ct = β
S
0 + C
′
ctβ
S
1 + β
S
2 Uct + it (3.2)
Cct contains technical measures that contribute to rating stability. I include the pre-
vious period’s (linearly transformed) rating level as in Lando and Skødeberg (2002)
and Mizen and Tsoukas (2012) to control for the fact that ratings at the upper end of
the scale are deliberately made more stable. Furthermore, a dummy variable is added,
which controls whether rating changes have taken place in the previous period (so-called
momentum, see Carty and Fons, 1994, Lando and Skødeberg, 2002, Mizen and Tsoukas,
2012). Including the fiscal uncertainty index Uct as an additional regressor allows me
to test whether it can explain rating stability, or conversely, if during periods of high
uncertainty, ratings are changed more frequently (Attention Hypothesis). βSj are the
coefficients assigned by the rating agency to both types of stability determinants. it
is the error term of the stability process. It is assumed to be independent of the error
term εit of the credit risk process.
Joint outcome Whether the credit rating of country c in period t will be downgraded,
upgraded or left at its previous level is determined jointly by the two latent processes
– the index of credit risk (3.1) and the stability process (3.2):
∆Rct =

‘downgrade’ if ∆R∗ct ≤ c1 and sct = 1
‘no change’ if c1 < ∆R
∗
ct ≤ c2 and sct = 1 OR if sct = 0
‘upgrade’ if c2 < ∆R
∗
ct and sct = 1
(3.3)
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Note that only if ratings are allowed to be changed in t and if movements in credit risk
relative to the cross-country average exceed thresholds cj , a rating change is observed.
3.3.3 An adjusted ordered outcome estimator
Sovereign rating stability Section 3.3.1 implies that an estimator of sovereign rat-
ing determinants has to take into account the dominant features of sovereign rating
data. This includes the limited number of ratings in some rating categories and high
rating stability, in particular at the upper end of the rating scale. Rating stability may
result from limited movements in relative credit risk (‘through-the-cycle approach’),
technical factors inhibiting the frequency of rating changes (stability process), and ob-
servations at the boundary of the rating scale (especially in the top category AAA).
Previous studies with an interest in the determinants of sovereign credit ratings have
regressed linearly transformed rating levels on the levels – not changes – of macroeco-
nomic and fiscal fundamentals related to sovereign credit risk (e.g. Cantor and Packer,
1996, Ferri et al., 1999, Monfort and Mulder, 2000, Mora, 2006) (see also Table 3.1).
Alternatively, acknowledging the nonlinear nature of ratings, the probability of falling
into a specific rating category has been regressed on a latent process of credit risk,
itself a function of fundamentals in levels (e.g. Hu et al., 2002, Block and Vaaler, 2004;
Depken et al., 2006, Afonso et al., 2011). However, given that data on sovereign ratings
are characterised by a low number of, or zero observations in some rating categories,
estimating the level of ratings proves difficult. Bruha et al. (2017) and Dimitrakopou-
los and Kolossiatis (2016) deal with missing observations using a Bayesian estimation
approach, which requires a range of prior assumptions about model parameters. Esti-
mating a model of rating changes rather than levels, like in equation (3.1), provides an
alternative. Purda (2007) and Hill et al. (2010) follow such a procedure.
However, due to rating stability over time, in particular at the upper end of the
rating scale, the investigator is confronted with a large number of ‘no change’ obser-
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vations relative to very few ‘upgrade’ and ‘downgrade’ observations, as discussed in
Section 3.3.1. In the context of categorical outcome estimation, the relative abundance
of observations in one outcome category relative to all other outcomes is sometimes
referred to as outcome ‘inflation’. This inflation of observations for one outcome can
yield biased estimates in standard ordered outcome estimation techniques, like Ordered
Probit (or Logit). It has been shown that ‘pure’ inflation in one outcome category leads
to an underestimation of relatively rare outcomes in moderate samples. I define ‘pure’
inflation in this context as inflation due to limited movements in explanatory variables
(credit risk). Vice versa, a data-generating process with a large distance between cut-
off point parameters cj in equation 3.3 can lead to the same result. King and Zeng
(2001) analyse this problem analytically and by conducting Monte Carlo simulations
for a binary Logit model. Their results show that for a sample with properties similar
to those of my dataset on sovereign ratings (N of around 2,000, around 5% ‘change’
events), estimates of the probability of the rare event obtained by the traditional Logit
estimator are around one percentage point lower than the true probability.
In addition, if outcome inflation is partly driven by an underlying stability process,
like equation (3.2), biases in Probit or Logit estimates increase. Harris and Zhao (2007)
explore the performance of the Ordered Probit estimator when the true data-generating
process is category-inflated because of the presence of an unobserved stability process.
Monte Carlo simulations show that marginal effects and threshold parameters estimated
by Ordered Probit are severely biased and type I errors occur relatively frequently. This
provides the econometric rationale for a regression model with two latent processes,
as outlined in the previous section, and controlling explicitly for factors that may
contribute to stability.
The large number of observations in the top category AAA (Table 3.2) may further
add to rating stability. Given that for these observations, additional upgrades are not
feasible even if credit risk improves and technical controls allow for a rating change, the
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number of ‘no change’ observations inflates further. To my knowledge, the reduction
in the set of feasible outcomes for some observations, which is known ex ante, has so
far not been explored in the context of categorical outcome estimation.
By contrast, it is well established that maximum likelihood estimation is subject to
considerable small sample biases because of the restrictive distributional assumption it
imposes (e.g. Shenton and Bowman, 1977; Griffiths et al., 1987). Peduzzi et al. (1996)
and Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007) find that a high number of regressors – like in
the context of rating determinants – can also generate biases in standard categorical
data estimators.
Outcome probabilities An estimator based on Ordered Probit that estimates a
stability process and an ordered outcome process jointly by maximum likelihood has
been proposed as Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit estimator by Harris and Zhao (2007).
It is designed for set-ups in which the first of a range of ordered outcome categories
(category zero) is associated with a disproportionally large number of observations.
The estimator is comparable in principle to Poisson estimators for count data. In
contrast to Heckman-type selection estimators, inflated observations are not truncated.
Instead, they are accounted for when estimating the final outcome. More specifically,
the standard Ordered Probit likelihood function is manipulated such that estimated
final outcome probabilities are conditional on the outcome of the stability process.
Bagozzi and Mukherjee (2012) provide a version in which observations in the middle
category out of three categories is inflated. Their approach can directly be applied to
the two-process model outlined above.
Using equations (3.2) and (3.1), the probability function of the Middle-Category
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Inflated Ordered Probit estimator can be written as:
Pr(∆Rct) =

Pr(∆Rct = ‘downgrade’|Cct, Uct, Xct) = Φ(s∗ct)Φ(c1 − (∆R∗ct))
Pr(∆Rct = ‘no change’|Cct, Uct, Xct) = [1− Φ(s∗ct)] + Φ(s∗ct)[Φ(c2 − (∆R∗ct))
−Φ(c1 − (∆R∗ct))]
Pr(∆Rct = ‘upgrade’|Cct, Uct, Xct) = Φ(s∗ct)[1− Φ(c2 − (∆R∗ct))]
(3.4)
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function. Note that if the stability
process was ‘inactive’, i.e. sct = 1 for all c and t, then Φ(s
∗
ct) = 1 and equation (3.4)
reduces to the standard Ordered Probit likelihood function for three outcomes.
In the context of sovereign rating changes, an additional adjustment to the category-
inflated estimator is needed to yield unbiased estimates. This is because of the presence
of ratings at the boundary of the rating scale: an additional upgrade is infeasible for
countries in the top rating category AAA. Conversely, countries in the Default category
cannot be downgraded further. Put differently, if a rating lies in the AAA or Default
category, it is certain that the probability of an upgrade or downgrade, respectively,
is zero and does not need to be estimated. A boundary adjustment can take this into
account. Consider two dummy variables DAAAct and D
D
ct . D
AAA
ct (D
D
ct) takes the value of
1 if the rating in period t−1 is AAA (Default), and zero otherwise. If a rating lies in the
AAA (Default) category, the agency faces a binary rather than three-outcome decision:
‘no change’ or ‘downgrade’ (’upgrade’). The Probit-based outcome probabilities of such
a Boundary-Adjusted Middle-Category Inflated Ordered Probit estimator (BAM) then
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become:
Pr(∆Rct) =

Pr(∆Rct = ‘downgrade’|Cct, Uct, Xct, DDct , DAAAct ) = (1−DDct)Φ(s∗ct)Φ(c1 − (∆R∗ct))
Pr(∆Rct = ‘no change’|Cct, Uct, Xct, DDct , DAAAct ) = [1− Φ(s∗ct)] + Φ(s∗ct)[Φ(c2 − (∆R∗ct))
−Φ(c1 − (∆R∗ct))]
+DAAAct Φ(s
∗
ct)[1− Φ(c2 − (∆R∗ct))]
+DDctΦ(s
∗
ct)Φ(c1 − (∆R∗ct))
Pr(∆Rct = ‘upgrade’|Cct, Uct, Xct, DDct , DAAAct ) = (1−DAAAct )Φ(s∗ct)[1− Φ(c2 − (∆R∗ct))].
(3.5)
Note that the presence of dummy indicators DAAAct and D
D
ct allows me to take directly
into account the third potential source of rating stability, alongside technical stability
due to the stability process (3.2) and stability from limited, relative movements in
fundamentals of the credit risk process (3.1): stability due to the boundary of the
rating scale. For ratings that would see a change according to equations (3.2) and
(3.1), this change will not be observed if these ratings lie at the boundary of the rating
scale.
Likelihood function I assume that the error terms of the stability process and credit
risk process, it and εit, are independent of each other. Let θ = (β
S′, β′, c′j)
′ be a vector
containing the parameters from equations (3.2) and (3.1) to be estimated by the BAM
estimator. Using the probabilities from (3.5), the log likelihood function, that the ML
algorithm maximises, becomes:
logL(θ) =

log[
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
[Pr(∆Rct = ’downgrade’)]] if ∆Rct = ’downgrade’
log[
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
[Pr(∆Rct = ’no change’)]] if ∆Rct = ’no change’
log[
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
[Pr(∆Rct = ’upgrade’)]] if ∆Rct = ’upgrade’.
(3.6)
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Marginal effects A number of different marginal effects can be obtained to evaluate
the economic significance of stability and credit risk determinants: marginal effects of
changes in the determinants of the stability process or the credit risk process. Marginal
effects may be unconditional, conditional on sct = 1 in equation (3.2), or conditional on
DAAAct = 0 and D
D
ct = 0. One might want to calculate marginal effects at average values
of stability and credit risk determinants, average marginal effects, or marginal effects
on the probability of ‘downgrade’, ‘no change’, or ‘upgrade’. In what follows, I calculate
marginal effects of changes in the determinants of the credit risk process conditional on
sct = 1, and D
AAA
ct = 0 and D
D
ct = 0. The effect of a change in a fundamental variable
on the probability of a rating change is the most interesting from a policy perspective.
In addition, conditional marginal effects estimates obtained by BAM in this way are
comparable to respective estimates obtained by Ordered Probit. I focus on marginal
effects at the average of explanatory variables on the probability of a downgrade.
Conditionality implies setting sct = 1 as well as D
AAA
ct = 0 and D
D
ct = 0. This
allows me to make use of the standard Ordered Probit expression to calculate marginal
effects at the average:
ME
Pr(∆Rct=’downgrade’)
=
∂ Pr(∆Rct = ’downgrade’)
∂x
= φ(−β̂x)β̂ (3.7)
where φ is the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. β̂ is
the parameter estimate and x is the sample average of a variable x.
Goodness of fit The goodness-of-fit of binary outcome regression models is often
evaluated using true positive (sensitivity) and true negative (specificity) rates. For that,
the estimated (predicted) outcome is classified as positive or negative depending on
whether the probability predicted by the regression model exceeds a certain threshold or
not. Likewise, expressions for outcome probabilities given in equation (3.5) can be used
to predict the probability of falling into categories ‘downgrade, ‘no change’, or ‘upgrade’
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with estimated model parameters θˆ = (βˆS , βˆ, cˆj). Using pre-defined thresholds τk,
predictions can then be classified as ‘downgrade, ‘no change’, or ‘upgrade’:
Rˆct =

‘downgrade’ if Pˆr(∆Rct = ‘downgrade’) > τ‘downgrade’
‘no change’ if Pˆr(∆Rct = ‘no change’) > τ‘no change’
‘upgrade’ if Pˆr(∆Rct = ‘upgrade’) > τ‘upgrade’.
(3.8)
To calculate the sensitivity and specificity for all three possible outcomes, I set thresh-
old parameters τl to the unconditional probability of each outcome τk =
1
N
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
Rkct,
where k is one of {‘downgrade’, ‘no change’, ‘upgrade’}. In other words, a predicted
outcome is classified as a ‘downgrade’ if the predicted probability of ‘downgrade’ ex-
ceeds the unconditional probability of a ‘downgrade’. The same holds for ’no change’
and ’upgrade’ observations. Sensitivity is then defined as the share of correctly clas-
sified outcomes relative to all observed outcomes of that type,
∑
Rˆkct∑
Rkct
. Specificity is
the share of correctly classified alternative outcomes, e.g. ‘no change’ and ‘upgrade’
for ‘downgrade’, relative to all alternative outcomes
∑
Rˆl 6=kct∑
Rl 6=kct
. Furthermore, varying τk
allows me to depict true positive rates (sensitivity) as a function of false positive rates
(1- specificity). This yields receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for each
outcome, which are used to evaluate the model’s goodness-of-fit.
3.3.4 Monte Carlo experiment
In order to assess the performance of the BAM estimator relative to the MIOP and
Ordered Probit estimator in the context of rating data, I conduct a series Monte Carlo
simulations.
Experimental design The data for simulations is generated using the stability pro-
cess (3.2) and the credit risk process (3.1). When generating fundamentals Xct, I face
a trade-off. On one hand, I want to simulate results that are most relevant to my
92
application. Ideally, I would therefore use actual data. On the other hand, there is a
need for a ‘controlled lab environment’. Results for different Monte Carlo set-ups need
to be comparable with each other. They should not be driven by patterns in the data
I do not control for. A more general set-up also yields the benefit of yielding results
that are relevant in a broader context. To maintain full control over data patterns,
I generate regressors artificially but orient as closely as possible towards moments of
actual fiscal and macroeconomic series (cf. Table 2.7). Abstracting from moments of
these actual series, I generate ten regressors xgenjct :
xgenjct = ρjx
gen
jct−1 + ejct, (3.9)
where ρj is the autoregressive parameter of the jth regressor series which I set to 0.95
in line with typical properties of actual macroeconomic time series. Initial values xgenjc0
are normally distributed as ∼ iid N(0, 5), and the errors ejct follow a standard normal
distribution. A different set of parameters could have been chosen but ultimately
results remain unaffected by this choice as first differences are taken. I set all elements
of vector β in the credit risk process (3.1) to 1. Doing so makes coefficient estimates
easily comparable. I also consider a linear index of (first-differenced) fundamentals of
the form ∆xgenindex,ct = ∆x
gen
1ct +∆x
gen
2ct +...+∆x
gen
10ct to evaluate the estimator performance
with respect to the number of regressors. As a result, the single coefficient for the index
is also 1.
The regressor Cgenct of the stability process (3.2) is generated as∼ iid 10∗[uniform(0, 1)−
0.5] for every cross-section c and time period t. βC is set to 1; the intercept in equation
(3.2) is 4. The error terms of the credit risk and stability processes, εct and ct in equa-
tions (3.1) and (3.2), are both set to follow a standard normal distribution independent
of each other. This meets the assumptions of Probit-based estimators. Parameters c1,
c2 are used to determine the level of ‘pure’ inflation. Given the symmetric set-up and
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remaining parameter choices, I set c1 = −c2. c1 = −1.5 generates a near balance of
outcomes across the three categories ‘downgrade’, ‘no change’, ‘upgrade’; around 33
percent of outcome observations fall into either category. c1 = −4 inflates the middle-
category outcome ‘no change’ to 76 percent, and c1 = −6 creates around 93 percent
‘pure’ inflation. The specification of the stability process increases the overall inflation
in the ‘no change’ outcome. Replacing sct = 1 for all c and t ‘turns’ the selection process
‘off’. By the means of a dummy variable DAAAct that is set to 1 if uniform(0, 1) > 0.5
independent of t, and zero otherwise, I assign whether a panel observation lies at the
upper end of the rating scale. Given its relatively small importance in practice, the
lower end of the rating scale is left without bound, i.e. DDct = 0 for all observations.
DAAAct adds a third source of middle-category inflation. It is turned ‘off’ if D
AAA
ct is set
to zero for all c and t. The value of the final outcome ∆Rct is assigned according to
equation (3.3) above.
I set the cross-sectional dimension N of my generated dataset to 30 in line with
my actual dataset for advanced economies. Concerning the time dimension, I allow the
generated autoregressive processes ∆xgenjct to ‘burn in’ and discard the first 100 time-
observations. I use the next 60 time periods for a dataset of moderate size with 1,800
observations. In practice, this corresponds to an estimation of the regression model
for each rating agency individually. To create a large-sample benchmark, I instead
consider 600 additional time periods which yields a total of 18,000 observations. This
would correspond to using more frequent data and longer series in practical applications.
Table 3.3: Monte Carlo set-ups
1) ‘pure’ middle-category inflation: 33% vs 76% vs 93%
2) inflation due to stability process: off vs on
3) inflation due to boundary observations: off vs on
4) sample size: 1,800 vs 18,000
5) number of regressors: 10 vs 1 index
Table 3.3 summarises which data characteristics will be varied across Monte Carlo
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set-ups. This yields 48 different Monte Carlo set-ups, for each of which I = 2, 000
iterations are simulated. The set-up with 33% ‘pure’ inflation, no inflation due to the
stability process or boundary observations, N = 1, 800 observations and 10 regressors
will be referred to as the baseline set-up. In every iteration, new errors εct and ct are
generated, while remaining variables Xct and Cct are held fixed across iterations. For
every set-up, the first coefficient in the coefficient for the credit risk process β (or the
coefficient for the index), is estimated by Ordered Probit, MIOP and BAM. Estimator
performance is evaluated using the mean bias per set-up, i.e. the average deviation of
the estimated parameter from the true parameter over iterations v, 1I
I∑
v=1
(βˆ1v−β1), the
root mean squared error of the estimated coefficient over iterations v, RMSE(βˆ1) =√
1
I
I∑
v=1
(βˆ1v − β1)2, the average standard error (SE) over iterations per set-up as well
as the standard deviation of estimates βˆ1 (SD).
Simulation results Simulation results for the baseline set-up are reported in the top
panel of Table 3.4.4 Ordered Probit, MIOP and BAM perform almost identically if ob-
servations are balanced across outcome categories (middle-category inflation of 34.8%).
Estimates contain a small, positive baseline bias, which can be interpreted as a small-
sample bias. This baseline bias is marginally larger for MIOP and BAM compared to
Ordered Probit. Standard errors are small and correctly reflect the standard deviation
of estimates.
Increasing the number of observations in the middle category significantly increases
4Monte Carlo simulations were conducted in Stata/SE 14.0. The programme’s ml and oprobit
commands were used for maximum likelihood estimation. For evaluation, only those Monte Carlo
results were considered for which Ordered Probit, MIOP, and BAM all converged within less than
100 maximum likelihood iterations. This reduces the overall number of results from 2, 000 × 48 =
96, 000 to 70,408 (73.34%). For instance, under the econometrically most challenging set-up – 93%
‘pure’ inflation/ stability process ‘on’/ boundary observations ‘on’/ sample size 1,800/ 10 regressors –
convergence was achieved with less than 100 ML iterations by all estimators in 71.3% of all Monte Carlo
iterations. For MIOP and BAM estimation, Ordered Probit estimates were used as initial values which
improved convergence rates. Without initial values set, overall convergence was achieved in 66.0% of
all iterations (54.3% in the most challenging set-up).
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Table 3.4: Simulation results
Middle-category
inflation
Estimator Bias RMSE SE SD
Baseline
34.8% OP 0.011 0.054 0.052 0.052
MIOP 0.016 0.056 0.053 0.053
BAM 0.016 0.056 0.053 0.053
82.6% OP 0.024 0.087 0.078 0.083
MIOP 0.036 0.093 0.081 0.086
BAM 0.035 0.094 0.081 0.087
92.9% OP 0.051 0.129 0.114 0.119
MIOP 0.081 0.154 0.125 0.131
BAM 0.081 0.154 0.125 0.131
+ Selection process
42.2% OP -0.435 0.437 0.035 0.033
MIOP 0.012 0.059 0.057 0.058
BAM 0.012 0.059 0.057 0.058
84.6% OP -0.256 0.264 0.062 0.065
MIOP 0.028 0.094 0.086 0.090
BAM 0.027 0.096 0.086 0.092
93.7% OP -0.175 0.203 0.096 0.103
MIOP 0.066 0.157 0.130 0.143
BAM 0.064 0.158 0.130 0.145
+ Boundary observations
50.8% OP -0.504 0.505 0.034 0.026
MIOP -0.228 0.236 0.068 0.060
BAM 0.021 0.066 0.062 0.062
86.7% OP -0.326 0.330 0.062 0.053
MIOP -0.035 0.109 0.108 0.103
BAM 0.046 0.108 0.094 0.097
94.5% OP -0.230 0.248 0.096 0.093
MIOP 0.027 0.204 0.171 0.203
BAM 0.113 0.195 0.148 0.159
+ Selection process & boundary observations
56.4% OP -0.587 0.588 0.033 0.026
MIOP -0.280 0.294 0.071 0.090
BAM 0.016 0.071 0.067 0.069
88.2% OP -0.408 0.412 0.059 0.056
MIOP -0.111 0.182 0.106 0.145
BAM 0.040 0.114 0.100 0.107
95.1% OP -0.305 0.320 0.093 0.098
MIOP -0.042 0.234 0.160 0.230
BAM 0.102 0.204 0.152 0.176
Note: 10 regressors, sample size of 1,800.
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baseline biases. This occurs to a larger extent for the complex estimators MIOP and
BAM than for standard Ordered Probit. Simultaneous increases in standard errors
seem to account for this, which ensures that inference remains valid. That ‘pure’
inflation leads to biased estimates confirms earlier findings by King and Zeng (2001).
The presence of upward biases instead of downward biases can be explained by the fact
that I consider middle-category inflation: opposed biases in estimates for ‘upgrade’ and
‘downgrade’ seem to partially cancel out but the normalised measure RMSE increases
substantially.
If middle-category inflation is generated partly by an unobserved stability process
(second panel of Table 3.4), Ordered Probit estimates are severely biased downwards,
as previously shown by Harris and Zhao (2007). However, the variation in Ordered
Probit estimates remains relatively limited and standard errors remain small. Hence
inference becomes highly problematic as biased coefficient estimates likely show up as
statistically significant. Results from MIOP and BAM estimation, by contrast, remain
valid. Only if ‘pure’ inflation is very high do MIOP and BAM fail to distinguish between
the two sources of middle-category inflation and biases increase.
If, on the other hand, asymmetric outcome probabilities, i.e. observations at the
boundary of the rating scale, generate inflation in middle-category observations (third
panel of Table 3.4), BAM clearly outperforms Ordered Probit and MIOP, both of which
yield significantly downward-biased and widely dispersed estimates.
The fourth panel of Table 3.4 provides Monte Carlo results for a set-up in which
middle-category inflation results from a combination of ‘pure’ inflation, the unobserved
stability process and observations for which one outcome is infeasible (boundary obser-
vation). BAM yields estimates that are somewhat upward-biased if the contribution of
‘pure’ inflation is high but outperforms MIOP and standard Ordered Probit, which yield
substantially downward-biased estimates. In particular, Ordered Probit estimates re-
main characterised by relatively small standard deviations and standard errors, which
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makes inference problematic as wrong estimates will remain unrejected by standard
significance tests (type II error).
Turning to the effect of sample size on estimator performance, I find that working
with a larger sample can considerably reduce baseline biases (Table 3.5). ‘Pure’ inflation
still generates biases but these remain small. A larger sample also ensures that MIOP
and BAM estimates are less diffuse; their standard deviation is considerably reduced
compared to the moderate-sample set-up.
If increasing the sample size is not feasible in practical applications, reducing the
number of regressors can have a similar effect on estimator performance. As previously
shown by Peduzzi et al. (1996) and Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007), and confirmed
by Table 3.6, employing one regressor instead of 10 reduces Ordered Probit baseline
biases by a half. The performance of MIOP and BAM is also considerably improved
throughout.
To summarise simulation results, three different sources of middle-category infla-
tion can significantly impair the performance of Ordered Probit estimation in a three-
category set-up. While biases that stem from a high degree of ‘pure’ inflation cannot
be sufficiently eliminated within the realm of standard maximum likelihood estimation,
inflation that stems from an unobserved stability process, given that ‘pure’ inflation is
moderate, can be dealt with by using the MIOP estimator instead of standard Ordered
Probit.
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Table 3.5: Simulation results: large sample
Middle-category
inflation
Estimator Bias RMSE SE SD
Baseline
34.5% OP 0.001 0.016 0.016 0.016
MIOP 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.016
BAM 0.003 0.017 0.016 0.016
82.0% OP 0.001 0.023 0.024 0.023
MIOP 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.024
BAM 0.004 0.024 0.024 0.023
92.6% OP 0.004 0.036 0.034 0.036
MIOP 0.008 0.038 0.035 0.037
BAM 0.008 0.038 0.035 0.037
+ Selection process
41.8% OP -0.428 0.428 0.011 0.012
MIOP 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.018
BAM 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.018
84.1% OP -0.267 0.268 0.019 0.020
MIOP 0.002 0.027 0.026 0.027
BAM 0.002 0.028 0.026 0.028
93.4% OP -0.213 0.215 0.029 0.030
MIOP 0.002 0.048 0.037 0.048
BAM 0.003 0.047 0.037 0.047
+ Boundary observations
50.9% OP -0.511 0.511 0.011 0.008
MIOP -0.179 0.181 0.022 0.029
BAM 0.002 0.018 0.019 0.018
86.5% OP -0.354 0.354 0.019 0.017
MIOP -0.108 0.114 0.033 0.034
BAM 0.006 0.029 0.028 0.029
94.4% OP -0.295 0.296 0.029 0.028
MIOP -0.090 0.103 0.045 0.051
BAM 0.011 0.042 0.040 0.040
+ Selection process & boundary observations
56.3% OP -0.584 0.585 0.010 0.009
MIOP -0.208 0.213 0.024 0.043
BAM 0.002 0.021 0.021 0.021
88.0% OP -0.431 0.432 0.018 0.018
MIOP -0.154 0.163 0.036 0.056
BAM 0.003 0.031 0.030 0.031
95.1% OP -0.372 0.373 0.028 0.028
MIOP -0.141 0.157 0.047 0.068
BAM 0.004 0.046 0.043 0.046
Note: 10 regressors, sample size of 18,000.
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Table 3.6: Simulation results: one regressor
Middle-category
inflation
Estimator Bias RMSE SE SD
Baseline
34.8% OP 0.005 0.037 0.036 0.037
MIOP 0.009 0.039 0.037 0.038
BAM 0.009 0.039 0.037 0.038
82.6% OP 0.010 0.060 0.056 0.059
MIOP 0.020 0.065 0.059 0.062
BAM 0.020 0.065 0.059 0.062
92.9% OP 0.017 0.082 0.079 0.080
MIOP 0.042 0.098 0.089 0.089
BAM 0.042 0.098 0.089 0.089
+ Selection process
42.2% OP -0.425 0.425 0.018 0.021
MIOP 0.006 0.041 0.041 0.040
BAM 0.006 0.041 0.041 0.040
84.6% OP -0.258 0.262 0.038 0.042
MIOP 0.009 0.065 0.062 0.065
BAM 0.007 0.068 0.062 0.067
93.7% OP -0.191 0.201 0.060 0.062
MIOP 0.024 0.103 0.091 0.101
BAM 0.024 0.102 0.091 0.100
+ Boundary observations
50.8% OP -0.495 0.495 0.017 0.017
MIOP -0.210 0.216 0.054 0.051
BAM 0.011 0.046 0.044 0.045
86.7% OP -0.338 0.339 0.034 0.026
MIOP -0.058 0.099 0.082 0.080
BAM 0.025 0.073 0.068 0.069
94.5% OP -0.262 0.266 0.056 0.045
MIOP -0.027 0.148 0.130 0.146
BAM 0.057 0.120 0.105 0.106
+ Selection process & boundary observations
56.4% OP -0.577 0.577 0.015 0.014
MIOP -0.269 0.282 0.058 0.084
BAM 0.006 0.049 0.047 0.048
88.2% OP -0.415 0.416 0.031 0.027
MIOP -0.146 0.193 0.076 0.126
BAM 0.012 0.079 0.072 0.078
95.1% OP -0.332 0.335 0.052 0.048
MIOP -0.103 0.186 0.110 0.155
BAM 0.043 0.127 0.107 0.119
Note: 1 regressor, sample size of 1,800.
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If, on the other hand, inflation is due to a high number of observations for which
some outcomes are known to be infeasible (boundary observations in the context of
sovereign credit ratings), given moderate levels of ‘pure’ inflation, the new boundary-
adjusted estimator BAM, proposed in this chapter, can yield sufficiently unbiased esti-
mates. This, however, comes at the cost of relatively large standard errors. In addition,
small sample biases associated with maximum likelihood estimation make the use of
data with high frequency, long time series, or pooled datasets indispensable if the cross-
sectional dimension is by nature limited. Finally, minimising the number of regressors,
and thereby the number of parameters to be estimated, can improve maximum likeli-
hood estimates by Ordered Probit, MIOP and BAM.
3.3.5 Fundamentals data
Section 3.3.1 introduces a dataset on sovereign rating changes, which is also used for
the empirical analysis. I consider major (across-letter notch), minor (within-letter
notch) rating changes and changes in the watch or outlook status between the end
of the quarter and the end of the previous quarter. The countries included are Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, and the United States. Note that the use of quarterly rating
changes is the result of a trade-off. Hill et al. (2010), for instance, use changes over a
6-months interval instead. Using data of lower frequency, like semi-annual or annual
frequency, may lead to a loss of information if ratings are changed several times per
year, as happened during the recent global financial and European government debt
crisis. Hill et al. (2010) therefore define a fourth category ‘credit crisis’, in addition to
the three outcomes in equation (3.3), to capture multiple-notch downgrades. In light
of the discussion on the estimation of rare events in the previous section, I refrain from
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defining another category and instead use quarterly rating data.
The limitations of quarterly data are set by the availability of data on rating deter-
minants. To capture information available in real time to credit rating agencies and the
public, I use projections published in the OECD Economic Outlook and IMF World
Economic Outlook, similar to data used in Chapter 2. For the variables deficit/GDP
(government net lending per GDP, OECD, multiplied by -1), debt/GDP (general gov-
ernment gross financial liabilities per GDP, OECD), real GDP growth (IMF) and the
unemployment rate (OECD), I use data on the previous year’s estimated realisation
(t − 1), the forecast for the current year (t) and the forecast for the following year
(t+ 1) from spring and autumn publications. Empirical analyses show that a relatively
parsimonious set of macroeconomic and fiscal variables related to sovereign credit risk
can explain a significant part of the variation in sovereign ratings across countries and
time (Cantor and Packer, 1996, Afonso et al., 2011, Hill et al., 2010). Keeping in mind
that a relatively large number of regressors may bias estimates of the regression model
of rating changes, I restrict the set of controls to the deficit/GDP, debt/GDP, real GDP
growth and unemployment. I use current-year annual changes and expected one-year
ahead annual changes in those four variables as potential regressors to account for the
forward-looking nature of ratings. Changes are computed using the data published
in respective projections and not relative to past projections, in order to account for
information updates potentially known to rating agency staff in real time.5 The timing
is the following: data from spring projections are assigned to Q2 and serve as deter-
minants of changes in ratings between the end of Q1 and the end of Q2. Autumn
projections are assigned to Q4 and used as regressors for rating changes between the
end of Q3 and the end of Q4. For Q1 and Q3, projections are linearly interpolated.
The same approach is applied to the semi-annual index of fiscal uncertainty de-
5For the deficit/GDP, I work with differences between t− 1 and t estimates and for debt/GDP and
the unemployment rate I consider projected changes between t and t+ 1. Real GDP growth rates are
used directly as reported.
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veloped in Chapter 2, which I employ as a regressor in the stability and credit risk
equation. In contrast to existing measures of uncertainty, this index has a number of
characteristics that allow a direct identification of uncertainty effects on rating changes.
First, unlike measures of market volatility, such as the standard deviation of govern-
ment bond yields, it captures more directly uncertainty about the future path of the
fiscal deficit, which is a key variable taken into account by credit rating agencies (see
also discussion in Chapter 2). Second, in contrast to forecast error-based measures, the
fiscal uncertainty index developed in this study captures uncertainty experienced in real
time, by credit rating agency staff, financial market participants and the general pub-
lic. Third, by construction, the fiscal uncertainty index is exogenous to rating changes
that occur after official deficit publications have been made public. It is more of a
slowly changing measure of the uncertainty that prevails compared to more frequent
news-based indices like the Baker et al. (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty index.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline results
Table 3.7 reports baseline results for the determinants of changes in sovereign credit
ratings. To increase the sample size and reduce potential small-sample biases, baseline
results are obtained for data pooled across the three credit rating agencies Fitch, S&P
and Moody’s. BAM estimates for the set of fiscal and macroeconomic controls (lower
panel of column II) are compared to Ordered Probit results (lower panel of column I)
whereby Ordered Probit estimates are obtained from separate, unconditional estima-
tions of the stability and credit risk process. Results show that debt/GDP and unem-
ployment have the expected positive effect on credit risk and the downgrade probability.
The effect of GDP growth is negative, independent of the estimator, which confirms
comparable findings in Hill et al. (2010) who estimate their regression model of rating
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changes by Ordered Probit. The effect of deficit/GDP on credit risk is positive but not
statistically significant. Table 3.7 reports marginal effects in percent on the probability
of a downgrade. For instance, an increase in debt/GDP increases the probability of a
downgrade by up to 8.2 percent; a 1 percent higher growth rate reduces the downgrade
probability by up to 23.7 percent (using BAM estimates from column II).
Table 3.7: Baseline results for rating determinants
I II III IV V
OP BAM BAM BAM BAM
Stability:
Fiscal uncertainty 0.08** 0.015* 1.16
[0.04] [0.01] [5.66]
Rating level -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02* -0.005 -0.24***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05]
Momentum 2.38 1.64 -0.96 -0.24 217***
[1.49] [1.19] [0.60] [0.17] [11.5]
Credit risk:
Fiscal uncertainty 0.70** 1.64***
[0.33] [0.51]
Deficit/GDP 0.11 1.05 0.19 0.19 0.08
[0.11] [0.90] [0.16] [0.16] [0.28]
Debt/GDP 0.12** 8.16* 0.30** 0.29** 0.37
[0.05] [4.22] [0.15] [0.15] [0.26]
GDP growth -0.87*** -23.7*** -1.35*** -1.43*** -3.68***
[0.30] [9.04] [0.48] [0.48] [0.85]
Unemployment 1.97*** 40.7** 3.77*** 3.61*** 4.85***
[0.48] [16.2] [1.06] [1.02] [1.48]
Observations 4,859 4,859 4,304 4,128 4,128
Sensitivity ↓ 73.8% 66.7% 81.2% 81.3% 75.2%
Specificity ↓ 72.3% 87.4% 71.9% 71.9% 81.0%
Sensitivity = 82.7% 62.2% 54.2% 54.8% 71.2%
Specificity = 44.6% 82.1% 92.8% 93.0% 73.2%
Sensitivity ↑ 64.6% 100.0% 92.1% 93.0% 76.9%
Specificity ↑ 67.2% 50.9% 63.6% 64.6% 73.5%
Notes: BAM estimation: marginal effects on the probability of ‘change’ (stability process) and ‘down-
grade’ (credit risk process) are computed at the sample average of all variables. OP estimation: separate
estimation of the stability and credit risk process. Standard errors (in brackets) are computed using the
delta method, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ↓: downgrade, ↑: upgrade,
=: no change. Watch observations not considered in columns I to IV, considered as rating changes in
column V. Fiscal uncertainty measure: Uct1.
As expected from Monte Carlo simulations in section 3.3.4, OP estimates are sub-
stantially smaller in absolute terms compared to BAM estimates, which take into ac-
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count the effects of the boundary of the rating scale and the stability process on the
stability of sovereign ratings. Comparing estimates reported in columns I and II in
the lower panel of Table 3.7, I find that BAM estimates are all substantially larger in
absolute terms. This suggests that standard Ordered Probit estimates are likely to be
biased. In fact, the rating level is found a significant determinants of rating changes
independent of movements in fundamentals related to credit risk (see top panel of Ta-
ble 3.7 which reports parameter estimates for the stability process). Ratings at the
upper end of the rating scale (high rating level), are changed significantly less fre-
quently than ratings at the lower end, as the negative coefficient estimate for this
variable in the stability process indicates. Differences between OP and BAM are also
reflected in goodness-of-fit measures (bottom of Table 3.7). BAM correctly identifies
all rating upgrades (upwards pointing arrow) correctly (sensitivity of 100 percent) but
under-predicts downgrades (downwards pointing arrow) and the outcome ‘no change’
(indicated by equal sign). By contrast, OP over-predicts rating changes substantially.
Only 44.6 percent of ‘no change’ observations are classified by OP as such, compared
to 82.1 percent for BAM.
The advantage of BAM over OP is illustrated more clearly by the ROC curves in
Figure 3.3. A larger area under the ROC curve indicates a larger true positive rate at
a given false positive rate, i.e. a higher goodness-of-fit. For downgrades (Figure 3.3a),
OP (blue line) and BAM (black line) curves are similar, with OP only marginally
underperforming BAM. By contrast, the area under the ROC curve is substantially
larger for BAM compared to OP with respect to ‘no change’ observations and upgrades
(Figures 3.3b, c).
Figure 3.3 also shows that accounting for fiscal uncertainty in the credit risk and
stability process improves the goodness-of-fit, although only marginally (grey lines). In
particular, the prediction of downgrades improves (higher sensitivity in columns III and
IV of Table 3.7). This result comes at the expense of poorer ‘no change’ predictions.
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Fiscal uncertainty has a significantly positive effect on the frequency of rating changes.
The coefficient on fiscal uncertainty in the stability process is statistically significant and
lies between 0.015 and 0.08 (top panel of Table 3.7). In economic terms, this suggests
that a one-standard deviation increase in fiscal uncertainty increases the probability of
a rating change by up to 0.08 percent, independent of movements in credit risk. Given
that the unconditional probability of rating changes lies only at around 5 percent,
this is a substantial effect. A one-standard deviation increase in fiscal uncertainty
corresponds to the average change during the financial crisis. However, a number of
countries experienced much larger surges in fiscal uncertainty during the global crisis,
for instance Iceland with 4.4 standard deviations, Ireland with 3.5 and Norway with
2.7. This finding supports the Attention Hypothesis. Credit rating agencies seem to
change ratings more frequently during periods of higher uncertainty than what would
be justified by movements in credit risk. This may be due to an increase in publicity,
which agencies may want to exploit.
While the effect of fiscal uncertainty on rating frequency remains significant, un-
certainty is also considered a credit risk factor by rating agencies. The coefficient for
fiscal uncertainty in the credit risk process is positive and statistically significant in
column IV and the lower panel of Table 3.7. A one-standard deviation increase in fiscal
uncertainty increases the probability of a downgrade by 0.7 percent. I infer that credit
rating agencies take fiscal uncertainty into account as a second-moment effect when
assessing a country’s credit risk. This supports the Credit Risk Hypothesis.
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Figure 3.3: ROC curves for OP and BAM estimates
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Interestingly, the estimated effect is larger, when changes in the watch status are
included in the rating data (column V). This suggests that rating agencies are more
likely to issue a warning first when uncertainty rises, while major and minor rating
changes are announced only as fundamentals change. On the contrary, fiscal uncertainty
loses its explanatory power in the stability process, when watch changes are considered
amongst rating change observations. This could suggest that publicity incentives to
credit rating agencies are larger for actual movements along the rating scale.
Table A8 in the Appendix reports results for alternative versions of the fiscal un-
certainty index. While largely confirming results for the forward-looking uncertainty
measure Uct1, the statistical significance for the disagreement component Dct1 and the
current-year index version Uct0 is lower. Dct1 and Uct0 are significant determinants of
the credit risk process once watch observations are included. Uct0 has a significant ef-
fect on rating stability, independent of movements in credit risk, if watch observations
remain excluded.
3.4.2 Agency-specific results
To gauge differences in rating agency behaviour, I estimate the model for agencies sep-
arately. Results are reported in Table 3.8, for the forward-looking and current-year
version of the fiscal uncertainty index. Given that this reduces the sample size rela-
tive to the pooled specification, a note of caution is warranted that reported standard
errors may be somewhat too large. Overall, I find that the two-process regression
model fits the data equally well for all three agencies, in terms of sensitivity and speci-
ficity. However, rating agencies seem to apply a different weighting system to fiscal and
macroeconomic fundamentals. While all four fundamentals have sizeable effects on the
probability of a change in Fitch ratings, S&P appears to respond mainly to changes
in debt/GDP and growth, while growth and changes in unemployment are significant
drivers of Moody’s ratings. Depending on the uncertainty index version employed, I
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find significant effects of fiscal uncertainty on credit risk for all three rating agencies.
Results on fiscal uncertainty as a determinant of the stability process appear to be
mostly driven by Moody’s rating transition, for which fiscal uncertainty is statistically
significant in the upper panel of Table 3.8. While coefficients for the other two rating
agencies are not statistically significant, the size of the coefficient varies widely, also
across the two index versions. This may suggest that the incentives to change ratings
more frequently during periods of higher ambiguity about fiscal deficits independent of
credit risk movements vary across agencies and the perceived level of uncertainty.
Table 3.8: Agency-specific results for rating determinants
I II III IV V VI
Fitch Standard & Poor’s Moody’s
Uncertainty mea-
sure:
Uct1 Uct0 Uct1 Uct0 Uct1 Uct0
Stability:
Fiscal uncertainty 1.82 7.17 1.07 27.3 71.2 7.54**
[1.21] [4.38] [1.26] [28.66] [319] [3.51]
Rating level -2.53*** -0.10*** -0.13 -0.45 -0.200 -0.07***
[0.08] [0.03] [0.10] [0.66] [0.59] [0.02]
Momentum -2.36*** 3.30 -8.13 -21.6 16.0 4.02
[0.85] [9.00] [11.1] [43.0] [74.1] [5.71]
Credit risk:
Fiscal uncertainty 0.63 0.50* 0.55* 0.61*** 0.61** -0.63
[0.60] [0.27] [0.30] [0.20] [0.29] [0.64]
Deficit/GDP 0.41*** 0.49 0.28* 0.07 -0.23 0.00
[0.14] [0.39] [0.16] [0.30] [0.25] [0.92]
Debt/GDP 0.27** 0.98 0.26* 0.28* 0.17 2.45**
[0.13] [0.74] [0.15] [0.16] [0.14] [1.25]
GDP growth -1.25*** -3.21** -1.87*** -2.30*** -1.44** -4.43*
[0.42] [1.36] [0.57] [0.77] [0.61] [2.58]
Unemployment 3.28*** 8.33*** 2.62 2.90 3.53** 20.8***
[0.97] [3.09] [1.66] [2.90] [1.40] [6.15]
Observations 1,418 1,416 1,429 1,427 1,281 1,279
Sensitivity ↓ 89.7% 76.9% 76.9% 73.1% 78.4% 75.7%
Specificity ↓ 74.3% 84.8% 70.2% 75.4% 75.2% 85.3%
Sensitivity = 52.4% 71.3% 51.9% 65.1% 66.9% 73.6%
Specificity = 95.5% 68.2% 90.8% 78.9% 84.2% 77.2%
Sensitivity ↑ 88.9% 85.2% 87.5% 75.0% 85.0% 90.0%
Specificity ↑ 66.7% 70.6% 63.7% 70.9% 74.5% 76.3%
Notes: BAM estimation: marginal effects on the probability of ‘change’ (stability process) and ‘down-
grade’ (credit risk process) are computed at the sample average of all variables. Standard errors (in
brackets) are computed using the delta method, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. ↓: downgrade, ↑: upgrade, =: no change. Watch observations not considered as rating changes.
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3.4.3 Time variation in agency methodology
To deepen the understanding of rating agency behaviour, I augment the analysis by
considering two changes to the baseline specification. The criticism rating agencies
faced during the recent crisis may have led them to change their methodology after 2009
in order to restore their reputation. De Vries and de Haan (2016), for instance, find that
after the crisis in the euro area, rating agencies have become more cautious and changed
ratings less frequently than movements in bond yield spreads would have suggested,
compared to crisis years. On the other hand, agencies might also change the weight
they assign to the determinants of credit risk in order to make ratings more accurate.
Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) find that over time, financial markets change their pricing
behaviour of sovereign bonds in a sense that weights received by fundamental variables
in determining sovereign bond yields are time-varying. I therefore split the sample at
the crisis year 2009 and estimate the model separately for each sub-sample (Table 3.9).
Results suggest that rating agencies somewhat changed their focus from debt/GDP to
growth, unemployment and the deficit after 2009. With respect to fiscal uncertainty,
results depend on the uncertainty index version employed but overall suggest that fiscal
uncertainty has gained importance as a credit risk determinant. Second moment effects
have become more important after the global financial crisis and during the European
sovereign debt crisis. By contrast, the evidence for an effect of fiscal uncertainty on
the frequency of rating changes (Attention Hypothesis) is smaller for the sub-sample
post-2009, compared to before (upper panel of Table 3.9). Reputational concerns seem
to have gained importance after the crisis.
To test more directly whether publicity considerations matter for the timing of
rating announcements, I check whether a rating agency’s action depends on actions
taken by other rating agencies. For that, I define a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if in a certain period other agencies announce rating changes. I include
this dummy variable as a regressor of the stability process, instead of fiscal uncertainty
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Table 3.9: Split-sample results for rating determinants
Pre-2009 Post-2009
Uncertainty mea-
sure:
Uct1 Uct0 Uct1 Uct0
Stability:
Fiscal uncertainty 9.58 30.4*** -7.65 8.96*
[11.3] [11.5] [7.86] [5.06]
Rating level -0.42 -0.41 -0.24 -0.11
[0.26] [0.29] [0.17] [0.07]
Momentum -70.5 -76.1 73.6 10.6
[66.1] [55.1] [56.4] [18.5]
Credit risk:
Fiscal uncertainty 0.38 1.51 1.11*** 0.02
[0.53] [0.97] [0.44] [0.54]
Deficit/GDP -0.56 -0.45 0.45** 0.79
[0.49] [0.51] [0.22] [0.53]
Debt/GDP 0.47*** 0.44** 0.12 0.06
[0.14] [0.22] [0.24] [1.44]
GDP growth -0.74* -0.69* -2.71*** -6.26***
[0.40] [0.39] [0.94] [2.29]
Unemployment 2.09 1.84 4.26*** 8.89
[1.47] [1.46] [1.65] [8.26]
Observations 2,451 2,451 1,989 1,989
Sensitivity ↓ 72.2% 75.0% 78.3% 69.8%
Specificity ↓ 81.1% 83.9% 72.3% 80.9%
Sensitivity = 67.8% 70.0% 49.1% 71.8%
Specificity = 91.4% 87.7% 89.4% 71.2%
Sensitivity ↑ 100.0% 100.0% 80.8% 88.5%
Specificity ↑ 71.2% 71.7% 67.2% 67.7%
Notes: BAM estimation: marginal effects on the probability of ‘change’ (stability process) and ‘down-
grade’ (credit risk process) are computed at the sample average of all variables. Standard errors (in
brackets) are computed using the delta method, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. ↓: downgrade, ↑: upgrade, =: no change. Watch observations not considered as rating changes.
(Table 3.10, variable ‘Other’). The fact that another rating agency changes its rating
in a given period has a significantly positive effect on the frequency of rating changes
by S&P and Moody’s (columns III, IV), independent of movements in credit risk. This
could suggest that agencies may want to make rating announcements around the time
announcements of other agencies are made, possibly in order to also gain publicity.
This would support the Attention Hypothesis.6
6Gomes (2011), by contrast, proposes a piggy-backing hypothesis according to which rating agencies
may change ratings shortly after another rating agency announces a rating change. This is explained
with the costs of rating production which may incentivise agencies to spend less effort on their own
analysis but wait until other agencies publish their findings. Given that my analysis is based on
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Table 3.10: Other agencies’ actions as a rating determinant
I II III IV
Full sample Fitch Standard &
Poor’s
Moody’s
Stability:
Other agency 28.6*** 57.4 32.8*** 16.3***
[8.69] [92.5] [11.8] [2.80]
Rating level -0.09*** -0.16** -0.10*** -0.038***
[0.02] [0.08] [0.03] [0.01]
Momentum -4.11 -21.2 -4.17 0.38
[5.78] [60.7] [10.0] [3.75]
Credit risk:
Fiscal uncertainty 2.23** 1.00 1.91** 8.35***
[0.94] [1.38] [0.85] [3.03]
Deficit/GDP 0.34 0.52* 0.60 -0.39
[0.34] [0.29] [0.38] [0.64]
Debt/GDP 0.95 0.54 0.43 3.70*
[0.82] [0.42] [0.47] [2.00]
GDP growth -4.21*** -2.22** -4.94*** -5.87
[1.57] [1.05] [1.50] [4.00]
Unemployment 9.08*** 5.13*** 5.46 28.5***
[2.99] [1.75] [4.81] [9.70]
Observations 4,128 1,418 1,429 1,281
Sensitivity ↓ 80.5% 79.5% 78.8% 86.5%
Specificity ↓ 82.3% 83.2% 77.9% 88.0%
Sensitivity = 73.6% 73.0% 69.3% 80.1%
Specificity = 75.9% 75.8% 73.7% 75.4%
Sensitivity ↑ 74.6% 70.4% 79.2% 90.0%
Specificity ↑ 73.4% 72.7% 71.5% 77.3%
Notes: BAM estimation: marginal effects on the probability of ‘change’ (stability process) and ‘down-
grade’ (credit risk process) are computed at the sample average of all variables. Standard errors (in
brackets) are computed using the delta method, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. ↓: downgrade, ↑: upgrade, =: no change. Watch observations not considered as rating changes.
Fiscal uncertainty measure: Uct1.
3.4.4 Application to sovereign rating downgrades during the global
financial and European government debt crisis
A question of high policy relevance is whether sovereign credit ratings were changed
more often during the financial and European government debt crisis than model-
implied rating changes (e.g. Polito and Wickens, 2014, Polito and Wickens, 2015,
D’Agostino and Lennkh, 2016). I therefore compute model-implied downgrade proba-
quarterly rating changes and abstracts from the exact timing, results in Table 3.10 are consistent with
both the Attention and ‘piggy-backing’ hypothesis.
112
bilities using equation (3.5) and BAM estimates of model parameters. Parameters are
taken from three model specifications: one that excludes fiscal uncertainty (correspond-
ing to column II in Table 3.7), one that includes fiscal uncertainty (corresponding to
column IV in Table 3.7), and one that includes fiscal uncertainty but is estimated only
up to 2009 (corresponding to column I in Table 3.9). This also provides an additional
check of the predictive power that fiscal uncertainty adds to a model of sovereign rating
changes. Estimates from the specification for the period after 2009 can be thought of
as out-of-sample predictions.
Results are plotted in Figure 3.4 for Greece and Ireland and in Figure 3.5 for Spain
and Portugal, i.e. countries most severely affected by the European government debt
crisis, as well as for the three agencies Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. They
are contrasted in Figure 3.6 with results for Germany, where no rating changed was
announced over the sample period, and the United States that experienced only one
downgrade by Standard & Poor’s in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Actual rating
changes are marked as red bars in all figures. In-sample predictions of the probability
of a downgrade from a model that excludes fiscal uncertainty as a rating determinant
are plotted as dashed blue lines. Solid blue lines illustrate the movement of downgrade
probabilities over time implied by a model that includes fiscal uncertainty as a mea-
sure. Yellow lines capture predicted downgrade probabilities from a full specification
estimated until 2009, which after that point in time can be interpreted as out-of-sample
predictions. A downgrade can be considered predicted once the estimated downgrade
probability exceeds the unconditional downgrade probability of 3.1 percent, which cor-
responds to the overall sample average of downgrades per quarter. Dashed horizontal
lines mark that threshold.
I find that the model that accounts for fiscal uncertainty (solid blue lines) fares
surprisingly well in predicting rating downgrades of the countries hit by the European
sovereign debt crisis. In a number of cases, the probability estimate exceeds the un-
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conditional threshold shortly before a series of actual rating downgrades occurs. This
confirms that the model could be used to predict sovereign rating changes. This is in
particular true for Ireland in 2008, prior to downgrades of the country’s ratings by all
three agencies. For Spain, initial downgrades in 2010 may not be picked up but the
estimated downgrade probability rises substantially during the country’s debt crisis
of 2011-2012. Interestingly, the estimated probability of a Portuguese downgrade lies
consistently above the unconditional threshold prior to the financial crisis, but rises
significantly as the country enters the crisis period.
Comparing the estimates from a model specification that includes the fiscal uncer-
tainty index (solid blue lines) to one that does not (dashed blue lines), Figures 3.4 and
3.5 illustrate that the latter specification provides a substantially poorer prediction of
rating downgrades. For most of the examples, the estimated probability from such a
specification remains below the threshold for a longer time into the crisis, than predic-
tions from the fiscal uncertainty specification, and only surges in 2010-11. Only for the
safe haven countries Germany and the United States, this specification yields superior
estimates. Figure 3.6 shows that the model-implied downgrade probability remains
below the threshold as no downgrades are observed. By contrast, probability estimates
based on the fiscal uncertainty specification rise briefly for Germany at the height of
the Great Recession of 2009, or in 2002 for the United States, despite the fact that no
actual downgrade was observed.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated downgrade probabilities, Greece and Ireland
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Figure 3.5: Estimated downgrade probabilities, Spain and Portugal
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Figure 3.6: Estimated downgrade probabilities, Germany and United States
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Figures 3.4 to 3.6 show further that out-of-sample results are mixed. While proba-
bility predictions from a model, that is estimated for the sample up to 2009, generally
move in parallel with full-sample estimates (yellow lines), they react somewhat more
sluggishly to increases in credit risk after 2010 compared to full-sample results. This
may be because estimates assign too small a weight to fiscal uncertainty as a de-
terminant of sovereign credit risk, and too large a weight to fiscal uncertainty as a
determinant of rating stability.
Model-implied downgrade predictions are therefore much in line with actual rating
changes undertaken by credit rating agencies. Once fiscal uncertainty is taken into ac-
count as a rating determinant, actual ratings no longer appear to be lagging movements
in model-implied rating changes. This confirms that fiscal uncertainty, both as a deter-
minant of sovereign credit risk as well as a factor contributing to a higher frequency of
rating announcements, can explain the pro-cyclical movement of ratings during crisis
episodes.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter develops a new empirical framework for the analysis of sovereign rating
determinants. The framework accounts for high levels of rating stability over time.
Rating stability may result from the approach adopted by credit rating agencies of
looking through the business cycle, technical factors that determine the rating process,
and a large number of observations at the boundary of the rating scale. Monte Carlo
simulations and an application to data on advanced economies’ sovereign credit ratings
show that empirical approaches not accounting for rating stability can yield biased
estimates and over-predict rating changes.
The empirical framework is applied to test whether fiscal uncertainty affects sovereign
ratings. I find that credit rating agencies consider high levels of uncertainty about the
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future path of fiscal policy a credit risk determinant. In addition, my results show
that credit rating agencies tend to change sovereign ratings more frequently than sug-
gested by movements in credit risk. I interpret this as a result of increased publicity
from which agencies benefit. To confirm the assumption that underlies this hypothesis,
namely that fiscal uncertainty increases the attention to rating announcements, chapter
4 proceeds with an analysis of announcement effects.
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Chapter 4
Attention to Sovereign Rating
Announcements
4.1 Introduction
Having established in Chapter 3 that fiscal uncertainty significantly affects sovereign
credit risk as measured by credit ratings, this chapter turns to the effect fiscal uncer-
tainty can have on the attention paid to rating announcements. Behavioural research
finds that uncertainty changes the way economic agents make decisions. As public
information becomes more noisy, agents may become cognitively over-burdened (Kah-
neman, 1973). They may then revert to simple heuristics rather than analysing public
data as thoroughly as they would in more certain times (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
For investors in sovereign debt, such a heuristic may be the use of sovereign credit rat-
ings as a benchmark. One of the assumptions in the previous chapter is that credit
rating agencies provide information to market participants that they do not previously
possess. Therefore, more attention may be given to announcements about sovereign
ratings, the noisier the public information about sovereign credit risk, in particular as
noisy information often coincides with dramatic events during crises.
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Indirect evidence suggests that sovereign credit ratings indeed gain more attention
during periods of economic crisis in the form of larger price reactions on financial
markets. Crises are associated with downgrades, which, Reisen and von Maltzan (1999)
find, cause larger movements in sovereign bond yield spreads than upgrades. Exchange
rates respond more sharply to sovereign rating announcements when fiscal fundamentals
are weak (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), while stock market reactions are stronger
when global volatility is high (Hill and Faff, 2010). Yet the direct effect of country-
specific uncertainty about variables that determine sovereign credit risk, like the fiscal
deficit, has not been analysed. This is the gap this chapter tries to fill.
I conduct an event study for a set of advanced economies to investigate the impact
of announcements about sovereign ratings. I find that greater fiscal uncertainty sig-
nificantly increases the attention to rating announcements by institutional investors in
sovereign debt: sovereign CDS spreads, i.e. the price paid to insure against sovereign
default, increase more after the announcement of a negative rating event, the higher
the degree of uncertainty about the future path of the fiscal deficit.
The use of CDS spreads to measure the price impact of events on sovereign debt
markets is popular in the literature (e.g. Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010, Kiff et al., 2012).
In contrast to sovereign bond yields or stock market indices, CDS prices are available
as country-specific spreads and no benchmark needs to be identified. Figure 4.1 shows
for the example of Spain that the sovereign CDS spread spikes every time Standard
& Poor’s announce a change of the country’s sovereign rating (red arrows). However,
event study analyses require the estimation of ‘normal’ returns – counterfactual returns
that would arise without the event. In the sovereign context, this is particularly dif-
ficult as announcements about other countries’ ratings may spill over (Afonso et al.,
2012), especially since rating agencies often announce rating changes simultaneously
for a set of countries. In addition, the mechanism by which prices, like CDS spreads,
instantaneously incorporate the new information provided by rating announcements
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Figure 4.1: Spain’s sovereign CDS spread, Google search volume and fiscal uncertainty
rests on the assumption that financial markets are efficient (Fama, 1970). The efficient
market hypothesis might fail if investors are cognitively overburdened with information,
in particular during crisis periods (Kahneman, 1973).
To address these shortcomings of financial market indicators, like CDS spreads, the
second contribution of this chapter lies in introducing to the literature on rating impact
an attention measures that is based on internet search volume. Da et al. (2011) find
that the frequency of stock-related search terms on Google captures attention more
timely and directly than market prices. The Google search frequency can also capture
attention not just of sophisticated institutional investors but the general public more
widely. In addition, by using the frequency of country- and rating agency-specific search
terms, I obtain an attention measure that is cleaner from other news than sovereign
CDS spreads. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the search term ‘S&P Spain’ is looked up
considerably more frequently in weeks during which Standard & Poor’s announced
rating changes for Spain. Figure 4.1 shows further that spikes in search volume tend
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to be larger when the fiscal uncertainty index lies above its average of zero. Overall, I
find that attention measured using Google search volume increases significantly more
when fiscal uncertainty is high.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the existing literature on rating
impact. The event study set-up and attention measures are explained in Section 4.3.
Results are presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Existing literature on rating impact
The market impact of credit ratings has been estimated in a number of event studies.
From work on corporate ratings we know that the impact of downgrades on stock
returns (Goh and Ederington, 1993, Dichev and Piotroski, 2001), bond yields and CDS
spreads (Daniels and Shin Jensen, 2005) is generally significant. On the other hand,
upgrades seem not to have a significant effect. The impact of rating announcements
depends on the credit rating agency that issues it as well as on the rating level (Norden
and Weber, 2004). Announcements are often anticipated (Hull et al., 2004), which
mitigates the direct market impact.
These general findings have been confirmed by event studies of sovereign credit rat-
ings. Cantor and Packer (1996), in an early study, look at the response of sovereign
bond yield spreads to rating announcements. They find significant 90 basis point in-
creases after negative announcements and 130 basis point decreases following positive
news. Response effects are highly significant for sovereigns with low, speculative-grade
ratings but are found insignificant for high, investment grade ratings. Reisen and von
Maltzan (1999) find that, on average across advanced economies and emerging markets,
the impact of rating news on sovereign yield spreads is insignificant. Rating news, and
in particular downgrades, however, do significantly affect spreads of emerging market
sovereigns. This confirms that ratings matter when fundamentals are weak. It may
123
also have to do with poorer quality of information about the state of the economy
in emerging markets, i.e. uncertainty. Brooks et al. (2004) come to the conclusion
that downgrades have significant negative effects on domestic stock markets and the
dollar value of the country’s currency. Gande and Parsley (2005) show that there are
significant spillover effects across countries: rating downgrades in one country signifi-
cantly affect sovereign yield spreads in other countries. Ferreira and Gama (2007) find
that news about sovereign downgrades spill over to foreign stock markets, especially
if the foreign country is an emerging market economy and geographically close. Fo-
cusing on emerging markets only, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) provide evidence on
responses of sovereign CDS spreads to rating changes that contrast responses of other
financial market indicators. In particular positive rating news seems to trigger larger
domestic responses in the authors’ sample, as well as spillover effects, compared to neg-
ative announcements, which are anticipated more often. In line with previous findings,
Bo¨ninghausen and Zabel (2015) find strong evidence for bond market spillovers from
downgrades, especially if countries lie in the same geographic area. Kiff et al. (2012),
who assess the impact on sovereign CDS spreads, confirm that negative credit warnings
(reviews, outlooks, watches) have significant effects, whereas actual rating changes do
not. If upgrades or downgrades move ratings in and out of the investment grade class of
rating categories, their impact becomes statistically significant however. Afonso et al.
(2012) focus on countries of the European Union rather than emerging markets. They
find that rating news spill over from countries that were more severely affected by the
financial and European government debt crisis to less affected countries. Differences in
the market impact across developing and developed countries are found by Alsakka and
ap Gwilym (2012), who study effects on domestic and international foreign exchange
markets. Hill and Faff (2010) find differences in the market impact of ratings across
rating agencies. Standard & Poor’s is found to provide more new information while
Moody’s has more of an impact with ratings for advanced economies. Changes in the
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‘outlook’ or ‘watch’ status are found to be more influential than actual downgrades or
upgrades. The authors also conclude that market reactions are stronger during crises.
In summary, the literature on the impact of sovereign rating announcements finds
that market responses are stronger for downgrades, for countries with weak fundamen-
tals and during crises. This suggests that uncertainty about whether the future path
of fundamentals may lead the country into default, or not, affects the way rating an-
nouncements are internalised by market participants. This chapter is the first to study
explicitly the effect of uncertainty around fiscal fundamentals on the market impact of
sovereign rating announcements.
4.3 Event study set-up
In line with the event study literature, I employ the following approach to analyse the
effect of fiscal uncertainty on the attention to sovereign rating announcements. If Ami
is the movement of an attention variable m around the time an event i takes place,
such as a sovereign rating change for a particular country on a particular day, then the
average attention to such events can be estimated as:
Ami = β0 + β1Ui + β2Ci + i (4.1)
Note that subscript i denotes an identifier for every rating event, i.e. every country-
time combination for which a rating announcement is made. β0 is the constant term.
Ui is the level of fiscal uncertainty for each country- and time-specific event, Ci is a
matrix with control variables, β1 and β2 are coefficients to be estimated, i is the error
term, which may be correlated across observations for each country.
Regressing Ami on the constant term β0 constitutes a simple t-test of whether the
average attention response is significantly different from zero. β1 yields an estimate
of the additional effect an increase in fiscal uncertainty has on the attention to rating
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announcements. A coefficient estimate that is positive and significantly different from
zero supports the hypothesis that uncertainty about fiscal policy increases the attention
to sovereign rating announcements. By measuring uncertainty using projections of the
fiscal deficit published prior to rating announcements, I make sure the fiscal uncertainty
index remains uncorrelated with the error term i.
Gande and Parsley (2005) and Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012), by contrast, iden-
tify responses using so-called comprehensive credit ratings: a linearised scale of major
rating changes, minor (intra-category) rating changes and outlook/watch status. Small
changes serve as the benchmark, whereas larger rating changes are defined as event
and their impact is estimated. Similarly, Bo¨ninghausen and Zabel (2015) define the
difference between single-notch and multi-notch changes as event and estimate if this
triggers a significant response. A problem with this approach may occur if small events,
like the change in the watch status, have a bigger impact than those defined as a major
event. For instance, findings by Kiff et al. (2012) for sovereign rating changes and CDS
spread responses suggest that changes in credit warnings (outlook/watch status) can
have larger effects than changes of rating categories.
I therefore refrain from a comprehensive credit rating procedure. Instead, I consider
a set of control variables in matrix Ci. It includes a dummy for the direction of rating
changes, which takes the value of one if the announcement is positive, i.e. constitutes
an upgrade or a withdrawal of a watch or outlook status. Positive announcements
are expected to lead to a smaller response in attention. I further control for agency
fixed effects and the level of the previous rating. The former allows some agencies to
raise more attention than others. The latter captures differences in attention across
the rating scale. I linearly transform sovereign ratings by assigning a value of 21 to
AAA/Aaa ratings, 20 to AA+/Aa1 ratings, etc. to 1 for Default ratings. Changes at
the upper end of the rating scale are expected to cause smaller responses.
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4.3.1 Sovereign credit rating announcements
To estimate the effect of fiscal uncertainty on rating attention, I employ a sub-sample
of the dataset on sovereign rating announcements introduced in Chapter 3. The scope
of the dataset used for this event study is constrained by the availability of data on
CDS spreads and Google search volumes. The resulting database contains 203 an-
nouncements about major (across-letter category) rating changes, minor (within-letter
category) rating changes, and announcements of a change in the watch or rating out-
look status (145 for the Google Trends sub-sample). It covers announcements for 22
advanced economies during the period 2000 to 2013. Table 4.1 provides the total num-
ber of rating announcements by country, for the overall sample (fourth column) and
the sub-sample for which Google Trends data is available (last column). The highest
number of observations are obtained for Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal – coun-
tries most affected by the global financial and European government debt crisis. No
Google Trends data could be obtained for rating announcements made about Czechia,
Estonia, Finland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden, which drop out of the sub-sample.
Table 4.1 also summarises the number of rating events by type of announcement –
whether the announcement was negative (downgrade or watch or outlook status im-
posed) or positive (upgrade or watch or outlook status lifted). The majority of events
are negative rating announcements (163 out of 203) owing to the large impact of the
crisis on sovereign credit risk.
4.3.2 CDS returns
Like Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), Afonso et al. (2012) and Kiff et al. (2012), I use daily
data on sovereign CDS spreads as a response measure. CDS are credit derivatives that
protect against the default of – in this case sovereign – debt issuers. Spreads are periodic
payments from a buyer to the seller of the insurance and expressed as a percentage of
the amount insured. In contrast to bond yields, for which an appropriate risk-free
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Table 4.1: Sovereign credit rating announcements
Country Positive an-
nouncements
Negative an-
nouncements
Total Google Trends
sub-sample
Australia 1 0 1 1
Austria 0 2 2 2
Belgium 1 6 7 2
Czech Republic 3 0 3 0
Estonia 1 0 1 0
Finland 1 1 2 0
France 0 5 5 5
Germany 1 1 2 2
Greece 2 29 31 29
Hungary 0 17 17 7
Ireland 3 21 24 24
Italy 0 16 16 16
Japan 1 2 3 3
Korea 9 0 9 2
Netherlands 1 2 3 3
New Zealand 0 2 2 1
Portugal 0 22 22 22
Slovakia 13 3 16 0
Slovenia 0 10 10 0
Spain 2 21 23 23
Sweden 1 0 1 0
United Kingdom 0 3 3 3
Total 40 163 203 145
Source: Bloomberg financial database.
benchmark rate needs to be identified to construct a spread measure, CDS prices are
recorded as credit spreads (Hull et al., 2004). The market for sovereign CDS has been
growing over the last decade, in particular since the financial crisis. Around 75 percent
of sovereign CDS are bought and sold by global market-making financial institutions;
much smaller shares are traded by other banks and securities firms, insurance companies
and hedge funds.1 Movements in CDS spreads on event days hence reflect the attention
of professional investors at these institutions to sovereign rating announcements.
Ideally, attention is measured as the abnormal CDS return around the event day,
where normal returns are returns on a benchmark portfolio. In event studies on corpo-
rate data, the average relationship between the response variable and the benchmark
1Source: Bank for International Settlements OTC Derivatives Statistics, averaged over multiple
years.
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portfolio is often estimated for a so-called estimation window: a period before the
event that is uncontaminated by the event of interest and other influential news. In
the sovereign rating context, where announcements by other agencies, rating announce-
ments for other countries as well as various other news affect CDS spreads at a constant
rate, it is hard to argue that such a clean estimation window can be identified. Instead,
I use raw returns to capture baseline effects and follow the literature on the market im-
pact of sovereign rating announcements (Gande and Parsley, 2005, Afonso et al., 2012,
Bo¨ninghausen and Zabel, 2015) by using a relatively short event window of 2 trading
days t ∈ [0, 1], the day of the announcement and the subsequent day. A short event
window ensures that market responses remain unaffected by news that appear shortly
before or after the rating announcement. It also facilitates a causal interpretation:
while in theory rating agencies may react to new information conveyed by movements
in CDS spreads, a short event window helps to mitigate the risk of reverse causality.
The empirical measure for ACDSi is the cumulative rate of return (percentage change)
on the CDS contract for the country the rating of which changes, between the end of
the trading day preceding the announcement day t = −1 and the end of the trading
day after the announcement day t = 1:
ACDSi =

100× p
CDS
t=1 −pCDSt=−1
pCDSt=−1
if ∆Rct < 0
−100× p
CDS
t=1 −pCDSt=−1
pCDSt=−1
if ∆Rct > 0
(4.2)
Negative rating announcements are expected to lead to an increase in sovereign
CDS spreads as they signal to financial markets that sovereign credit risk has increased.
Positive announcements, on the other hand, are expected to have a zero or negative
effect as they signal an improvement in creditworthiness. To increase the size of the
estimation sample and thereby efficiency, I estimate attention responses jointly. To
do so, I multiply CDS returns after positive announcements by minus one to make
them comparable to CDS returns after negative announcements. Compared to absolute
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return values, such an approach ensures that spread movements in an unexpected
direction are taken into account as such.
As other news may affect sovereign CDS spreads even on the day of the announce-
ment, I also provide a robustness check using two measures of abnormal returns. The
first proxy is based on equally-weighted average CDS spreads of all other countries in
the sample and follows Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) and Afonso et al. (2012). The
second measure consists of innovations to CDS spreads that cannot be explained by
slowly changing macroeconomic and fiscal variables. Details are provided in section
4.4.2.
Data on daily CDS spreads are obtained from Bloomberg’s financial database. More
specifically, I work with end-of-day price, bid and ask price data for 5-year USD-
denominated sovereign CDS spreads, priced in New York. Data is available from the
mid-2000s, which is when trading in most sovereign CDS began, and earlier for some
countries, like Hungary, Korea or Slovakia. Dickey-Fuller tests reported in Table 4.2
suggest that the large majority of daily CDS spread series are integrated of order 1.
The relatively strong persistence of CDS spreads is economically relevant as innovations
introduced to the series by sovereign rating announcements are likely to affect spreads
over a long time, rather than constituting only a transitory shock.
Over the whole period, two-way cumulative CDS returns on non-announcement
days are on average 0.138 percentage points (Table 4.3). On days of negative rating
announcements, mean cumulative returns are 2.35, which is significantly larger than
non-announcement day returns. However, on days of positive rating announcements,
mean cumulative returns decrease on average by 0.357 percent but the standard devi-
ation is large and the mean is not significantly different from non-announcement day
mean returns. This is also illustrated by Figure 4.2. For each rating announcement the
cumulative evolution of CDS spreads from 10 days prior to the announcement to 10
days after is calculated. For all negative events, the average evolution of CDS spreads
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Table 4.2: Unit root tests of sovereign CDS spread data
Country Observations Without trend With trend
Australia 1,397 0.200 0.316
Austria 2,327 0.225 0.473
Belgium 2,826 0.522 0.798
Czech Republic 1,986 0.276 0.655
Estonia 1,387 0.711 0.610
Finland 1,592 0.391 0.837
France 2,806 0.551 0.695
Germany 2,826 0.449 0.589
Greece 2,826 0.605 0.693
Hungary 3,077 0.547 0.555
Ireland 1,622 0.626 0.966
Italy 2,826 0.530 0.518
Japan 2,866 0.528 0.545
Korea 3,088 0.091 0.247
Netherlands 1,387 0.287 0.691
New Zealand 1,208 0.063 0.225
Portugal 2,806 0.679 0.841
Slovakia 3,181 0.414 0.418
Slovenia 2,274 0.769 0.537
Spain 2,534 0.521 0.591
Sweden 2,594 0.200 0.412
United Kingdom 1,407 0.237 0.066
Note: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the null hypothesis that the variable has a unit root. Approx-
imate p-values for the relevant test statistic are reported.
Table 4.3: Cumulative 2-day returns on sovereign CDS
N Mean t-test Std Dev
Non-event day 50,636 0.138 7.523
Negative announcement 163 2.350 0.000 6.941
Positive announcement 40 -0.357 0.707 8.261
Note: Estimation sample, t-test of difference in means relative to non-event days, p-value reported.
around the announcement is depicted by the solid line in 4.2a; for positive events the
solid line in panel (b) draws the corresponding average movement. Figure 4.2a illus-
trates that around 5 days prior to negative rating announcements, spreads somewhat
widen on average, then decrease a little but increase sharply during the first four days
after the announcement. By contrast, spreads appear to decrease gradually during days
preceding positive rating announcements (Figure 4.2b). Average spreads then appear
to increase somewhat on the announcement day, and drop further the day after. This
suggests that positive announcements are anticipated more often by financial market
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Figure 4.2: Average response of CDS spreads to sovereign rating announcements
participants. Figure 4.2 also suggests that fiscal uncertainty alters the way announce-
ments about sovereign ratings impact financial markets. Dotted lines depict the average
evolution of spreads by type of announcement for the subcategory of events for which
fiscal uncertainty is high, defined as Uct1 > 0, i.e. whenever the index version based on
year-ahead forecasts lies above the overall sample average. During periods of high fiscal
uncertainty, spread changes are larger on average. Spreads increase much more sharply
after negative rating announcements but also seem to increase prior to positive rating
announcements. During periods of below-average uncertainty (dashed lines, defined as
Uct1 < 0), average spread changes are somewhat less pronounced.
4.3.3 Internet search volume
Given that spillover effects from announcements about other countries’ ratings and
other news about sovereign credit risk may attenuate CDS returns, I use an addi-
tional measure of attention to sovereign rating announcements: the rating news-related
Google search volume obtained from Google Trends. Internet search volume has been
shown to improve forecasts of consumption activity (Vosen and Schmidt, 2011, Choi
and Varian, 2012, Carrie`re-Swallow and Labbe´, 2013), unemployment (Askitas and
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Zimmermann, 2009) and inflation (Guzman, 2011) by providing real-time information.
Da et al. (2011) argue with Kahneman (1973) that the efficient market hypothesis
might fail if investors are cognitively overburdened with information, hence attention
may be limited and prices do not reflect all available information. This may also be
true for ratings announcements if they are accompanied by a number of other relevant
news about sovereign credit risk, in particular during crises. Da et al. (2011) propose
as a direct measure of investor attention the frequency of stock-related search terms
on Google, which, they find, correlates with existing attention measures (albeit at low
levels), captures attention in a more timely way, reflects the attention of less sophisti-
cated individual investors and can predict stock prices in the short run. In Cunha et al.
(2017), the frequency of the search term ‘credit ratings’ on Google is used to measure
public attention to announcements by credit rating agencies about the credit risk of
local government debt across US states.
I construct an attention measure of sovereign rating-related Google search requests
as follows. For every country in the sample and the three main credit rating agencies
Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, I obtain the weekly search volume of the search
term ‘[agency] [country]’ from Google Trends in the English language.2 Compared to
CDS returns, rating news-related search volume is likely capturing the attention by
the (informed) general population to sovereign rating announcements, rather than so-
phisticated investors, who will access this information through other channels, like
Bloomberg or Reuters terminals. The measure therefore reflects a more widely defined
type of attention that may be relevant to credit rating agencies, if they care about
their reputation among the general public. It measures attention more directly than
movements in CDS spreads given that it is country- and rating agency-specific. Fur-
thermore, Google search volume defined this way is robust to spillover effects from
2[country] is one of ‘austria’, ‘belgium’, ‘germany’, ‘spain’, ‘france’, ‘greece’, ‘hungary’, ‘ireland’,
‘israel’, ‘italy’, ‘japan’, ‘korea’, ‘netherlands’, ‘new zealand’, ‘portugal’, ‘uk’. [agency] is one of ‘fitch’,
‘s&p’, ‘moodys’. Google search terms are not case-sensitive.
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announcements about other countries’ ratings.
The search volume-based attention measure is defined as the frequency of the coun-
try and agency-specific search term in the week of the rating announcement w. The
search volume from Google Trends is given as an index value on a 1 to 100 scale relative
to other search requests in the respective week, and relative to the history of the search
volume of the term. Following Da et al. (2011), I use the natural log of search volume
as the attention measure and control for country-agency fixed effects in equation (4.1).
Given the relative nature of Google Trends series, I check the robustness of the results
using a scaled version.3 To do so, I divide the search volume during the announce-
ment week by the average search volume across the whole search volume series for each
agency- and country-specific search term:
AGooglei =
SVi(‘country’ ‘agency’)
1
W
W∑
w=1
SVw(‘country’ ‘agency’)
(4.3)
for announcement week i and all other weeks w.
4.4 Event study results
4.4.1 Baseline results for CDS returns
Baseline results for cumulative (normal) CDS returns are reported in Table 4.4. As ex-
pected, changes in CDS spreads after rating announcements are substantially different
from zero as indicated by statistically significant estimates of the constant term. This
confirms the findings in the literature. Controlling for agency fixed effects (columns
II to V) improves the goodness of fit, which implies that announcements by differ-
ent agencies receive different attention on financial markets. By contrast, whether the
announcement is positive or negative, or whether it is announced for ratings at the
3Bontempi et al. (2016) discuss the comparability of Google Trends volumes across search terms in
detail.
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Table 4.4: Baseline results for CDS returns
I II III IV V
Uncertainty measure: Uct1 Uct1 Uct1 Dct1 Uct0
Fiscal uncertainty 0.645** 0.663** 0.713*** 1.163*** 0.127*
[0.29] [0.28] [0.21] [0.40] [0.07]
Positive announcement -1.232 -1.772 -1.420
[1.29] [1.43] [1.34]
Rating level -0.226 -0.136 -0.182
[0.15] [0.17] [0.15]
Constant 1.814*** 3.463*** 6.451*** 5.609** 6.451***
[0.56] [0.77] [2.07] [2.57] [2.07]
Agency FE no yes yes yes yes
Observations 203 203 203 203 203
R-squared 0.024 0.049 0.070 0.069 0.048
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
upper or lower end of the rating scale, does not seem to affect CDS spread responses.
Coefficients for both variables remain statistically insignificant (columns III to V).
By contrast, fiscal uncertainty significantly increases the absolute response of sovereign
CDS spreads. The higher the degree of fiscal uncertainty, the more attention rating
announcements receive on markets for sovereign CDS. The impact of a one-standard
deviation increase in fiscal uncertainty on the percentage change in CDS spreads over
the two days after the rating announcement depends on the uncertainty measure and
lies between 0.127 and 0.713 percentage points. The effect for the disagreement com-
ponent of the fiscal uncertainty index is even larger (column IV). This could imply that
financial markets are more sensitive to idiosyncratic uncertainty, rather than common
shocks to fiscal policy. The effect of the latter on sovereign credit risk may be more
easily gauged without rating information. In other words, the information content of
ratings appears to be larger when uncertainty is driven by differences in the assessment
of fiscal outcomes across forecasters.
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4.4.2 Cumulative abnormal returns
As discussed above, raw CDS returns may respond to other information and therefore
be contaminated. However, defining abnormal returns as the difference between raw
returns and normal returns is difficult in the sovereign context. Ismailescu and Kazemi
(2010) and Afonso et al. (2012) define normal returns as returns of an equally-weighted
average CDS spread of all countries in the sample other than the country of interest.
Abnormal returns are then defined as cumulative returns on adjusted CDS spreads,
the difference between the observed rate of change in the spread and the cross-country
average change. I apply their approach to my sample and report results in panel
A of Table 4.5. This shows that the effects of uncertainty remain positive but only
statistically significant in the case of my forward-looking index version Uct1. Lower
statistical significance may result from spillovers of rating news across countries (cf.
Gande and Parsley, 2005, and Ferreira and Gama, 2007), in particular as cross-country
average returns may also pick up CDS responses of those countries for which rating
announcements are made on the same day.
However, while the relatively short event window ensures that CDS returns do not
capture a substantial amount of other news, CDS returns may be consistently higher or
lower during different periods of time, independent of rating announcements. In partic-
ular, fiscal uncertainty or global market volatility may lead to an elevation of average
two-day cumulative returns, and so may a deterioration in fiscal and macroeconomic
fundamentals. To obtain an alternative proxy of normal cumulative returns, I therefore
regress raw returns on a range of slowly-changing variables that themselves do not re-
spond to rating announcements, as well as on year- and country-fixed effects. Table A9
in the Appendix reports results for the three fiscal uncertainty index versions and three
different sets of regressors. Specification (1) regresses two-day cumulative CDS returns
on year- and country-fixed effects and fiscal uncertainty only. Rather than increasing
CDS spreads, fiscal uncertainty is found to have no statistically significant effect, or
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even a negative effect.
In specification (2), I include changes in the VIX as a measure of global volatility.
It has a significantly positive effect. I also include the lagged level of CDS spreads and
the VIX to account for an error correction mechanism. In fact, the significantly neg-
ative coefficient on the level of CDS spreads and the significant VIX coefficient imply
that CDS spreads tend to return to a long-run equilibrium defined by global sentiment.
Specification (3) adds as controls the current-year and one-year-ahead forecasts of fis-
cal and macroeconomic fundamentals. Fiscal variables are found to significantly affect
average cumulative CDS returns. Residuals from these regressions are interpreted as
cumulative abnormal CDS returns. They are orthogonal to components predictable
by fiscal uncertainty, global sentiment, or fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. In
panels B to D of Table 4.5, I employ cumulative abnormal returns defined in this way
as the dependent variable. Results confirm the robustness of the findings based on
raw CDS returns. The effect of fiscal uncertainty is statistically significant through-
out, independent of the index version employed and the specification used to calculate
abnormal returns. In fact, coefficients are somewhat larger than those for raw returns
reported in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.5: Cumulative abnormal CDS returns
I II III
Uncertainty measure: Uct1 Dct1 Uct0
A) Normal returns defined as weighted averages
Fiscal uncertainty 0.358** 0.580 0.057
[0.17] [0.42] [0.04]
Constant 5.777*** 5.053** 5.472***
[1.79] [2.19] [1.76]
Observations 203 203 203
R squared 0.067 0.067 0.057
B) Normal returns controlling for fiscal uncertainty (specification 1)
Fiscal uncertainty 0.856*** 1.118** 0.270***
[0.22] [0.41] [0.08]
Constant 7.017*** 5.339* 6.336**
[2.36] [2.71] [2.23]
Observations 199 203 199
R squared 0.078 0.064 0.065
C) Normal returns controlling for volatility (specification 2)
Fiscal uncertainty 0.866** 1.152** 0.167**
[0.33] [0.43] [0.07]
Constant 6.989*** 5.319** 6.200***
[1.73] [1.88] [1.70]
Observations 172 174 172
R-squared 0.100 0.084 0.064
D) Normal returns controlling for full set of fundamentals (specification 3)
Fiscal uncertainty 0.847** 1.154** 0.246***
[0.31] [0.42] [0.07]
Constant 6.269*** 4.463** 5.505***
[1.85] [1.92] [1.78]
Observations 172 174 172
R squared 0.093 0.076 0.074
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All specifications control for positive announcement effects, the rating level and agency fixed effects.
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4.4.3 Controlling for CDS liquidity
In Table 4.6, I control for the rate of growth of the bid-ask spread relative to the
CDS spread within the event window. The change in the bid-ask spread approximates
changes in the liquidity of the CDS contract. In contrast to slowly changing fiscal and
macroeconomic determinants of sovereign CDS spreads, liquidity may change daily
around the rating announcement. This may be because the rating announcement trig-
gers an increase in liquidity (or a decrease in the bid-ask spread) as more investors enter
the market. Controlling for short-term liquidity changes is also motivated by work on
insider trading in CDS markets and endogenous liquidity. Acharya and Johnson (2007)
argue theoretically that in markets that are dominated by banks that serve both as
loan providers and as intermediaries in the credit derivatives market – i.e. like in the
sovereign CDS market – asymmetric information in the form of insider trading may
prevail. Uninformed market makers may then decrease their liquidity before events
in order to avoid the exploitation by insiders. This should lead to a decrease in liq-
uidity before, in particular, negative rating announcements and possibly price effects.
Acharya and Johnson (2007) fail to find empirical evidence for these theoretical con-
siderations on US corporate CDS markets. Qiu and Yu (2012), by contrast, do find
evidence for a positive effect of liquidity on CDS prices if there are many dealers and
room for information asymmetries.
Interestingly, the change in the bid-ask spread is only a significant determinant of
cumulative CDS returns following positive rating announcements. This can be seen
in the interaction between the bid-ask spread and the dummy for positive announce-
ments in columns II, IV and VI of Table 4.6. If liquidity (the bid-ask spread) decreases
(increases) during the event period, then the CDS price effect is more pronouncedly
negative (multiplying the coefficient by -1 given the definition of CDS returns in equa-
tion (4.2)). CDS spreads drop as demand for insurance against sovereign default de-
creases and investors leave the CDS market. For negative announcements (baseline
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coefficient on the bid-ask spread), this effect remains statistically insignificant. Two
counteracting forces may be at work. Following negative announcements, liquidity in-
creases (the bid-ask spread decreases) as more investors enter the market and demand
for CDS increases. In fact, the bid-ask spread decreases on average by 14 percent fol-
lowing negative announcements (whereas it increases by 3 percent following positive
announcements). Higher demand increases the CDS spread further; this effect seems
to dominate. Yet supply may also increase, which has a countervailing negative effect
on spreads. Future work could explore further how these results can be reconciled with
findings on insider trading.
Table 4.6: CDS returns controlling for liquidity effects
I II III IV V VI
Uncertainty measure: Uct1 Uct1 Dct1 Dct1 Uct0 Uct0
Fiscal uncertainty 0.920** 0.951** 1.305*** 1.440*** 0.139 0.136
[0.34] [0.35] [0.34] [0.25] [0.08] [0.08]
Positive announcement -1.298 -1.911 -1.961 -2.641* -1.559 -2.166
[1.28] [1.18] [1.42] [1.27] [1.32] [1.29]
Rating level -0.211 -0.236* -0.099 -0.119 -0.147 -0.168
[0.13] [0.13] [0.14] [0.14] [0.13] [0.13]
Bid-ask spread 0.021 0.007 0.020 0.005 0.018 0.004
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02]
*positive ann. 0.186* 0.195* 0.179*
[0.10] [0.10] [0.10]
Constant 6.924*** 7.290*** 5.171** 5.434** 6.071*** 6.393***
[1.67] [1.81] [1.84] [2.01] [1.61] [1.63]
Agency FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 195
R-squared 0.098 0.146 0.087 0.140 0.056 0.101
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
4.4.4 Google Trends results
Table 4.7 reports results for the response of Google search volume to sovereign rating
announcements. I find that fiscal uncertainty increases the attention of Google users.
This supports the hypothesis of higher attention during periods of uncertainty and is in
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line with findings for CDS spreads. It also suggests that non-professional stakeholders
pay more attention to rating changes during periods of higher fiscal uncertainty by
increasing the frequency at which they search information about these changes on the
internet.
The effect is statistically significant when agency-country-fixed effects are controlled
for, i.e. the peculiar nature of Google Trends data is taken into account that arises from
the normalisation of search volume time series for each search term. A one-standard
deviation increase in fiscal uncertainty increases the volume of internet search by 4.9
percent. For the disagreement component of the index Dct1, results are again higher
and lie at 14.3 percent.
Interestingly, the rating level is a statistically significant regressor for Google search
volumes. Announcements about ratings at the upper end of the rating scale trigger sig-
nificantly smaller search frequencies than announcements about lower ratings. Whether
the announcement is negative or positive does not have a significant effect.
Overall findings are confirmed by Table A10 in the Appendix, which considers
effects on scaled Google Trends data series. Note that, in contrast to results for the
impact on CDS spreads, the constant term estimate for Google Trends responses does
not carry any meaning and simply reflects the average response of the search volume
index during announcement weeks. Given the interest lies solely in the effect of fiscal
uncertainty on attention during announcement weeks, I do not attempt to explicitly
estimate whether attention during non-announcement weeks is different, although the
scaled version of the Google Trends attention measure implicitly accounts for search
volume during weeks in which no rating announcement is made.
4.4.5 Other uncertainty measures
Tables A11 and A12 in the Appendix provide results for alternative measures of uncer-
tainty, for CDS spreads and Google search volume respectively. These show that mea-
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Table 4.7: Google Trends results
I II III IV V
Uncertainty measure: Uct1 Uct1 Uct1 Dct1 Uct0
Fiscal uncertainty 0.025 0.023** 0.049* 0.143*** 0.016***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.04] [0.00]
Positive announcement -0.488 -0.506 -0.490
[0.29] [0.30] [0.31]
Rating level -0.049** -0.049** -0.039**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Constant 3.048*** 2.647*** 3.659*** 3.687*** 3.441***
[0.06] [0.00] [0.44] [0.42] [0.35]
Agency-Country FE no yes yes yes yes
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
R-squared 0.003 0.304 0.334 0.341 0.331
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
sures that do not capture uncertainty about fiscal fundamentals directly, like the EPU
and sovereign bond yield volatility, do not significantly affect attention to sovereign
rating announcements. From ex post observable absolute forecast errors, only the error
in year-ahead deficit forecasts appears to have an effect on CDS spreads (Table A11,
column IV), but not on Google search volume (Table A12, columns III, IV). This serves
as another proof that the index of fiscal uncertainty developed in Chapter 2 captures
better the degree of uncertainty related to fiscal outcomes, which are relevant in the
context of sovereign credit risk, compared to existing proxies.
4.5 Conclusion
The two event studies conducted in this chapter show that changes in sovereign credit
ratings gain more attention on financial markets, and among the wider public, the
higher the degree of uncertainty about the future path of the fiscal deficit. Both absolute
returns on sovereign CDS as well as the frequency of country- and rating agency-specific
search requests on Google are larger after sovereign rating announcements if fiscal
uncertainty is high. Results hold independently of the measurement of uncertainty in
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forecasts of the fiscal deficit, i.e. for different versions of the fiscal uncertainty index.
Results are also robust to specifications that control for the effect of slowly moving fiscal
and macroeconomic fundamentals on cumulative CDS returns, liquidity on markets for
sovereign CDS and the definition of Google Trends search volumes.
By showing that attention to actions taken by credit rating agencies depends on the
degree of noise about the information agencies are expected to provide expert analysis
on, this chapter confirms empirically one key assumption in models of credit rating
agency behaviour. Market participants seek rating news when these news add to the
stock of publicly available information. The result may provide one possible explanation
for why rating agencies adjust sovereign credit ratings more frequently during periods
of higher uncertainty than justified by movements in sovereign credit risk: an increase
in attention may correspond to publicity gained by rating agencies.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent ’Great Recession’ brought three
main themes to the forefront of the academic and policy debate: the importance of
uncertainty for economic outcomes, the implications of fiscal policy becoming active,
and sovereign credit risk as an issue that can also arise in advanced economies, not only
in the developing world. This doctoral thesis provides a joint account of these themes.
This final chapter summarises the main methodological advances made and directs to
potential future avenues of research. It discusses the findings obtained in individual
thesis chapters, discusses their interrelation and outlines potential policy implications.
A first contribution is made to a literature that is concerned with the measure-
ment of economic uncertainty. While the aftermath of the recent crisis brought about
a number of new approximations to macroeconomic uncertainty (Jurado et al., 2015,
Rossi and Sekhposyan, 2015) and economic policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016), a
coherent measure of fiscal uncertainty has not been agreed on. Chapter 2 proposes a
proxy that is directly related to fiscal outcomes in the near term, comparable across
advanced economies and observable in real time. It develops further the uncertainty
index Lahiri and Sheng (2010) construct for macroeconomic forecasts to apply it to
official projections of the fiscal deficit provided by the IMF, the OECD and the Eu-
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ropean Commission. The method by Lahiri and Sheng (2010) consists of constructing
two index components: forecast disagreement and expectations about the variance of
common shocks. The authors argue that disagreement alone does not capture economic
uncertainty fully. I confirm this for my sample of fiscal forecasts and find that the vari-
ance of common fiscal forecast shocks is particularly important in the aftermath of the
financial crisis, i.e. when innovations to fiscal policy came as a surprise to all forecast-
ers. Fiscal forecasts are subject to considerable biases as forecasting institutions are too
optimistic about governments’ budgetary positions, likely as a result of the data they
are provided with by fiscal authorities. I therefore clean the forecast data from pre-
dictable components before constructing the disagreement measure. Lahiri and Sheng
(2010) obtain an empirical proxy for the variance of aggregate shocks in macroeconomic
series from a GARCH estimation. Given that fiscal forecasts are available only at a low
frequency and a limited number of years, such an approach cannot be easily applied to
fiscal deficit data. Instead, I propose the use of unexpected forecast innovations. These
are obtained by stripping forecast revisions from components that are predictable at
the time the initial forecast is made. The fiscal deficit relative to GDP is a widely
used indicator of the fiscal position. Uncertainty around this indicator therefore has
implications for a large number of stakeholders, in the public and the private sector.
However, the fiscal deficit subsumes cyclical adjustments made to the government bud-
get balance as well as interest payments, uncertainty about which therefore also enters
the index. Future work could consider using a more direct measure of discretionary
spending, such as the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, provided the availability of
such data improves. A fiscal uncertainty index based on the cyclically-adjusted primary
balance would capture more directly the uncertainty about planned fiscal policies. The
fiscal deficit is also the fiscal indicator that is most coherently measured across fore-
casters. As more forecasters, including private sector professionals, report fiscal deficit
projections, the index could be extended to include a larger number of point forecasts.
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Likewise, if fiscal forecasters were to provide an indication of forecast probabilities, for
instance in the form of density forecasts, this could provide a better proxy of fiscal
uncertainty. Fiscal deficit forecasts are also only consistently available for a forecast
horizon up to one year. The fiscal uncertainty index therefore captures uncertainty
about fiscal policy measures that may be adopted within a relatively short time frame.
Using fiscal forecasts for longer horizons, where available, may instead shed light on
uncertainty about the long-term sustainability of fiscal policy.
The resulting index is closely related to the theoretical concept of fiscal uncertainty,
according to which fiscal instruments follow stochastic processes. It allows a more direct
analysis of the factors that underlie fiscal uncertainty compared to existing measures
of fiscal policy discretion (Sørensen et al., 2001, Gal´ı and Perotti, 2003, Lane, 2003,
Cimadomo, 2012), fiscal forecast errors (Jonung and Larch, 2006, von Hagen and Wolff,
2006, de Castro et al., 2013), or fiscal policy volatility (Henisz, 2004, Zhou, 2009, Agnello
and Sousa, 2013). I assess the correlation between the new fiscal uncertainty index and
factors that the literature identifies as the drivers of fiscal policy discretion and forecast
errors. In particular, I estimate the link between fiscal uncertainty and the business
cycle, financial sector vulnerabilities and elections. I also look at possible constraints
to fiscal policy, which may reduce fiscal uncertainty. More specifically, I estimate the
role of institutional constraints, such as the participation in an Economic Adjustment
Programme enforced by international institutions, and the role of debt stabilisation,
which may reduce fiscal space. The latter is approximated using the level of debt/GDP,
which is only an incomplete proxy of fiscal space. It may be worthwhile in future work
to estimate linkages between fiscal uncertainty and more direct estimates of fiscal space
provided by international institutions (e.g. Blanchard, 1990, Kose et al., 2017), or
model-based estimates of fiscal space (e.g. Polito and Wickens, 2012). Another avenue
for future work may consist of testing recently proposed theoretical predictions about
the effects of fiscal uncertainty on economic activity (e.g. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.,
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2015), the effectiveness of fiscal policy (Ricco et al., 2016) and risk premia (e.g. Sialm,
2006, Pa´stor and Veronesi, 2013). The fiscal uncertainty proxy proposed in this thesis
would be suitable for this type of analysis given its close link to theory and its high
comparability across countries.
This thesis focuses on the effects of fiscal uncertainty on sovereign credit ratings
and the attention given to rating announcements. A main methodological innovation
proposed in Chapter 3 is a new empirical framework for the estimation of sovereign
credit rating determinants. Credit ratings of advanced economies are characterised by
a high number of observations in investment grade categories. Hence the number of
time observations in some rating categories is small. Some authors deal with this data
characteristic using Bayesian methods (e.g. Bruha et al., 2017, Dimitrakopoulos and
Kolossiatis, 2016). Instead, I estimate a model of rating changes. While the level of
the credit rating depends on initial conditions, including slowly-changing institutional
factors, the weights assigned to which in the rating process are increasingly made trans-
parent by credit rating agencies, the interest often lies in the timing of rating changes.
However, given that ratings of advanced economies hardly change over time, estimating
the determinants of rating migration proves difficult. In fact, Monte Carlo simulations
show that Ordered Probit estimates of a model with three possible outcomes – rating
upgrade, no change, or downgrade – tend to be biased downward. This is confirmed in
an empirical application to ratings data from Fitch, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s.
I therefore propose the estimation of a model that explicitly allows for rating stabil-
ity. Harris and Zhao (2007) develop an adjustment to the Ordered Probit estimator to
account for inflation in survey data on consumer choice through an additional latent
process. I show that in the rating context, the additional process can be interpreted as
a technical process, which is part of the rating methodology and reduces the probability
of rating changes. Parameter estimates from the adjusted Ordered Probit estimation
of credit risk determinants are associated with smaller biases. In addition, a high
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number of cross-country, cross-time rating observations sit in the top rating category
(AAA). For these observations, it is known ex ante that further upgrades have a zero-
probability, which further contributes to rating stability; the same argument applies
vice versa to downgrades away from the bottom rating category. I develop the estima-
tion framework to also account for the boundedness of the rating scale and find that
this reduces estimate biases further. Limits on the set of feasible outcomes for some
observations, which are known ex ante, are not necessarily confined to the context of
rating changes. For instance, the number of options given to survey respondents may
be different for some respondents than others. The boundary-adjusted ordered outcome
estimator proposed in Chapter 3 may therefore find useful applications in fields other
than the rating context. The new empirical framework for the estimation of rating
migration could be extended and built upon along several lines. Improvements to the
maximum likelihood-based estimation approach could reduce relatively large standard
error estimates and enhance inference. The framework could be applied to rating data
for other countries, in particular in the developing world, as well as to ratings issued by
other than the three largest credit rating agencies. Hypotheses about rating determi-
nants in addition to those about fiscal uncertainty, that have been tested in a number
of empirical studies, could be cross-checked using the new framework. In general, the
framework could be used to inform policy-makers, financial regulators or credit rating
agencies about the quality of the rating process and its external replicability.
By introducing an attention measure based on online search volume, I also make
a contribution to work on the effects of policy announcements. In the context of
sovereign credit ratings, this literature has so far focussed on the effects on market
prices like bond yields and spreads, exchange rates or equity price indices (e.g. Cantor
and Packer, 1996, Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999, Gande and Parsley, 2005, Ismailescu
and Kazemi, 2010, Kiff et al., 2012). Online search volume can capture the attention
of stakeholders more directly if the efficient market hypothesis fails and prices do not
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immediately reflect new information. In addition, in applications to sovereign ratings
it is often difficult to identify whether observed price movements are truly driven by
rating announcements, or instead caused by other news. Using the search volume that
is specific to the rated issuer and rating agency helps to identify the effects more clearly.
It can therefore be worthwhile to make use of data on online search volume also within
other practically relevant event studies, for instance on the effectiveness of monetary
policy announcements.
Turning to a discussion of the empirical results, I find that the recent crisis marked
a striking rise of fiscal uncertainty. While the newly constructed index of uncertainty
in fiscal deficit forecasts is relatively subdued for the period prior to 2007, it spikes in
2009 as official forecasters fail to gauge the fiscal implications of the financial crisis. In
most advanced economies, fiscal policy soon becomes predictable again as the index re-
turns to pre-crisis levels. However, the cross-country heterogeneity in fiscal uncertainty
remains elevated as ambiguity rises about the fiscal position of a number of euro area
countries during the European government debt crisis of 2010-11. Trying to trace some
of the origins of fiscal uncertainty, I find that its rise is driven by the more active role
of fiscal policy. As with uncertainty measures in general, statements about causality
are difficult to make. I show that the economic downturn as well as financial sector
vulnerabilities, to which fiscal policy reacts with a lag, are significantly correlated with
fiscal uncertainty. Given that theory suggests that fiscal uncertainty may itself generate
a reduction in economic activity (e.g. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2015), future work
should lay a stronger focus on the direction of causality, for example by looking at
selected crisis episodes and the timing of events associated with uncertainty. I further
show that the election cycle plays an important role. If an election is scheduled in a
given year, the uncertainty about that year’s fiscal deficit increases ex ante. The more
heated political climate in the aftermath of the crisis and unanticipated election results
across advanced economies have certainly contributed to this. The result is not so much
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driven by political budget cycles in the original sense, according to which politicians
buy votes prior to elections (Nordhaus, 1975, Hallerberg and Strauch, 2002). Instead,
the link between elections and fiscal uncertainty is stronger, the smaller the projected
deficit, either because governments manipulate the data provided to official forecasters
(Bru¨ck and Stephan, 2006), or because a smaller deficit reflects more room for fiscal
manoeuvre. In fact, I find that a more pressing need to stabilise debt levels, as indi-
cated by high debt/GDP ratios, can decrease fiscal uncertainty. In addition, exogenous
constraints on fiscal policy, such as those imposed by international institutions on euro
area member states during the European government debt crisis, are also associated
with lower fiscal uncertainty.
Given that fiscal uncertainty is strongly linked to adverse fiscal effects from crises
and political disruptions, it is not surprising that credit rating agencies appear to
consider it a risk to sovereign creditworthiness. I find that elevated levels of uncertainty
about future fiscal deficits significantly increase the likelihood of a rating downgrade.
The result holds alongside the contribution of fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals,
which rating agencies report to take into account. It can explain why credit ratings
deviate from their objective fundamentals-based component during crises (D’Agostino
and Lennkh, 2016). If agencies consider fiscal uncertainty, explicitly or implicitly, when
they make a subjective judgement, this can provide an explanation for why ratings may
sometimes differ from from model-based credit risk measures (Polito and Wickens, 2014,
Polito and Wickens, 2015). In fact, as fiscal uncertainty increases at the height of crises,
incorporating it can render ratings pro-cyclical and lead to what may seem like excessive
downgrades (Ferri et al., 1999, Dimitrakopoulos and Kolossiatis, 2016).
I also find that fiscal uncertainty can affect the way economic agents acquire infor-
mation. I show that fiscal uncertainty increases the attention to rating announcements.
Risk premia priced on financial markets react more strongly to a rating change in an
environment of uncertainty. This can explain why rating responses are stronger for
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rating downgrades (Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999), when fiscal fundamentals are weak
(Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), or global market sentiment is high (Hill and Faff,
2010). Likewise, rating-related online search volume is shown to increase substantially
more in response to rating announcements if fiscal uncertainty is high, implying that
the wider public also gives ratings more attention. Consulting sovereign credit ratings
can provide a simple heuristic when the noise about publicly available data increases
the cost of information acquisition.
What are the lessons to be drawn for future research on fiscal uncertainty and
sovereign credit risk as well as for policy-makers and financial market stakeholders?
Given its substantial variation across countries and over time, uncertainty about fu-
ture fiscal outcomes should feature more prominently in theoretical work. Similarly,
future empirical work on the determinants of sovereign credit ratings, but also of other
market-based measures of credit risk premia, may want to control more explicitly for
market reactions to uncertainty about fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals. As the
index developed in this thesis reflects uncertainty about the fiscal deficit within the
horizon of one year, an extended analysis may also consider measures of uncertainty
about fiscal outcomes further into the future. Governments have an incentive to im-
prove their rating to reduce the cost of borrowing, which depends to a high degree
on sovereign credit ratings. The findings provided here imply that reducing ambiguity
about future fiscal deficits can make a substantial contribution. Communicating clearly
the fiscal strategy, in particular during downturns, appears to be important. Similarly,
constraints set by an economic adjustment programme can be a temporary means to
reduce fiscal uncertainty and thereby alleviate sovereign credit risk. At the same time,
unforeseen events, such as financial crises, will require unforeseen policy action, which
will ratchet up the level of fiscal uncertainty independent of what governments may do
to reduce ambiguity about fiscal policy. Similarly, the regular occurrence of elections
in a democratic system, that provides voters with clear alternatives, may always lead
151
to a certain degree of unpredictability. A reduction in the credit rating can, however,
serve as an incentive for governments to place more weight on a sustainable conduct of
fiscal policy. This can reduce fiscal uncertainty and eventually improve sovereign cred-
itworthiness. To this end, it may be beneficial for credit rating agencies to explicitly
state that uncertainty is taken into account when sovereign credit risk is assessed. This
would not only raise the awareness of fiscal policy-makers to the adverse effects of fiscal
uncertainty. It would also resolve some of the criticism faced by rating agencies as pro-
cyclical rating changes could be considered justified during periods of high uncertainty.
However, if rating agencies partly responded to fiscal uncertainty to raise the atten-
tion they receive during the crisis, which could explain why ratings are changed more
frequently during periods of uncertainty independent of movements in sovereign credit
risk, recent regulatory changes should facilitate higher rating quality in the future (see
e.g. European Union, 2013). A higher reliance on credit rating changes by financial
market participants and the general public, whether these changes are justified or not,
can trigger the self-fulfilling dynamics between sovereign risk and the state of economy
that are described in work by Corsetti et al. (2013) and others. More generally, the
relation between uncertainty and the role for expert analyses, as well as a discussion
of potential incentives faced by the providers of these analyses, is certainly a field that
deserves more research. The present application to sovereign credit ratings can be a
step in this direction. From the point of view of financial regulation, a lesson to be
drawn is that providers of an export opinion may need to be scrutinised more during
periods of higher uncertainty, which is when the reliance on these experts increases.
Ensuring that market stakeholders, policy-makers and the public are provided with in-
formation without bias from a large number of independent sources would help prevent
the escalation of periods of uncertainty into self-fulfilling crises.
In summary, the thesis as a whole therefore illustrates the pervasive nature of
uncertainty in the area of fiscal policy, in particular since the outbreak of the global
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financial crisis. An application to sovereign credit risk shows that understanding the
effects of fiscal uncertainty is indispensable from an academic point of view as well as
from a policy perspective.
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Appendix A
Technical Appendix
A1 Deriving the aggregate measure of uncertainty
To derive an aggregate measure of uncertainty from the variance decomposition V ar(eicth) =
β2ichV ar(ecth) +V ar(icth), Ozturk and Sheng (2018) follow Campbell et al. (2001) and
find an expression of individual forecast errors that does not require estimates of βich:
eicth = ecth + victh (A1)
where victh is the difference between individual and consensus forecast errors.
Plugging equation (A1) into the expression eicth = βichecth + icth + φich, setting
φich = 0 and re-arranging yields:
victh = (βich − 1)ecth + icth (A2)
The variance of eicth can then be written as:
V ar(eicth) = V ar(ecth) + V ar(victh) + 2Cov(ecth, victh)
= V ar(ecth) + V ar(victh) + 2(βich − 1)V ar(ecth)
(A3)
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The covariance term Cov(ecth, victh) in this expression does not drop out because ecth
and victh are not orthogonal, unlike ecth and icth. The second line follows from equation
(A2).
Aggregating across forecasters eliminates the covariance term however, as well as
individual βich’s:
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(eicth) = V ar(ecth) +
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(victh) (A4)
Ozturk and Sheng (2018) write the observed disagreement among forecasts, and hence
among forecast errors, as:
N∑
i=1
wicth(eicth − ecth)2 =
N∑
i=1
wicth[(βich − 1)ecth + icth]2
=
N∑
i=1
wicth[(βich − 1)2e2cth + 2icth + 2(βich − 1)ecthicth].
(A5)
The problem with expression (A5) is that it represents a random variable prior to
observing the forecast. To obtain a real-time expression, expectations are taken to yield
a measure of non-random disagreement dcth, given the assumptions E(ecthicth) = 0 and
E(ecth) = 0:
dcth ≡ E[
N∑
i=1
wicth(eicth − ecth)2]
=
N∑
i=1
wicth[(βich − 1)2E(e2cth) + E(2icth) + 2(βich − 1)E(ecthicth)]
=
N∑
i=1
wicth[(βich − 1)2V ar(ecth) + V ar(icth)].
(A6)
The variance of expression (A2) is V ar(victh) = (βich − 1)2V ar(ecth) + V ar(icth). It
can be used to replace the right hand side of equation (A6) to obtain the following
173
expression for dcth:
dcth =
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(victh) (A7)
Equation (A7) together with equation (A4) yields the final expression of forecast
uncertainty derived in Lahiri and Sheng (2010) and Ozturk and Sheng (2018):
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(eicth) = V ar(ecth) + dcth. (A8)
Ozturk and Sheng (2018) further note that the difference between the proxy of id-
iosyncratic uncertainty
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(victh) and its true expression
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(icth) is
determined by the variance of βich,
N∑
i=1
(βich− 1)2, and the common shock. This can be
shown by taking the weighted average of V ar(victh):
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(victh) =
N∑
i=1
wicth(βich − 1)2V ar(ecth) +
N∑
i=1
wicthV ar(eicth). (A9)
If the variance (βich − 1)2 is small across forecasters, the proxy coincides with the true
measure of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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A2 Derivation of the model proposition
(i) If x = 1 and a∗ = 1, the best response by the Agency is a pure strategy in which
a rating change {R = 1|x = 1, a∗ = 1} is issued with pi∗1 = 1 since
UA(R = 1|x = 1, a∗ = 1) = pi∗1(p+ r) > 0 = UA(R = 0|x = 1, a∗ = 1). (A10)
(ii) Given pi∗1 = 1, the belief of the Public that x = 1 if R = 1 is issued, becomes:
µ =
pixpi
∗
1
pixpi∗1 + (1− pix)pi∗0
=
pix
pix + (1− pix)pi∗0
. (A11)
Hence µ is greater than pix unless pi
∗
0 = 1 and the Agency always misinforms when
x = 0.
a∗ = 1 is the best response to {pi∗1 = 1|x = 1} and pi∗0 if and only if UP (a = 1) ≥
UP (a = 0). Plugging the Public’s pay-offs into UP , this condition becomes
[pix + (1− pix)pi∗0]µb+ (1− pix)(1− pi∗0)h ≥ pixb. (A12)
Replacing µ with expression A11 and simplifying yields that condition A12 holds
for all pi∗0 ≤ 1 as long as h > 0. In other words, the Public is strictly better off
playing a∗ = 1 if pi∗0 < 1 and there is a gain from getting to know x = 0. The
mechanism is not the information contained in R = 1 but rather the information
contained in R = 0. If the Public pays attention to R = 0, it knows for sure that
x = 0. .
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(iii) Given a∗ = 1, the Agency maximises its expected pay-off in response to x = 0:
max
pi∗0
pi∗0p+ (1− pi∗0)r (A13)
The first-order condition with respect to pi∗0 implies that the Agency’s equilibrium
strategy is mixing between {R = 1|x = 0} and {R = 0|x = 0}, i.e. 0 < pi∗0 < 1 if
and only if
p = r. (A14)
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Tables and Figures
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Table A1: The determinants of average deficit revisions
Revisions to nowcasts Revisions to year-ahead
forecasts
Lag 0.054 0.177***
[0.07] [0.04]
Lagged deficit/GDP forecast 0.062*** 0.051***
[0.01] [0.01]
Lagged debt/GDP forecast 0.001 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00]
Lagged GDP growth forecast 0.062** -0.019
[0.03] [0.01]
Lagged inflation forecast 0.073 0.015
[0.05] [0.02]
Lagged unemployment forecast -0.001 0.019
[0.01] [0.01]
Lagged current account forecast 0.035*** 0.039***
[0.01] [0.01]
Observations 791 728
R-squared 0.042 0.068
Notes: Pooled OLS regression, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Deficit
nowcasts and forecasts averaged across the OECD, IMF and European Commission.
Table A2: Cross-sectional dependence of fiscal uncertainty index
Uct0 Dct0 Uct1 Dct1
Overall 45.0*** 4.9*** 46.5*** 8.4***
Before spring 2009 45.3*** 6.1*** 48.9*** 9.4***
After spring 2009 24.1*** 3.2*** 9.0*** 3.2***
Notes: Pesaran (2015) test of weak cross-sectional dependence, CD test statistic, significance level
given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
178
T
ab
le
A
3:
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
of
fi
sc
al
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
in
d
ex
ve
rs
io
n
s
I
II
II
I
IV
V
V
I
V
II
V
II
I
IX
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
e:
D
c
t1
D
c
t1
D
c
t1
U
c
t0
U
c
t0
U
c
t0
D
c
t0
D
c
t0
D
c
t0
D
efi
ci
t/
G
D
P
sq
u
a
re
d
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
8
*
*
*
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
D
eb
t/
G
D
P
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
4
*
*
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
2
3
*
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
2
4
*
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
3
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
2
]
[0
.0
1
]
B
a
n
k
C
D
S
sp
re
a
d
0
.1
2
6
-0
.0
7
4
0
.0
1
1
[0
.1
4
]
[0
.0
8
]
[0
.0
9
]
L
a
g
1
0
.1
8
6
-0
.0
6
9
-0
.0
8
7
[0
.1
4
]
[0
.0
8
]
[0
.0
9
]
L
a
g
2
0
.4
3
8
*
*
*
0
.1
5
0
*
-0
.0
8
7
[0
.1
4
]
[0
.0
8
]
[0
.0
9
]
E
le
ct
io
n
0
.1
1
6
*
*
-0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
2
3
[0
.0
5
]
[0
.0
4
]
[0
.0
5
]
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
7
7
7
3
5
7
7
7
7
7
5
6
3
5
5
7
5
6
8
3
7
3
5
7
8
3
7
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
3
1
2
0
3
1
3
1
2
0
3
1
3
1
2
0
3
1
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.5
7
5
0
.3
8
3
0
.6
1
4
0
.8
1
2
0
.9
1
6
0
.8
1
2
0
.7
0
0
0
.9
0
5
0
.7
0
0
p
-v
a
lu
e
C
D
st
a
ti
st
ic
0
.6
7
5
0
.2
4
3
0
.9
1
6
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
7
5
0
.8
2
5
0
.4
4
2
0
.8
7
8
N
o
te
s:
C
o
m
m
o
n
C
o
rr
el
a
te
d
E
ff
ec
ts
es
ti
m
a
te
s,
cr
o
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
a
l
av
er
a
g
es
o
f
fi
sc
a
l
p
o
li
cy
u
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
,
d
efi
ci
t/
G
D
P
a
n
d
G
D
P
g
ro
w
th
in
cl
u
d
ed
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
th
e
cr
is
is
d
u
m
m
y.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s,
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
g
iv
en
b
y
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
179
T
ab
le
A
4:
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
of
al
te
rn
at
iv
e
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
m
ea
su
re
s
I
II
II
I
IV
V
V
I
V
II
V
II
I
IX
X
X
I
X
II
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
-
a
bl
e:
E
P
U
E
P
U
E
P
U
B
o
n
d
v
o
l
B
o
n
d
v
o
l
B
o
n
d
v
o
l
|e c
t1
|
|e c
t1
|
|e c
t1
|
|e c
t0
|
|e c
t0
|
|e c
t0
|
D
efi
ci
t
sq
u
a
re
d
.0
0
5
*
*
*
.0
0
4
*
*
*
.0
0
3
*
*
*
.0
0
4
*
*
*
.0
0
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
-.
0
2
*
*
*
.0
0
3
-.
0
2
*
*
*
-.
0
1
*
*
*
-.
0
0
2
-.
0
1
*
*
*
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
D
eb
t/
G
D
P
.0
0
6
*
*
*
.0
0
6
*
*
.0
0
6
*
*
*
-.
0
1
*
*
*
-.
0
0
1
-.
0
1
*
*
*
-.
0
2
*
*
*
.0
0
5
-.
0
2
*
*
*
-.
0
2
*
*
*
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-.
0
2
*
*
*
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
[0
.0
0
]
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
-.
0
2
*
*
-.
0
2
3
-.
0
2
*
.0
8
5
*
*
*
.0
3
3
*
.1
0
8
*
*
*
.0
6
0
*
.0
4
1
.0
6
0
*
.1
0
0
*
*
*
.0
4
6
*
.1
0
2
*
*
*
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
2
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
2
]
[0
.0
1
]
[0
.0
3
]
[0
.0
5
]
[0
.0
3
]
[0
.0
3
]
[0
.0
3
]
[0
.0
3
]
B
a
n
k
C
D
S
sp
re
a
d
-.
0
1
4
.1
0
8
.4
2
5
*
*
.0
9
3
[0
.0
8
]
[0
.0
7
]
[0
.1
8
]
[0
.1
1
]
L
a
g
1
.0
9
2
.0
8
1
1
.1
6
2
*
*
*
.0
7
4
[0
.0
8
]
[0
.0
7
]
[0
.2
1
]
[0
.1
1
]
L
a
g
2
.1
0
4
.2
1
0
*
*
*
.7
3
5
*
*
*
.0
7
9
[0
.0
8
]
[0
.0
7
]
[0
.1
9
]
[0
.1
1
]
E
le
ct
io
n
.0
1
7
.0
8
9
-.
1
3
7
-.
2
0
*
*
[0
.0
4
]
[0
.0
6
]
[0
.1
1
]
[0
.1
0
]
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
7
6
2
3
2
6
7
6
2
8
4
3
3
5
9
8
4
3
7
8
5
3
5
9
7
8
5
8
4
5
3
5
9
8
4
5
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
2
7
1
8
2
7
3
0
2
0
3
0
3
1
2
0
3
1
3
1
2
0
3
1
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0
.8
1
5
0
.6
3
1
0
.8
1
6
0
.5
8
4
0
.8
4
1
0
.5
7
7
0
.6
7
3
0
.5
6
8
0
.5
8
7
0
.4
8
3
0
.6
8
0
0
.4
8
6
p
-v
a
lu
e
C
D
st
a
t
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.8
5
8
0
.0
0
2
0
.8
8
9
N
o
te
s:
C
o
m
m
o
n
C
o
rr
el
a
te
d
E
ff
ec
ts
es
ti
m
a
te
s,
cr
o
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
a
l
av
er
a
g
es
o
f
fi
sc
a
l
p
o
li
cy
u
n
ce
rt
a
in
ty
,
d
efi
ci
t/
G
D
P
a
n
d
G
D
P
g
ro
w
th
in
cl
u
d
ed
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
th
e
cr
is
is
d
u
m
m
y.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
b
ra
ck
et
s,
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
g
iv
en
b
y
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
.
180
Table A5: Transition matrix Fitch
Rating (t)
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+ BB- B+ B B- CCC
R
a
ti
n
g
(t
-1
)
AAA 99.52 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA+ 2.53 93.67 2.53 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.00 2.88 95.19 1.44 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA- 0.00 0.00 2.97 91.09 2.97 1.98 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.89 94.34 0.94 2.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.97 92.86 2.38 0.00 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.55 90.15 3.79 0.00 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 5.15 92.65 0.74 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.79 81.58 2.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.34 75.86 13.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.08 93.22 0.00 1.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.35 91.30 4.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
B+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 66.67 8.33 0.00 8.33
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.11 77.78 11.11 0.00
B- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 62.50 12.50
CCC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 60.00
Note: Fitch sovereign credit ratings, quarterly transitions, percentages.
Data source: Bloomberg.
Table A6: Transition matrix S&P
Rating (t)
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+BBB BBB- BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC CC SD/D
R
a
ti
n
g
(t
-1
)
AAA 99.03 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA+ 2.80 94.80 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.00 1.55 93.02 5.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA- 0.00 0.00 1.92 92.31 3.85 1.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.96 92.16 4.90 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.31 3.27 90.85 3.27 1.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.55 92.61 1.70 0.00 1.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB+0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.59 87.34 2.53 1.27 1.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 12.50 78.13 6.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BBB- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.16 87.76 2.04 2.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 88.00 4.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.23 96.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BB- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.35 91.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.35 0.00 0.00
B+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 66.67 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 62.50 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
B- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 87.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
CCC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00
CC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00
SD/D 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.000.00 0.00
Note: S&P sovereign credit ratings, quarterly transitions, percentages.
Data source: Bloomberg.
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Table A7: Transition matrix Moody’s
Rating (t)
Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3 Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B3 Caa1 Caa3 Ca C
R
a
ti
n
g
(t
-1
)
Aaa 99.41 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aa1 3.13 92.71 2.08 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aa2 1.97 1.32 93.42 0.66 1.32 0.66 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aa3 1.54 0.00 3.08 93.85 1.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 95.88 2.35 1.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 2.74 93.84 1.37 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
A3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.75 7.02 84.21 3.51 1.75 1.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baa1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70 3.70 1.85 83.33 0.00 5.56 0.00 1.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baa2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 88.00 0.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baa3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.27 4.55 4.55 84.09 4.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ba1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.38 91.49 0.00 0.00 2.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ba2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 75.00 8.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ba3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.69 92.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.57 92.86 3.57 0.00 0.00 0.00
Caa1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
Caa3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00
Ca 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00
C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 0.00 85.71
Note: Moody’s sovereign credit ratings, quarterly transitions, percentages.
Data source: Bloomberg.
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Table A8: Rating determinants and uncertainty index versions
I II III IV
Uncertainty mea-
sure:
Dct1 Dct1 Uct0 Uct0
Stability:
Fiscal uncertainty 0.39 -1.92 10.6** 14.1
[1.71] [2.60] [5.28] [9.75]
Rating level -0.28** -0.24*** -0.13** -0.23***
[0.13] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
Momentum -9.07 219*** 0.41 224***
[8.07] [5.94] [7.96] [9.05]
Credit risk:
Fiscal uncertainty 0.63 1.79*** 0.27 0.48***
[0.56] [0.68] [0.27] [0.12]
Deficit/GDP 0.19 0.13 0.13 -0.12
[0.15] [0.29] [0.39] [0.38]
Debt/GDP 0.31** 0.46 0.87 0.34
[0.15] [0.29] [1.09] [0.24]
GDP growth -1.41*** -3.72*** -3.45** -3.70***
[0.52] [1.01] [1.20] [0.82]
Unemployment 3.70*** 5.01*** 7.33* 5.02***
[1.06] [1.79] [3.74] [1.50]
Observations 4,635 4,635 4,122 4,122
Sensitivity ↓ 81.6% 74.6% 75.8% 73.3%
Specificity ↓ 71.3% 80.0% 82.6% 81.4%
Sensitivity = 53.7% 70.7% 71.1% 71.8%
Specificity = 92.0% 74.0% 74.4% 73.6%
Sensitivity ↑ 91.7% 76.1% 84.5% 76.9%
Specificity ↑ 64.2% 73.0% 72.3% 73.5%
Notes: BAM estimation: marginal effects on the probability of ‘change’ (stability process) and ‘down-
grade’ (credit risk process) are computed at the sample average of all variables. Standard errors (in
brackets) are computed using the delta method, significance level given by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. ↓: downgrade, ↑: upgrade, =: no change. Watch observations considered as rating changes in
columns II, IV.
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Table A10: Google Trends results (relative search volume)
I II III IV V
Uncertainty measure: Uct1 Uct1 Uct1 Dct1 Uct0
Fiscal uncertainty 0.002 0.019*** 0.036** 0.105** 0.015***
[0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.04] [0.00]
Positive announcement -0.489 -0.504 -0.482
[0.30] [0.30] [0.31]
Rating level -0.037** -0.037** -0.031**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constant 1.087*** -0.448*** 0.326 0.343 0.174
[0.13] [0.00] [0.31] [0.30] [0.26]
Agency-Country FE no yes yes yes yes
Observations 145 145 145 145 145
R-squared 0.000 0.326 0.351 0.355 0.351
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A11: Other uncertainty measures (CDS spreads)
I II III IV
Uncertainty measure: EPU Bond vol |ect0| |ect1|
Fiscal uncertainty -0.238 -0.239 0.466 0.229**
[0.51] [0.25] [0.32] [0.09]
Positive announcement -1.578 -1.824 -1.168 -1.361
[1.56] [1.45] [1.44] [1.39]
Rating level -0.206 -0.243 -0.132 -0.222
[0.15] [0.15] [0.14] [0.16]
Constant 7.169*** 7.946*** 4.925** 6.689***
[2.01] [2.32] [2.27] [2.04]
Agency FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 201 202 203 203
R-squared 0.048 0.043 0.057 0.054
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A12: Other uncertainty measures (Google Trends)
I II III IV
Uncertainty measure: EPU Bond vol |ect0| |ect1|
Fiscal uncertainty 0.002 0.017 0.002 0.000
[0.13] [0.04] [0.06] [0.02]
Positive announcement -0.536* -0.527* -0.536* -0.536*
[0.28] [0.30] [0.29] [0.30]
Rating level -0.036* -0.030 -0.037* -0.037*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Constant 3.375*** 3.264*** 3.389*** 3.390***
[0.58] [0.40] [0.36] [0.41]
Agency-Country FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 144 145 145 145
R-squared 0.326 0.327 0.326 0.326
Note: OLS, standard errors clustered at country level (in brackets), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure A1: Fiscal uncertainty across countries (standard deviations, current-year index
version)
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Figure A2: Fiscal uncertainty across additional countries (standard deviations, current-
year index version)
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Figure A3: Fiscal uncertainty across countries (standard deviations, year-ahead index
version)
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Figure A4: Fiscal uncertainty across additional countries (standard deviations, year-
ahead index version)
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Figure A5: Comparison to other uncertainty measures by country (standard deviations,
year-ahead index version)
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